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Abstract 
There are enormous risks associated with complex construction projects, 
maintenance of assets in the oil and gas infrastructure environment, and in their 
operations. These infrastructure projects are complex and capital intensive. 
Corporations rely on engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) contractors 
to build, maintain and operate these infrastructures.   
 
The existing processes and methods used in establishing contracts are frequently very 
prescriptive, and not always appropriate or optimal for a given situation. There is 
little research on contracting effectiveness or optimal contracting in the oil and gas 
industry. To contribute to gaps in the literature, this research focuses on how the 
current prescriptive framework used in the oil and gas industry to form contracts can 
be improved in order to allow greater flexibility and thus add greater value, while 
remaining compliant. The four research issues developed from the theoretical 
framework for this study are as follows: 
1. What are the methods used by corporations to arrive at the formation of 
contracting strategy? 
2. How are the major drivers for contract strategy formation identified, evaluated 
and ranked in importance and impact?  
3. What is the impact of identifying each risk element in the respective contract 
types (lump sum and reimbursable) and properly allocating the risks consistent 
with the contract type selected?  
4. What are the characteristics of persons, their positions, their assumed experience 
and general background that are involved in the contract strategy formation 
process? 
 
This research gathered data using qualitative methods. A mixed methodology of 
interviews and questionnaires was used to gather the data, with purposive and 
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snowballing sampling techniques. Seventy (70) participants were interviewed and 
completed questionnaires. Each respondent represents a case. 
 
Findings highlighted that the existing methods of contract strategy formation are 
lengthy and prescriptive, often resulting in delays and additional unnecessary 
expense to projects. Next, it established that national oil company directives and 
corporate policy, including the non-alignment of the drivers, may lead to the 
selection of suboptimal contracts. Furthermore, it established that the basic principles 
of risk allocation are not used in contract formation. Risk management strategy in the 
procurement process is seen by many to be deficient. Other findings are that the use 
of value-for-money contractors reduces overall project cost; that reimbursable 
contracts produce better quality work at lower cost; that Project Managers require 
expert guidance to form and select contracts that are sufficiently flexible to cater to 
the demands of specific situations of the contract.  
 
The final theoretical framework of this research established a ‘descriptive theory’ of 
contracting in the oil and gas industry that reflects the operating environment in 
which the project manager operates. By establishing a ‘theory’ of contract 
formulation in the oil and gas industry, this research has made a useful and 
potentially significant contribution to the gap in knowledge of contract formulation 
in the oil and gas industry, an industry which anecdotally suffers from delays, cost 
overruns, and poor quality work (Williams, 1999, p. 273).  
  
<Structured Contract Strategies for Capital and Operations Expenditure Projects in the Oil and Gas 
industry iv 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. ii 
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................................iv 
Keywords ............................................................................................................................................. vii 
Definition of Terms ............................................................................................................................. viii 
List of Figures ...................................................................................................................................... xii 
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................................... xiii 
List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................ xiv 
Statement of Original Authorship ........................................................................................................ xvi 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................ xvii 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background to the Thesis ............................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 Justification for the Research ....................................................................................................... 6 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis .................................................................................................................. 14 
1.4 Chapter Summary ...................................................................................................................... 17 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ......................................................................................... 19 
2.1 Contract Strategy Formation METHODS .................................................................................. 20 
2.2 Selection of Contract Strategy Drivers ...................................................................................... 30 
2.3 Risk Identification and Allocation ............................................................................................. 37 
2.4 Characteristics of persons making contract strategy decisions .................................................. 43 
2.5 Theoretical Framework and gaps in literature ............................................................................ 47 
2.6 Research Issues .......................................................................................................................... 50 
2.7 Chapter Summary ...................................................................................................................... 53 
2.8 Chapter Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 53 
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................... 55 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 55 
3.2 Research Outline ........................................................................................................................ 56 
3.3 Research Design and Framework............................................................................................... 57 
3.3.1 Critical Realism Paradigm .............................................................................................. 58 
3.3.2 Justification for a Case Study Approach ......................................................................... 61 
3.3.3 Justification for Qualitative Methodology ...................................................................... 63 
3.3.4 Strategies for Inquiry ...................................................................................................... 66 
3.3.5 Data Collection ............................................................................................................... 70 
3.3.6 Criteria for Selection of Participants............................................................................... 73 
3.3.7 The Case Study protocol ................................................................................................. 74 
3.3.8 The Interview Questions ................................................................................................. 78 
3.3.9 Data Analysis .................................................................................................................. 84 
3.3.10 Validity and Reliability ................................................................................................... 87 
3.3.11 Credibility of the Researcher .......................................................................................... 89 
<Structured Contract Strategies for Capital and Operations Expenditure Projects in the Oil and Gas 
industry v 
 
 
3.4 Ethical Issues ............................................................................................................................. 91 
3.5 Limitations and Key Assumptions ............................................................................................. 92 
3.6 Chapter Summary ...................................................................................................................... 93 
CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................... 95 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 95 
4.2 Data Coding ............................................................................................................................... 96 
4.3 Analysis of the Research Issues ................................................................................................. 97 
4.4 Summary of Findings ............................................................................................................... 140 
4.5 Revised Theoretical Framework .............................................................................................. 142 
4.6 Chapter Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 144 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 147 
5.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 147 
5.2 Conclusion about the Research Issues ..................................................................................... 148 
5.3 Conclusion about the Research Question ................................................................................. 163 
5.4 Implications ............................................................................................................................. 166 
5.4.1 Implications for Theory ................................................................................................ 166 
5.4.2 Implications for policy and practice ............................................................................. 167 
5.4.3 Implications for methodology ....................................................................................... 170 
5.5 Limitations of this Research .................................................................................................... 172 
5.6 Applicability of this research to AN INDUSTRY other THAN oil and gas ............................ 172 
5.7 Directions for Further Research ............................................................................................... 174 
5.8 Chapter Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 175 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................. 177 
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................................... 187 
Appendix A: Hot-Button Risks ................................................................................................ 187 
Appendix B: Consent to provide Data for Research ................................................................ 189 
Appendix C: Questionnaire ...................................................................................................... 192 
Appendix D: Illustrative Quotes/Extract - The Contract Strategy Formation Process ............. 200 
Appendix E: Illustrative Quotes/Extract - The Contract Selection Criteria ............................. 203 
Appendix F: Illustrative Quotes/Extract - Project Objective – Alignment of project goals ..... 206 
Appendix G: Illustrative Quotes/Extract - Project Objective – Alignment of project 
goals ………………………………………………………………………… .............. 208 
Appendix H: Illustrative Quotes/Extract - Corporate policy prescribe drivers for 
formation of contracts ................................................................................................... 210 
Appendix I: Illustrative Quotes/Extract - Reimbursable Contracts vs Lump Sum 
contracts ........................................................................................................................ 213 
Appendix J: Illustrative Quotes/Extract - Non Compliance with principles of Risks 
allocation ...................................................................................................................... 215 
Appendix K: Illustrative Quotes/Extract - Local Knowledge and Contract Formulation; 
and Incomplete team capabilities .................................................................................. 218 
  
 
 
<Structured Contract Strategies for Capital and Operations Expenditure Projects in the Oil and Gas 
industry vi 
 
 
  
<Structured Contract Strategies for Capital and Operations Expenditure Projects in the Oil and Gas 
industry vii 
 
 
Keywords 
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX), Capital Project, Contract, Contracting Strategy, 
Construction, Cost overrun, Drivers, Downstream, Final Investment Decision (FID), 
Hydrocarbons, Midstream, Operating Expenditure (OPEX), Planning and Design, 
Optimal Contract, Procurement, Project Life-Cycle, Quality, Schedule overrun, 
Structured Contract, Total Cost of Ownership, Upstream, Variables 
 
 
  
<Structured Contract Strategies for Capital and Operations Expenditure Projects in the Oil and Gas 
industry viii 
 
 
Definition of Terms 
CONTRACTS 
(Definitions developed from this research study) 
 
Contracting Strategy 
Contracting Strategy refers to decisions about if and how to complete the work, how 
to develop the project scope, pricing agreement decisions, selection of 
contractor/vendor, financing arrangements, and how to allocate the risks and rewards 
of performance (Ernst & Young, 2012). 
 
Contract quilt 
Company X contract quilt prescribes the type of contract to be used by each business 
unit for various types of project. Example; upstream business use reimbursable, LNG 
use Lump Sum, etc. 
 
Structured Contracts 
Structured Contracts are methodically generated standardized agreements which 
consider relevant variables in addressing all salient deliverables, issues, and risks. 
 
Variables 
Variables are terms in contracts/agreements that are of a changing nature pertinent to 
the realisation of the deliverables. 
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Drivers 
Drivers are the main forces behind the materialisation of the deliverables specified in 
a contract. They are also referred to as the main objectives/reasons for the contract 
agreement. 
 
Optimal Contract 
An optimal Contract is one which is structured and cost effective, and which takes 
into account issues such as world markets, current company strategy, skill 
availability, supplier and contractor availability and integrity, environmental and 
local issues to deliver cost reduction in capital projects through proper allocation of 
risks.  
 
PROJECTS 
(Definitions developed from this research study) 
 
Capital Projects  
Capital Projects are large infrastructure projects defined in the order of hundreds of 
millions of dollars. They provide a huge impact to the business, a major asset. These 
projects has ‘beginning and an end, conducted by people to meet established goals 
with parameters of cost, schedule, and quality’ (Buchanan & Boddy, 1992, p. 8) 
 
Project Managers 
Projects Managers (PMs) are defined as men and women who have the judgment and 
experience to manage projects throughout its lifecycle - engineering, 
fabrication/procurement/construction and commissioning. The project manager is 
also responsible to manage ‘conflicting stakeholders’ aims and objectives and act 
effectively in the face of a constant stream of unpredictable problems. PMs are not 
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necessarily people who understand and apply the latest sophisticated planning tools’ 
(Brady et al, 2012, p. 730).  
 
Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) 
The total cost of ownership (TCO) for a capital project includes the total of all costs 
to design, purchase, construct and operate. Most of the costs for these elements can 
be internal or indirect costs paid to external parties. 
 
OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY SECTOR 
(Definition is extracted from encyclopedia) 
 
Upstream  
The upstream segment of the oil and gas industry is often called exploration and 
production. Companies search for prospective areas for potential reserves of oil and 
gas and perform geological tests called seismic tests to determine the size and 
composition of the resource, drill wells to ‘explore’ the basin, and if satisfied with 
results, in the production phase to extract the hydrocarbons. 
 
Midstream  
The midstream sector of the oil and gas industry involves the transportation, storage 
and marketing of various oil and gas products. Depending on the commodity and 
distance covered, transportation options can vary from small connector pipelines to 
massive cargo ships making trans-ocean crossings. While most oil can be transported 
in its natural liquid state, natural gas must be either compressed or liquefied for 
transport. The midstream sector also includes the storage of oil and natural gas, 
which balances the fluctuations between supply and demand and helps ensure a 
secure supply of energy products. 
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Downstream  
The downstream sector involves the refining and processing of hydrocarbons into 
usable products such as gasoline, jet fuel and diesel. Refining is required since ‘raw’ 
hydrocarbons extracted from the ground are rarely useful in their natural form. The 
refining process is a complex chemical process that helps separate the hundreds of 
types of hydrocarbon molecules into useful forms. Petrochemical plants also break 
down hydrocarbons into chemical compounds that are used to create a myriad of 
products ranging from plastics to pharmaceuticals. 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to report the research investigating contracting 
practices in the oil and gas industry, and to recommend a framework for 
general application in arriving at more efficient and cost-effective decision 
making in contract formation. Accordingly, this introductory chapter 
introduces the research undertaken, and the relevant published literature. 
The research explored the (general) literature and theory of contracts in 
order to develop structured contracts which are widely thought to be 
optimal for project managers in the oil and gas industry. This approach is 
based on a detailed review of the current corporate methods used in 
contract strategy formation in the oil and gas industry.  
 
There are two central innovative components to this research: Firstly, 
emphasis is placed on studying the processes leading to the formation of 
contracting strategy, and not only on the selected contract strategy. The 
processes are analysed from a real world as well as a theoretical 
perspective. The second component is the development of a structured 
framework to be used in characterising different contract types and 
analysis of the process in the selection of different contract strategies. The 
conclusion is a ‘descriptive theory’ of optimal contracts that reflect the 
operating environment in which the project manager operates in any given 
scenario.  
 
This chapter outlines the background (section 1.1) of the research, and its 
justification (section 1.2). Section 1.3 includes an outline of the remaining 
chapters of the thesis. Finally, section 1.4 contains the chapter summary. 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE THESIS 
This research was undertaken in the context of the oil and gas industry in 
which there has been little research on contracting effectiveness or 
 2 Chapter 1: Introduction 
optimal contracting in project management. The existing processes and 
methods used by Project Managers are very prescriptive, which may not 
always be appropriate or optimal for a given situation. Not infrequently in 
the oil and gas industry, project managers lack guidance in the formation 
and selection of Contracts that are evidence-based in general, yet are 
sufficiently flexible to cater to the demands of specific situations.    
 
As increasingly multi-billion dollar revenue-generating infrastructure is 
constructed, commissioned and operated around the world, the tasks of 
asset maintenance, logistics, environmental issues, personnel skills, 
supporting services, supplier and contractor integrity are of the outmost 
importance in making a project a success. Most of these services and 
products are outsourced to contractors, mainly from Engineering, 
Procurement and Construction (EPC) companies. Different locations 
around the world offer widely different challenges that the company must 
manage successfully. There are enormous risks associated with complex 
construction projects, often referred to as ‘Corporate Mega Projects’ 
(Brady et al., 2007, p2), and in the maintenance and operation of assets in 
the oil and gas infrastructure environment. The risk events are most likely 
to occur when the project is in a challenging location and there is a 
mandated need to meet local content and employment requirements and 
objectives.  
 
The time frame for the development and execution of large projects is 
usually in the average range of 4-5 years. Sometimes, the lifecycle of a 
mega project can take longer than 6-8 years, raising particular challenges 
in technology, and in human resource management (for example in 
succession planning and career development). Most oil and gas Projects 
are capital intensive large scale projects that rely heavily on engineering, 
construction and procurement. The typical work breakdown in Oil, Gas, 
and Petrochemical industry is as follows: project management and 
engineering 20%, procurement 40%, and construction 40% (Berends, 
2007). These projects are increasingly very complex. There are numerous 
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standards and regulations which are very prescriptive and rigid in nature. 
The need to comply with these standards is paramount and cannot be 
compromised.  
  
Further, the capital costs of oil and gas projects may run into billions of 
dollars (Berends, 2000). Raising funds to finance projects is a major 
challenge in itself. Depending on the size of the projects, bank loans 
(debt) and/or equity are used by contractors/owners to finance projects. 
Because of the risks involved, loans usually are at relatively high interest 
rates, which add to the overall cost of the projects. Closely related to the 
issues of project financing is the need to ensure continued cash inflow and 
outflow for the owner and contractors during the work. These demands 
can be met only with an efficient payment system that does not starve the 
contractor of operational funds, ensuring that the cost of raising 
investment capital for project is kept low, yet also is fair to the contractor 
who is motivated to achieve quality project deliverables on time.  
 
The lengthy duration and capital intensive nature of oil and gas projects 
put additional pressure on project managers to achieve project deliverables 
of schedule, cost and quality. Despite these taxing parameters, less and 
less time and cost is being allocated to designing, bidding, planning, and 
construction (Ng & Skitmore, 2002). According to Berends, the project 
completion clock starts once the project final investment decision (FID) is 
taken. Therefore, the pressure on the project can be intense, to achieve 
first gas or oil production schedule date due to feedstock and/or product 
supply commitment (Berends & Dhillon, 2004). In finance, the project’s 
estimated completion date drives the date of the loan and conditions of 
repayment. 
 
In addition to the above issues, the oil and gas industry is currently 
suffering from the ageing demographic of its workforce (Berends, 2000). 
The existing experienced workforce is rapidly retiring. As a result, 
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corporations are experiencing a major scarcity of staff with the equivalent 
experience and skill to replace their retiring experts. This adverse situation 
is one of the main reasons why most of these skills, services and materials 
need to be outsourced and managed effectively.  
 
Despite these pressures, today’s contracting environment is increasingly 
becoming a contractor’s market. Contractors face a large demand that they 
cannot fully cover. The high demand for EPCM contractors to offer 
design, construction and management services for the different projects is 
constrained by the shortage in the supply of experienced contractors. The 
situation is further compounded by the shortage of qualified engineers 
within the owner organisations (Berends, 2000). Scarcity of qualified 
human resources is also affecting the capacity of contractors to handle 
multiple projects, and since contractors are in the business to make profits 
for their shareholders, they are forced into accepting jobs for which they 
have limited capacity to handle. More often than not, their existing 
workforce is thinly stretched to cover multiple projects. These actions 
have resulting consequences on quality, timelines and costs of projects. 
 
Surprisingly, given the scale of oil and gas projects, and the inherent 
financial and other risks, there is little research on contracting 
effectiveness/optimal contract in the oil and gas industry projects. 
Therefore, project managers in the oil and gas industry typically receive 
little guidance in the research literature and theory about their contracting 
and procurement strategy. The current processes used for the selection of 
the contracting strategy are very prescriptive, complex, time consuming, 
and very much depends on the experience of the personnel involved, on a 
case-by-case basis. The complex and prescriptive nature of the current 
contract process removes the flexibility for project managers to respond to 
problems through appropriate change management, inspection and 
maintenance programmes. Hence, intuitive rather than evidence-based 
approaches underlie their decisions in formulating contracts.  
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The lack of guidance and the prescriptive nature of the current contract 
process has resulted in the selection of incompetent and inexperienced 
contractors, inappropriate contracting strategies, delays, and cost overruns 
in projects  (Camps, 1996; Griffin, 1993). In addition, there is also an 
increasing frequency of deficiencies in risk estimation, uncertainty and 
complexity avoidance (Camps, 1996; Institute, 2006; Ernst & Young, 
2012). In most cases, the owners’ policies simply dictate the approach and 
the drivers used to select a particular form of contract. There is also lack 
of knowledge and process on how to identify, classify, rank and prioritise 
the drivers. This situation is further impacted by the shortage of quality 
and experienced decision makers with a consequent reduction in 
awareness of alternatives from which to choose.  
 
Therefore, there is increasing need to generate contracting strategies with 
real options (flexibility). The generation of contracting strategies will 
provide contract and project managers with options to handle the changing 
risks. These options could be activated at appropriately selected intervals 
throughout the life of the project.  
 
As a result of the continual changes in the contracting world, it is a 
significant challenge for the owners to design a contracting strategy that 
meets project objectives and is most cost effective over the lifecycle of the 
project. Successful contracting strategies used in the past have been 
challenged by these continuous changes, and often they cannot be judged 
to be applicable in certain locations and projects. Increasingly there is the 
need to generate contract strategies which take into consideration all the 
elements of a contract including location specific factors, market factors, 
risks, and corporation’s policy (Camps, 1996) including the potential 
turning points in the given scenarios.  
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These continual changes in the modern day projects and project 
environments leads to ‘uncertainties’, an overriding characteristics of 
projects (Winch, cited in Winter et al, 2006, p. 640) and further 
contributes to the increasing ‘complexity’ which traditional project 
management methods are inadequate to deal with (Williams, 1999). The 
complexities referred to throughout this research study are in terms of 
organisational and technological practices (Williams, 1999). The term, 
‘differentiation complexities’ in organisational practices refers to the 
number of hierarchical levels, number of formal organisational units, 
division of tasks, number of specialisations, etc.; while 
‘interdependencies’ means the degree of operational dependencies 
between organisation elements. On the other hand, differentiation 
complexity in technological practices refers to the number and diversity of 
inputs, output, tasks or specialities; and interdependencies means the 
interdependency between tasks, teams, technology or input (Williams, 
1999, p. 269). A third aspect of these definitions, according to Jones 
(1995) is the ‘instability of the assumptions upon which the tasks are 
based’ (cited by Williams, 1999, p. 270). Hence, complex projects do not 
‘behave the way we expect, often time-delayed and take time to emerge’ 
(Williams et al, 2012).  
 
1.2 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
Organisations have contract formulation processes which they consider as 
optimal but are very prescriptive, designed to guide/govern the project 
manager’s behaviour. However, little is known generally about how 
project managers implement these prescriptive frameworks (Tirole, 1999, 
p. 773. There is a need for theory of contract formulation in the oil and gas 
industry that better reflects the operating environment in which the project 
manager operates. This research is a first step in the development of such 
a descriptive theory of contract strategy formation   
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Gaps in Literature 
The Construction Industry Institute (CII) commissioned a study of the 
main drivers to be considered for the selection of contracting strategies. 
The CII research study identifies the main drivers or factors for selecting 
project delivery and contracting strategy (PDCS) (Oyetunji & Anderson, 
2006). In the CII study, twelve (12) main drivers were identified. Each of 
the drivers has a predefined project delivery and contracting strategy. 
However, the process requires key decisions such as ranking and setting 
priorities for the drivers. This action in order to be successful relies on the 
experience of the project managers and his team. This approach to ranking 
can be very subjective and relies on the quality and experience of those 
selecting the PDCS, and as such, it is possible that important or critical 
factors may be overlooked, creating problems during implementation.  
 
The main issue with the CII Research Study is that while the alternatives 
are quite rigid, the ranking of the different drivers is left to the discretion 
and experience of the user. Areas of effective contracting may be omitted, 
such as risk management selection of a value for money contractor rather 
than the cheapest one, the role of trust between client and contractor in 
saving money, the drivers for commodities, products and service 
contracts, and the payment structure to fit the particular contractor, sub-
contractors and the project. There is little published research that 
examines the theory of contract formulation in the oil and gas industry 
that better reflects the operating environment in which the project 
managers operate (Tirole, 1999, p. 773). Furthermore, little is known 
about how project managers utilise this prescriptive framework or the 
operating contingencies that influence how project managers interpret it, 
which is surprising given the value of contracts in the oil and gas industry 
and the potential for large savings in time and money. 
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This research purports to make a useful contribution to the gap in 
knowledge of contract formulation in the oil and gas industry, an industry 
which anecdotally suffers from cost and schedule overruns, and poor 
quality work (Griffith & Sidwell, 1997; Kamming, Olomaiyr, Holt, & 
Harris, 1997; Griffin, 1993; Williams, 1999). 
 
Industry complexity and importance 
The second justification concerns the industry complexity resulting from 
the numerous and sophisticated risks associated with the oil and gas 
industry. There is a common perception in the oil and gas industry that the 
world has effectively exhausted its available reserves of ‘easy oil’ 
(Casselman, 2011, p. 2). This dire perspective drives oil and gas 
corporations to be more inventive and prepared to go into difficult areas to 
extract hydrocarbons. This scenario involves heavy reliance on 
sophisticated extraction methodologies and often still unproven 
technologies such as those used in shale oil, oil sands, and other 
‘unconventional technologies’.  
 
The use of these sophisticated technologies results in increased 
uncertainty, and also increases in the associated risks (Chapman & Ward, 
2003; Kerzner, 2001). Risks can have positive and negative effects on 
achieving a project objective (PMBOK, 2008; Davidson et al, 2009; 
Mulchahy, 2003; Chapman & Ward, 2003). There is clear evidence that 
while corporations have the tools and processes to forecast upside risks 
and opportunities the challenge is in accurately assessing threats and 
forecasting the downside risks (Davidson et al, 2009). Proper risk 
identification and allocation to the parties that can best manage them in a 
contract still remains a challenge, with management ‘too often deficient in 
its estimations of risk and the appropriate management of it (Davidson, et 
al 2009, p. 572). Hence, there is a need to ensure a general awareness of 
the elements of the risks and how to responsibly manage each of these 
elements in the design of contracts (Kerzner, 2001).  
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Each contract type selected by the owner has its associated risks 
(Davidson et al, 2009; Camps, 1996; Kerzner, 2001; Berends, 2007; 
Salanie, 2005). Traditionally, owners are known to have selected certain 
types of contracts at least partially so that risks can thereby be transferred 
to the contractors (Camps, 1996; Kerzner, 2001). However, this passing 
over of the risks to contractors comes at a certain price, and a high 
premium may be charged whether it is made explicit or not. There is 
evidence that this is a common practice in, for example, the construction 
industry (Construction Industry Institute, 2006; Mulchahy, 2003; Kerzner, 
2001; Camps, 1996). However, Contractors are becoming even more 
reluctant to taking on risk which they see to be more appropriately carried 
by the project owner (Berends, 2000; Salanie, 2005).  
 
In current practice, many owners do not spend the time necessary to 
properly identify risks and incorporate the costs of the appropriate risk 
mitigation strategy in a given contract (Camps, 1996; Salanie, 2005; 
Mulchahy, 2003; Ward & Chapman, 1991). Where risks are not properly 
identified and allocated, they may be pushed further down to other parties 
in the contract who are often not in a position to manage them effectively 
(Construction Industry Institute, 2006; Mulchahy, 2003; Camps, 1996). 
Extraordinarily high costs of managing risks and related information 
asymmetry during the project lifecycle are not uncommon (Howard & 
Bell, 1998). Inevitably, the owner must ultimately pay for the risks, one 
way or the other (Construction Industry Institute, 2006; Mulchahy, 2003).  
 
It is self-evident that ignoring risks does not make them go away, and 
‘shifting the risks to the seller or contractor results in at least an additional 
8 – 20% cost increase to the buyer’ (Mulchahy, 2003). This passing over 
of risks could be as high as 30% of the total installed cost of projects paid 
for inappropriately allocated risks (Camps, 1996).  In a real world 
example, 87 percent extra on top of the total installed cost was paid by one 
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of the LNG Projects in Africa as ‘peace of mind’ payment for risks in a 
lump sum EPC contract. While this practice may increase the contractors’ 
profit, it makes no actual difference to the effectiveness of the risk 
management, and it has the undesirable effect of increasing the owners’ 
costs and thus the overall total cost of investment in a project. 
 
To achieve an optimal Contract, all risks must be taken into consideration 
and properly allocated (Salanie, 2005). This is a challenge for the Project 
Manager. Project Managers often do not have the capacity, knowledge, 
resources, experience and guidance to correctly handle the tasks of risk 
management especially in complex projects. Only an ‘ideal PM’ can 
possess all of these personal attributes  of the necessary knowledge, skill 
and experience  and such a person may be more an aspirational than a 
realistic possibility (Davidson et al, 2009).  
 
The third justification concerns the shortages of experienced Project 
Managers and contract personnel in the Oil and gas industry. As seen 
above, the skill and experience of the PMs are heavily challenged with the 
‘technological complexity’ of most projects (Kerzner, 2001). The oil and 
gas industry is very dynamic with continued technological invention. 
Reliance on previous project experiences and lessons captured from 
previous projects is no longer sufficient to deal with future turning points 
in the life of a project (Wack, 1985a).  
 
Based on the recognition that all projects rest on a technological base, it is 
considered a necessity in managing technology risk to ensure that 
technological forecasting or at least some form of scenario planning is 
explicitly done (Meredith & Mantel, 2009; Wack, 1985a). Scenario 
analysis is a description of a consistent set of factors which define in a 
probabilistic sense alternative sets of future business conditions (Huss, 
1988). Scenario analysis considers systematically qualitative variables, 
predicts turning points, provides an internal communications tools. While 
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inherently different from planning, it serves as a link between forecasting 
possible scenarios and the risks involved, and the planning and decision 
process that needs to follow (Huss, 1988). 
 
For example, in relation to technology risk, even the most straightforward 
consideration of the possible changes in technology during the life of a 3-
4 year project will show that the risk profile may alter substantially, thus 
requiring adaptations to be made in various areas of the management of 
the project (Kerzner, 2001, p. 903). More than a decade on, these 
challenges have not diminished. This lack of flexibility or 
knowledge/experience further requires the PM to receive proper guidance 
and to be creative as well as be allowed some level of flexibility in using 
this guidance.  
 
A common view is that if technological forecasting is correctly carried out 
and applied in the selection of technology and contracts for the project, 
then this inclusion will lead to the selection of a ‘value for money 
contractor’ and a cost effective contract (Hartman, 2003). One of the main 
challenges here is the shortage of experienced Project Managers.  Project 
managers in the Oil and Gas industry are usually professional engineers. 
Many of these experienced engineers are retiring as part of a distinct 
demographic in an ageing workforce (Mandil, 2005; Berends, 2007). 
When it is considered that PMs are responsible for developing the 
contracting strategy in conjunction with the Contract Advisers (Davidson 
et al, 2009),the question emerges as to whether the PMs have sufficient 
experience in contracting to be able to lead the development of a 
contracting strategy. If the PMs do not have the required experience, does 
this lack of experience of the drivers field affect the quality of the 
contracts  they develop?  
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The implications of the above gaps and issues on Contract Strategy 
formation.  
Contracts are formed using only the most relevant variables (Salanie, 
2005). Hence a contract may be incomplete (Salanie, 2005; Tirole, 1999). 
This assertion is argued by several authors to be the case in theory and 
practice of contracts (Salanie, 2005; Tirole, 1999; Hartman, 2003; 
Kerzner, 2001).  With little or no guidance in literature and with very rigid 
processes and procedures, it is not known how all the variables are 
identified, prioritized and ranked to select only the ‘most’ relevant 
variables to be included in the contract. 
 
As projects are unique undertakings (PMBOK, 2008), the contract 
strategy needs to have flexibility to fit the unique requirements of a 
project (Davidson et al, 2009), providing alternatives from which the PMs 
may choose. This requires the The PMs then are required to be properly 
equipped with the experience and tools necessary to correctly identify the 
variables and to select the most relevant variables, given all the options. It 
also requires all the alternatives to be known and readily available. A 
contract strategy cannot be complete if it doesn’t incorporate every part of 
the contracting process from how to select contractors to how to close out 
the contracts (Hartman, 2003).       
 
The decision about the contracting strategy to be used for outsourcing is 
crucial to the success of the contract selection process for the new project. 
While the selection of a contract strategy may be influenced by the quality 
of participants in the contract workshop, it is less than desirable for this 
activity to be the major determinant. The question of the factors to be 
taken into account is far from simple, and requires consideration of 
everything from the high-level strategy to the detailed check sheets to 
ensure that all elements or risks are properly considered or evaluated.  
There are other general concerns which include the lack of 
process/procedures, the ageing workforce with fewer experienced junior 
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decision makers, and the lack of databases of knowledge or framework to 
use for these decisions. In addition, the lack of consideration of the theory 
of transactional cost economics (TCE) is also a major concern. TCE 
theory (developed by Coase in 1937) provides the rationale to explain the 
business decision to source a product or services internally or externally 
based on cost efficiency (Williamson, 1975). These critical decisions 
relating to project delivery and contracting strategy require careful 
analysis, as they will impact all phases of execution of the project and 
greatly impacts the efficiency of project execution (Oyetunji & Anderson, 
2006). 
 
In summary, it can be concluded that research literature on the 
management of projects and the associated contracting strategies has been 
slow in its conceptual development and still has only a relatively thin 
theoretical basis. One of the main hurdles in the study of projects has been 
the absence of cases allowing a distinction between the project type, the 
contracting strategy that it is part of, and its managerial and organisational 
style. This research contributes to improving the process of formation and 
selection of contracts in the oil and gas industry in order to achieve an 
optimal contracting strategy. To contribute to filling gaps in the literature, 
this research focusses on how the current prescriptive framework used in 
the oil and gas industry to form contracts can be improved in order to 
create greater flexibility and thus add greater value, while remaining 
compliant. 
To achieve this result, the following questions were addressed.  
 
Main Research Question: 
How can structured contract strategies be established for the oil and gas 
industry? 
In answering the main question, the following sub-questions also needed 
to be addressed: 
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1. What are the methods used by corporations to arrive at the formation 
of contracting strategy? 
2. How are the major drivers for Contract strategy formation identified, 
evaluated and ranked in importance and impact?  
3. What is the impact of identifying each risks element in the respective 
contract types (such as lump sum and reimbursable) and properly 
allocating the risks regardless of the contract type selected?  
4. What are the characteristics of persons, their positions, their assumed 
experience and general background that are involved in the contract 
strategy formation process? 
 
The above research questions cover a wide range of contexts so as to 
provide sufficient scope to study the existing contracting strategy 
formation and selection approaches. This facilitated the development of a 
theoretical framework for contract strategy formation. The framework is 
examined in the light of theory and findings from field research, to yield a 
basis for real-world guidance (Winter, 2006; Winter & Smith, 2006).  
   
1.3 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The structure and flowchart of the thesis is as shown in Figure 1.1. The 
thesis is structured in five chapters as recommended by Perry (1998). 
Each chapter has sections as shown.  
 
Chapter 1: This chapter introduces the background to the thesis and 
provides insight into the remaining chapters and structure of the thesis.    
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Figure 1.1: Structure of the thesis 
 
 
 
Source: developed for this research 
 
 
Chapter 2 contains the literature survey and the theoretical framework for 
the research. The approach used in the chapter is to use the theory of 
contract and literature to conceptualise the topic, identify the research 
issues, and define the questions for this research. This approach is used so 
as to achieve the following: 
Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 2
Literature 
Review
Chapter 3
Methodology
Chapter 4
Data Analysis
Chapter 5
Conclusion
• Background to the thesis
• Justification of the research
• Identify research issues/problem
• Outline of the thesis
• Review of literature and theory of contracting
• Review of research gaps and questions
• Research design and framework
• Research paradigm
• Data collection methods
• Data analysis 
• Report results
• Integration of literature review with analysis of results and 
examination of implications of results in the light of research 
questions
• Answer research problems and present gaps
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(i) To understand theoretical development of academic research within 
the general field of Contracting and how they have been applied in the oil 
and gas industry.    
(ii) To explain the concept and findings within the real world of 
contracting in the oil and gas industry. 
(iii) To create the theoretical framework to explore the background of the 
identified problems and to focus the data collection for this research.  
 
Chapter 3 contains the design of the research project and the methodology 
used for the study. The chapter justifies the core steps of survey methods 
used to collect the data. These refer to population, sampling frame, sample 
design, sample size, questions and content issues, and bias issues (Davis 
& Cosenza, 1994). The methodology used for the data analysis is also 
discussed. 
 
Chapter 4 establishes the current practices of contract strategy formation 
in the oil and gas industry. The data collected are analysed in order to 
establish the current practices. The patterns of the results and analyses are 
presented. The analysis of the data for their relevance to the research 
issues/problems or research questions is detailed in this chapter (Perry, 
1998).  
 
Chapter 5 brings together the theoretical and literature perspectives on 
how optimal contracting strategy should be formed and how contracting 
strategies are formed in the real world of oil and gas industry. This chapter 
evaluates the research findings and the conclusions that follow. The 
chapter also contains the recommendations for future research in this area, 
the overall conclusion to the thesis, and discussion of the contribution of 
this research to the existing body of literature. 
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1.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that there are inconsistencies 
in the range of variables considered in the selection of a particular contract 
strategy. It is common for research into corporations to use convenience 
sampling. However, in the oil and gas industry, projects are not only 
unique but often very complex, in uncertain environments (Williams & 
Samset, 2010, Kurtz & Snowden, 2003, Williams et al, 2012, Williams, 
1999). PMs frequently fail to identify, much less manage the most 
significant risks. Some of the variables which are not visible at the early 
stages are known to have their effect after the award of the contracts and 
during the project execution. Successful management of these late 
changes along with the consequent benefits of the project is critical to the 
successful completion of the project. The key challenge is still centred on 
identifying the variables used in the selection of a contract, ascertain 
whether the variables are the most relevant required to achieve optimal 
contract.  
 
Furthermore, the experience and skills of the PMs to put together a 
successful and optimised contract strategy is heavily challenged by 
complex technology and uncertainties in the oil and gas industry. This 
situation invites the proposition that without being guilty of simplistic 
reductionism, it is possible that a schedule of contracts tailored to different 
scenarios of project variables may provide PMs with the much-needed 
breakthrough in these onerous tasks of developing a cost effective and 
optimised contract for a particular situation.  
 
In the next chapter, a detailed discussion of the literature on Contracts in 
the oil and gas industry is provided. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The introductory chapter to this thesis concluded with the assertion that the current 
practice of contracting strategy formation used in oil and gas industry does not take 
into consideration all the relevant variables in the formation of contracts. Different 
authors and corporations use different variables prescribed by their corporations. The 
existing methods and lack of knowledge by project managers (PMs) may have the 
unintended effect of discouraging the proper identification of the project drivers, 
benefits, risks, and the interrelationships of the risks.  
 
This chapter presents a review of literature of contracting. The purpose of this literature 
review is to demonstrate the gap in knowledge base in the formation of contracting 
strategies which this research programme addresses. The approach employed is to 
examine existing methods used for the generation of contracting strategies and identify 
gaps and weaknesses which will be addressed by this research programme. Existing 
theory evidenced in academic literature on contracting is reviewed along with a review 
of the practices adopted in the real world of the oil and gas industry. The theory and 
practice is summarised, to highlight the gaps from which the key research questions are 
drawn. The real world challenges of how to identify and manage the drivers of these 
practices are also investigated.  
 
This review is conducted within the theoretical framework of traditional contracting 
which looks at theory of incentives, information, and economic institutions. These are 
generally referred to as contract theory (Bolton & Dewatripont, 2004). The approach 
used is largely descriptive but also investigates the implications of the theory and 
literature in the real world of contracts and project management (Williams & Samset, 
2010) 
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capture and prioritising of business drivers (and alignment of conflicting drivers 
business and stakeholders’ drivers).  
 
As the new concept matures along the project lifecycle, other activities including 
investigation of the alternatives for project delivery and contracting strategy, and study 
of trade-offs between the alternatives, are carried out. This investigation supports the 
identification of risks and development of the contracting strategy. As part of the 
strategy – sourcing options for materials, services, and equipment are defined.  
 
These methods result in delays in putting a contract strategy in place. Also, there is 
evidence of project managers’ selecting the wrong contracts for the situation. 
Furthermore, there are inconsistencies across corporations in the methods used in the 
formation of contract strategies. Some of these approaches take into consideration the 
varied factors which affect the selection of the appropriate contract strategy. 
Surprisingly, it is not generally known which variables in particular are taken into 
consideration in the formation of the contract strategies and how relevant these 
variables are. The effectiveness of the current contract formation methods is also a 
major issue. The methods are based on the prescriptive framework which is available 
to PMs. Little is known about how (‘actuality’) PMs implement the framework or the 
contingencies that influence how PM interpret these presumptions (Cicmil, Williams, 
Thomas, & Hodgson, 2006, p. 675). 
 
Typically, current contract strategy formation uses variables which are prescribed by 
their corporations. This approach, which is supported by the existing body of 
knowledge, points to the fact that not all variables are selected by the corporations. 
Indeed, usually only the variables thought to be most relevant are taken into 
consideration.(Salanie,2005),.  This approach is argued by several authors to be the 
case in the theory and practice of contracts (Salanie, 2005; Tirole, 1999; Hartman, 
2003; Kerzner, 2001).  In particular, Kerzner stressed that the size of the contract is 
proportional to the ambiguity in the contract: the larger the contract, the greater the 
ambiguity in it (Kerzner, 2001). The issue therefore is to confirm if PMs or 
corporations deliberately leave out some variables in order to avoid ambiguity or 
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indeed they lack the knowledge or means to identify the most relevant variables. 
Furthermore, does the omission of certain variables affect the selection of optimal 
contract strategy? Given that contracts cannot be complete, does this incomplete 
selection of variables make it a suboptimal contract? 
 
An optimal contract is defined in this research as a contract which uses the product of 
consideration of issues such as world markets, current company strategy, skill 
availability, supplier and contractor availability and integrity, environmental and local 
issues to deliver cost reduction in Capital Projects through proper allocation of risks.  
 
The challenges of selecting an optimal contract are two-fold. The first concerns how 
the manager is to identify the most relevant variables required for a contract. The 
second concerns how a contract can be designed that can deliver the project objectives 
in a more ‘cost effective’ manner (Davidson et al, 2009). The creation of an optimal 
contract is further challenged by the non-visible drivers (such as risk management, 
human resource management, and anticipated developments in technology) which can 
be manifest only during the execution of the work. All these variables need to be 
planned and managed throughout the project.  
 
There is a gap in the published body of knowledge in this area regarding how the 
variables are to be identified and selected to be included in a contract. Hartman (2003) 
and Construction Industry Institute (CII) recognised these gaps. Most literature in the 
field appears to concentrate only on a few variables to be considered for the selection 
of contracting strategy. Also, different authors use different approaches in identifying 
the most relevant factors to be considered.  For example, Davidson et al (2009) offer a 
decision tree to differentiate different contracting strategies, based on criteria including 
scope, availability of owners’ personnel, and the experience of the corporation in the 
work to be undertaken. Camp (1996) identified corporate policy, an assessment of 
project and investment risks, and a cost analysis as major factors to be taken into 
consideration for a particular project. Ng and Skitmore (2002) identified world 
markets, skill availability, supplier and contractor availability and integrity, 
environmental, local content, and local issues. In all of these, it is not certain which of 
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the variables are the ‘most relevant’ or indeed what variables the project managers 
should be using. Hence, it has remained a challenge to define the term ‘optimal 
contract’.  
 
As already discussed, visible and non-visible variables are required to be taken into 
consideration in the formation of a cost-effective contract strategy. The body of 
literature pointed out that identifying all the variables and using them in the formation 
of a contract is a challenge that cannot be achieved. It is equally a challenge to select 
the most relevant variables. If indeed, a contract cannot be complete, then how does a 
project manager select the most relevant variables to produce an ‘optimal’ contract? 
What factors are taken into consideration? This remains a major challenge, as  there is 
little or no guidance in literature or in the very rigid processes and procedures available 
to project managers.  
 
The next logical step for this research is to further examine the impact of theory of 
contracts in the identification of variables for contract strategy formation. 
 
Theory of Adverse Selection – impact on identifying the variables for Contract 
formation 
The challenges and issues of identifying variables to be used for the selection of a 
contract are recognised in the theory of contract in the adverse selection model 
(Salanie, 2005, p.11). This states that only one party possesses private information. 
This is not exactly the case in the real world (Salanie, 2005) where in most two-party 
relationships both parties have their share of private information. This private 
information may contain the non-visible variables which contribute to establishing a 
complete or optimal contract. Hence, there is the added challenge of asking the agent to 
reveal its characteristics. In these situations, the characteristics of the agent are 
imperfectly observed. For the principal (owner) to attempt to get the agent (contractor) 
to reveal his true type is typically very difficult or even impossible (Salanie, 2005).   
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The reasons given for the difficulties of the agent to reveal his identity include fear of 
incurring too high social distortion, in which the form loses the respect of significant 
stakeholders in society (Salanie, 2005). For example, many firms have their operations 
regulated by Government. The firm has more information on its cost and productivity 
than does the regulator. In this case, ‘the firm will try to manipulate the way that it 
discloses information to the regulator so as to increase its profit’ (Salanie, 2005, p. 43). 
Therefore, it is in the regulator’s interest to do everything possible to make the firm 
reveal its correct figures so as to take proper decisions (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981).   
 
Given the above situation where the information available to make a decision cannot be 
relied upon, the owner has several options:  
 
(i) Seek ‘valued or truthful’ information in order to be able to make quality decisions. 
The price that the principal is willing to pay in order to ‘induce the agent to reveal his 
type’ is called informational rent (Salanie, 2005). This is also referred to as 
countervailing incentives. Countervailing incentives exist when the agent has an 
incentive to either understate or overstate his private information for some of its 
activities. The realisation by the agent of its private information can lead to distorted 
performance both above and below efficient levels. This inefficiency increases the 
agent’s rents (Salanie, 2005). Therefore, it is in the interest of the principal to create 
countervailing incentives to reduce the inefficiencies of having to deal with hidden 
information involved in adverse selection model. This approach is ‘encouraged’. 
Salanie stressed that the trade-off to solve the adverse selection issues is to give the 
agent ‘enough incentives without increasing his rent too much’ (Salanie, 2005). In the 
real world, the definition of incentives and correctly implementing the incentives to 
achieve the desired objectives or results is also a challenge.  
 
(ii) Another alternative approach is the application of the allocation rule in a 
deterministic situation. This is in a case where the principal does not know the agent’s 
preference. The principal can request from the agent their demand functions, use the 
information to compute the corresponding equilibrium, and allocate to each agent their 
equilibrium allocation. By doing this rebalancing act, it is possible for the principal to 
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state upfront certain conditions to be used for the resource allocation and how it will be 
financed. Therefore, the agent can only state their preference and signify their 
willingness to pay based on the given criteria (Salanie, 2005).     
 
While an agent may provide even negative information about himself or herself, it is 
more common for the principal to have to discover the negative information that may 
constitute a risk. This is one of the major challenges to the adverse selection model of 
contract theory. Salanie summed up the challenges by discussing the mechanisms that 
are direct and truthful – so that the agent finds it optimal to announce the true value of 
the information (Salanie, 2005). This is the revelation principle. One unique 
distinguishing features of the revelation principle is that the principal offers the agent a 
menu of contracts designed to meet the agent’s type that must ‘be truthful at 
equilibrium’ (Salanie, 2005). This approach in the real world gives the agent the 
alternatives from which to choose.  The revelation principle deals generally with one-
shot contract relationship. It does not generally apply in a repeated long-term contract 
arrangement (Bolton & Dewatripont, 2004). 
 
The Revelation principle is challenged by the fact that the agent may not know his type 
until after signing the contract. Salanie also acknowledged that it is reasonable to 
assume that the agent knows his type only after the contract is signed before execution 
(Salanie, 2005). In the standard model of the adverse selection, the principal and agent 
exchange a vector of goods and monetary transfers. The agent private information has 
a characteristic which is known only when the contract is signed. In this model, the 
agent chooses the contracts designed for him by the principal. His preference and 
decision in making this choice is based on the menu of contracts which provides him ‘a 
utility level as large as his reservation utility’. It is natural to expect that the agent will 
continue to discover other characteristics of the principal which was not apparent at the 
time of signing the contract. After all, the menu of contracts allocated by the principal 
are those that ‘maximise the principal’s expected utility’ (Salanie, 2005). 
 
Based on Salanie’s conclusions, it is likely that information is asymmetric when the 
contract is signed. This is the ‘hidden information model’ where information is 
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asymmetric ex ante (i.e. result of actions can only be forecasted) and asymmetric ex 
post (results of actions cannot be forecasted). One distinguishing fact about a standard 
model is that the contract makes profits or losses regardless of the type of agent who 
buys it (Salanie, 2005). 
 
Ex ante effort refers to effort by the owner to assess/forecast the characteristics of the 
contractor. This forecast is required to be as precise as much as possible when planning 
to ensure that the correct resources are available as and when needed. An adverse 
(negative) selection problem occurs when the contractor has ex ante (future) 
information which the owner does not have (Berends, 2007) but requires to make a 
very good judgment. 
 
Given the above analysis, it can be seen that the PM faces a major challenge to obtain 
all the information required to put together an optimal contract, yet may feel obliged to 
consider only those variables prescribed by its organisation. This result of this activity 
leaves another major gap in how these variables are managed or ranked in order of 
priority to form a contract. 
 
Application of the Adverse Selection theory in the oil and gas industry 
Experience has shown that some contractors make false representation of information 
about their capabilities in order to win a contract (Hartman, 2003). For instance, during 
bidding, the contractor may provide names of key personnel with their positions in the 
contractor’s organisations. On award of contract, less qualified people are substituted 
into the project team. This result defeats one of the objectives of contracting out work 
which is because the owners do not have resources or expertise in-house to do work, 
increase productivity, reduced costs, and reduce management effort (Bertolini et al, 
2004; Hartman, 2003). This further increases the risk exposure for the owner, 
especially if they do not have the required manpower to cover the shortfall (Howard & 
Bell, 1997).  
 
 28 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Another example is the owner’s ability to carry out background checks on the credit 
worthiness and financial strength of the contractors. Most corporations rely on credit 
checks using agents such as Dunn and Bradstreet. Others may require a bank guarantee 
letter. This makes it a massive challenge to create general equilibrium models that 
could account for informational asymmetries presented (Salanie, 2005). The current 
practice of most corporations to maintain information database of all their contractors 
and suppliers is good. However, the information contained in such databases can be 
only as good as the data supplied by the contractors.  
 
One of the key challenges of selecting a value-for-money contractor is the lack of 
information to properly identify and evaluate the contractor. According to Hartman 
(2003), it is not possible to select value-for-money contractors under the current 
practices where most corporations have their own procurement policy which also 
covers tendering. One of the major rules used by the procurement department which 
may not be favourable to the selection process is that contract can be awarded only to 
the lowest bidder. The commercially qualified bidder has to be the lowest in terms of 
money. Nevertheless, it is still possible that the most technically qualified and lowest 
bidder made a mistake in its estimation of the work. This disability to recover full 
information again throws the whole process of selection of the contractor into question. 
Hence there occur change orders and adverse relationships (Berends, 2007; Zaghloul & 
Hartman, 2005). 
 
The theory of the auction model throws more light on the understanding of the mind of 
the contractor when bidding for projects. Bidders generally submit a bid which is lower 
than their valuation of the goods but the bid is slightly higher than that of their 
competitor (Salanie, 2005). This deliberate lowering of the cost in order to win the 
contract will definitely result in unnecessary variations during the project execution. 
This practice is very common with poor performing contractors who are desperate to 
get work. They rely heavily on change orders (variations) to make profit. In an 
organisational environment where project managers do not accept variations, then the 
project is off to a troubled start, especially when the environment undergoes change 
that requires inevitable variations to a contract.  
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As a result of the misrepresentation or lack of trust, there may be unnecessary tension 
between the owner and contractors. This uneasiness makes it impossible to create a 
collaborative working environment during the contract execution. Many contractual 
arrangements between construction clients and contractors are confrontational, 
reflecting considerable mistrust and leading to increases in contractors’ premium to 
avert significant risk levels (Zaghloul & Hartman, 2005).The significance of trust in 
the strategic partnering relationship has received overdue attention in recent research 
(Lendrum, 2000).   
 
Another aspect of the Adverse Selection model is that the agents learn about their 
private information after the contract is signed and before execution of the contracts. 
Since their decision was based on the initial options available to them and their 
preferences at the time  (Salanie, 2005), there is a high tendency that they may find 
some more ‘valued’ information before and during the execution of the work which 
may require them to ask for a change or renegotiations. Principals therefore need to be 
open and prepared for variations and the management of such changes. The concept of 
long-term commitment and renegotiation can be better managed so as to achieve a 
‘renegotiation-proofness principle’ leading to an efficient contract (Dewatripont, 
1988). Unlike the revelation principle which deals with static or one-shot contracts, the 
renegotiation proofness principle addresses issues of repeated long term contracts. It 
provides options to address optimisation problems in long-term contracts where 
familiar incentive constraints of one-shot contract are replaced by tighter renegotiation-
proofness constraints which enable contracting parties to always commit to or enforce 
long term contractual agreements (Bolton & Dewatripont, 2004, p. 365). According to 
Bolton and Dewatripont (2004), the renegotiation-proofness principle provides a basis 
to deal with the increasing complexities and optimal contracting problems in long-term 
contracts if the contracting parties decide to renegotiate the contracts along the way.  
 
One of the major disadvantages of misrepresentation of work is the numerous change 
orders and claims. This is the case sometimes because the contractor doesn’t 
understand the scope of the work which may result in under bidding. In a lump sum 
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contract, this lack of understanding of the complete scope of work will be a major 
problem for both owners and contractor. Berends and Dhillon (2004) confirmed that 
the asymmetric information does not exist in a cost price fee contract because both 
parties are fully informed. The contractor incentive to pursue change orders and claims 
are weaker than under a Lump Sum Fixed Price (LSFP). This is one of the main 
reasons why a lump sum contract should not be selected unless the scope is firm and 
complete.  
 
In conclusion, it is accepted that executed contracts may still contain distortion 
(Beaudry & Poitevin, 1993) and that a contract is never complete (Salanie, 2005; 
Tirole, 1999). A contract may be incomplete because contracts can take into account 
only those variables that can easily be verified by a court or a limited number of 
variables that may be most relevant (Salanie, 2005). One key reason for selecting only 
variables that are most relevant is to reduce the cost of preparing the contracts (Tirole, 
1999; Salanie, 2005). Hartman (1994, 2003) agrees with Salanie’s view that since 
contracting strategy decisions are affected by business drivers, it is imperative that all 
relevant drivers must be completely identified and used in the selection of strategy. In 
both cases, reference is made to all relevant or most relevant drivers (Hartman, 1994). 
Hence some variations and renegotiation should be expected. Therefore, the next step 
for this research is to examine how to select the most relevant variables.  
                                   
2.2 SELECTION OF CONTRACT STRATEGY DRIVERS 
This discussion confirms that it is not possible for the owner to fully identify all the 
drivers for the formation of a contract strategy. Hence, project managers use variables 
prescribed by their corporation in the selection of a contract. It is also concluded that 
the variables cannot be complete. The next challenge is how are the variables selected 
and managed i.e. are these variables evaluated and ranked in terms of priorities?  
There are several different groups of stakeholders in oil and gas industry:  
(i) Environmental groups and indigenous populations. 
(ii) Government, National Oil Companies (NOC).  
(iii) Joint Ventures (JVs).  
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(iv) International Oil Companies (e.g. Shell, Exxon Mobil, British Petroleum, Total,    
Chevron and others).  
(v) The lenders/financial institutions, and Insurance companies.  
 
The typical drivers of the stakeholders are as follows:  
(i) Government/National Oil Company: Drivers – Revenue, Sustainable 
development, local content development, and environment.  
(ii) IOC and Joint Ventures: Drivers – Profit/Revenue, increase reserve inventory, 
sustain optimal production level, business opportunity, reliability of fuel and 
feedstock supplies, high degree of reliability and availability of production 
facilities, safety, and environment (Mian, 2002). 
(iii) Lenders/Financial institution: Drivers - Profit and timely repayment of debt). 
These drivers can be grouped into three main beneficial areas, namely Social, 
Economic and environmental.   
 
Different stakeholders have varied interests, which can be described as drivers (of their 
thinking and behaviour). All of these drivers are critical in the definition of the 
objective of the business and the project; hence the significance of aligning the 
objectives in the selection of a contractor. In the review of literature relating to the 
definition and selection of contracting strategy, it is not possible to ignore the major 
research study carried out by the Construction Industry Institute (CII) (CII-RS165-2, 
2003). The studies aimed to provide best practices and provide guidelines for the 
identification and selection of project delivery and contracting strategy (PDCS). The 
variables identified for the selection of PDCS are cost, schedule, minimum delay, 
minimum expenditure rate, risks, procurement, change/variation management, owner 
team, project confidentiality, familiarisation with project, scope, project complexity 
and innovation. The Construction Industry Institute studies also identified the first step 
in the process of developing contracting strategy as the definition of the business 
objective for the investment and aligning these objectives with the project objectives 
(CII-RS165-2, 2003). The major challenge is ‘how are the objectives defined and 
aligned?   
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There are no set guidelines for defining and communicating project objectives. A 
properly defined objective and communication process is one that has a top-down 
approach with feedback loop to ensure reviews and continued clarification of the 
objectives (CII-RS165-2, 2003). This implies that the overall business objectives and 
drivers should be translated into project objectives and subsequent definition of 
Contractors’ (Suppliers and Designers) objectives should be based on the project 
objectives (CII-RS165-2, 2003). In reality, this is a challenge. The contractors usually 
have their own objectives which are taken from their organisation’s overall objectives. 
Ironically, this may become the starting point for problems in projects.  
 
Consequently, the nonaligned objectives will affect the contracting strategy selected. In 
particular, the engagement and selection of contractor will be based on misrepresented 
information. Notably, the contractor/owner relationships will be adversary and 
counterproductive (Rose & Manley, 2005). The non-alignment of the owners’ 
objectives with those of the contractors has been explained as a direct consequent of 
the asymmetric information received from contractors. Asymmetric information 
usually results in the selection of the wrong alternatives or moral hazard. Moral hazard 
or potential moral hazard may be said to exist in a situation in which the contractor has 
more accurate information than the owner or where the objectives of the parties differ 
(Salanie, 2005).  
 
An example of asymmetric information is where the different objectives of contractor, 
owners or shareholders and managers, are not aligned. The principal can observe the 
actions of the agent and can order him to choose the efficient action, and choose the 
wages that achieve the optimal risk sharing. This situation is referred to by Salanie as 
‘first best’ situation (Salanie, 2005). 
 
Optimal risk sharing implies that the principal perfectly insures the agent by given him 
constant wages and by bearing all risks involved in their common activities (Salanie, 
2005). In this case, some form of evaluation and allocation of the risks is carried out. 
The owner puts together a contract as he deems fit with all the risks built in. The agent 
accepts the contract knowing that the allocated risks are all paid for in the contract. In 
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reality, this is not always the case. In the current practices of contract formation in oil 
and gas corporations, the owner chooses a certain type of contract in order to avoid 
owning and therefore having to manage the risks involved in the work. 
   
The theory of Moral Hazard model also introduces the need for the principal and agent 
to manage their relationship. Using Salanie’s “two-action, two-outcome model”, the 
interdependence of both parties is relevant after the contract is signed.  The agent can 
choose between working and not working. The principal can observe whether the agent 
succeeds or fail at his task. The principal gets a pay-off when the agent succeeds. 
Otherwise, the principal payoff in the case of failure is poor. Where the principal wants 
the agent to work, he must give the agent wages plus incentive and in case of failure, 
wages minus incentive (Salanie, 2005).   
 
Managing the relationship between agent and principal where the objectives are not 
aligned is a challenge. The standard model of the moral hazard theory describes a 
situation where the agent must choose between multiple possible actions which 
produce different outcomes depending on the chosen action. Salanie (2005) refers to 
the stochastic relationship between actions and outcomes as a ‘technology’. Since the 
only publicly observed variable is the outcome, contracts must take the form of wages 
that depend on the outcome. So the principal will pay a wage if he observes an 
outcome. Therefore, it is advisable for the principal to choose the contract that 
maximises his expected utility but takes into account his contract with the agent 
(Salanie, 2005). There is no doubt that the agent faces a very high risk of being 
exploited by the contracts that he chooses to sign given that the principal’s objective is 
to maximise his expected utility.  
 
When a contract is signed, the success of the principal depends on the agent’s 
succeeding in delivering the work (Salanie, 2005). This deliverable further emphasises 
the need for trust in relationships in the execution of the contract. It also emphasises 
the need to align objectives to ensure a win-win situation for both contractor and 
owner. To achieve this common goal, Salanie identified two main properties of optimal 
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contract that must be implemented to get the desired results. These are optimal wages 
schedule and optimal incentive contract. These properties are defined as follows: 
 
(i) The term ‘optimal wage schedule’ implies that the wage should be higher when 
the surplus to be shared is higher. Where there are only two factors (failure or success), 
then the agent should receive a basic wage and a bonus proportional to the increase in 
the surplus when he succeeds. Therefore the optimal wage should depend on all signals 
that may bring information on all actions chosen by the agent (Salanie, 2005).  
(ii) The term ‘optimal incentive contract’ implies that optimal contract over a whole 
period gives the agent a bonus that depends linearly on the number of periods in which 
the outcome increased.  
 
To summarise this section, the need to have well designed drivers for a project cannot 
be overemphasised. The drivers enable the owner to develop an effective payment 
terms, identify the behaviour to incentivise, and the type of contractors required to do 
the work. Hence the recommendation is to tailor the tender package to attract a value-
for-money contractor. The term ‘value-for-money contractor’ refers to getting the best 
qualified contractor to do a piece of work at a reasonable and acceptable) cost. A 
reasonable and acceptable cost is a cost that is within company estimates. According to 
Hartman, it is not possible to select value-for-money contractors under the current 
practices where most corporations have their own policy (Hartman, 2003).  
 
Application of the theory of Moral Hazard in the oil and gas industry 
The theory of moral hazard provides an insight into how the different contracting types 
are selected and implemented in practice.  
 
Contracts tend to be either Lump sum or Reimbursable, or derivatives of these two 
main types. Selecting between a Lump Sum contract and Reimbursable type contract 
should be one of the early strategic decisions faced by the management team (Camps, 
1996). It should be done very early in the project lifecycle (Davidson et al, 2009), so 
that the contract cost phasing can be made an integral part of the bidding and 
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contracting process (Berends & Dhillon, 2004). The various combinations of the 
contracting types and the associated compensation systems are reviewed below. The 
boundaries between both forms of contracting strategy are almost blurred. According 
to Berends (2000) in practice, lump sum and reimbursable type of contracts are not 
used ‘plain’ but in a form which contains bonus/malus (incentives) arrangements. 
Hence in the current world contracting market there seems to be a noticeable shift to 
reimbursable contracting (Berends, 2000). 
 
A. Lump Sum Fixed Price contract  
In a lump sum fixed price (LSFP), the contractor is paid a specified contract sum for 
executing the work scope. The contractor carries the project risks. The risks are 
considered inbuilt into the package. There are no efforts made to allocate the risks 
(Howard & Bell, 1997). There may be some identification but no consideration is given 
to the contractor’s ability to effectively manage the risks (Ward, 1999). In reality, the 
contractor ensures that he charges extra on top of the total contract cost, to repay him 
for carrying these risks. In the latest information available from senior managers in one 
of the oil and gas corporation, a contractor on one of the LNG projects in Africa, the 
contractor charged over 87% extra on the total installed costs of the project for the 
risks. This extra cost was demanded because regardless of difficulties and troubles, the 
satisfactory completion of the project remains the obligation of the contractor (Howard 
& Bell, 1997).  
 
The main disadvantage of this form of contract is the lack of owner’s control over and 
influence on the works. The principal can only observe the outcome of the action 
(Salanie, 2005). The contractor’s choice of suppliers or equipment is sometimes out of 
the controls of the owner as long as the equipment is fit for purpose. Example: the 
owner may suggest hiring higher capacity installation equipment with lower weather 
downtime, but the contractor can actually go for the cheapest equipment he could get. 
He is therefore at liberty to pursue its own objective to maximise profit from the high 
wages that he is paid by the principal. 
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The main advantage of this type of contract is that the contract costs are fixed and easy 
to manage. The fact that cost is fixed is contentious. Camps (1996) states that owners 
cost can increase and the contractors profit can also increase if the elements of risks in 
the lump sum contract are not properly allocated. The key advantage of the lump sum 
contract is the fact that the owner’s team is small. Thus in the real world, Salanie’s 
moral hazard model, which states that the principal can only observe the outcome of 
the action of the agent but cannot force the agent to take Pareto-optimal actions, is 
indeed the case.  
 
B. Reimbursable Contracts 
Reimbursable contracts are mostly used with incentives as follows. 
  
(i) Cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contract – As the name indicates, the owner 
reimburses the contractor for all the costs associated with the project work scope. The 
owner carries the project cost risks. Performance incentives are used to get the 
contractor to deliver the project on time and to schedule. The driver in this case is not 
cost but time and schedule – not enough time to put all of the pieces in place (Hartman, 
2003). The contract cost is not known until the end of the work. Hence contractor profit 
is equal to target profit plus share of the under run (Howard & Bell, 1997). This 
contracting type requires a large owner’s team to verify the work and to manage the 
contract.  
 
(ii) Cost-plus-fixed fee (CPFF) contract – This is also a form of reimbursable contract. 
The difference between the CPIF and this type of contract (CPFF) is that the owner 
pays the contractor a fixed fee (profit). The contractor profit does not vary with the 
actual cost of completing the work (Howard & Bell, 1997).  
 
(iii) Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) contract – This is another form of reimbursable 
contract. The difference between CPIF and FPI is that in FPI contract the contractor 
assumes the financial responsibility for costs overruns beyond some ceiling or under 
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runs below some ceiling. Whereas in CPIF, the owner assumes responsibilities for 
overruns beyond some ceiling or under runs below some ceiling (Scherer, 1964). 
 
In the real world, the practice of reimbursable contract is in accordance with the moral 
hazard (first best situation) in which the principal can observe the action of the agent 
and can order him to choose the efficient action (Salanie, 2005). However, most 
Corporations do not have adequate numbers of personnel or personnel with proper 
experience to supervise reimbursable contracts (Howard & Bell, 1997). There is a 
general preference to have the contractor manage the project to insure that there is 
adequate productivity rather than being involved in problem identification and 
resolution.  
 
2.3 RISK IDENTIFICATION AND ALLOCATION 
The theory of moral hazard also recommends optimal risk sharing (Salanie, 2005). In 
order to achieve optimal risk sharing, it is necessary to determine the relative 
significance of different sources of risk to guide the risk management effort and to 
ensure that the project remains cost effective. Corporations seems to be doing well in 
the identification of upside (opportunities) risks. The main challenges are in the 
identification of downside risks which could have greater impact in the delivery of the 
projects (Davidson et al, 2009). These downside risks are ‘uncertainty and ambiguity’ 
which represents ‘shadow conversations’ (Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014, p.239). 
Walker and Lloyd-Walker stressed that the ‘the broader conversation should consider 
both known and unknown risk and their mitigation’ (Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014, 
p.239). The difference between risks and uncertainty is in the practical management of 
the risk where risks are assigned probability but it is not possible to assign probability 
to uncertainties (Kerzner, 2001).  
 
Based on literature, to effectively identify and manage risks – ‘business processes and 
practices’ needs to be established and strengthened (Hartman, 2003, p.230) and 
‘systems need to be designed’ (Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014, p.239). This approach 
establishes a balance between cost of managing risks and the utility gained (Hartman, 
2003, p.239).  
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In real life, determining the sources of risks and hence rank the risk is currently a 
problem for risk management efforts, as project managers frequently do not have the 
capability, nor the willingness to invest the time in the proper identification and 
prioritising of risks, and in their allocation to the party that can better manage them 
(Ward 1999). Thus, some owners favour lump sum fixed price contracts in order to 
transfer the risk to their contractors, to avoid major cost overrun, and to reduce the size 
and the required capability of their management team. This is the traditional 
contracting strategy which may lead to economic inefficiency in which the cost risks 
are carried by a party that is not in the position to bear the risks in cases where the risks 
eventuate, or where information asymmetry exists during the project lifecycle (Howard 
& Bell, 1997). The fact that organisations do not compel project managers to put 
considerable effort into risk identification and management could be a reflection of the 
fact that risk management is strongly influenced by organisational attitudes to risk 
(Davidson et al, 2009).  
 
Clearly, lack of easy and simplified risks identification process/methods has resulted in 
the lack of proper identification of risks in projects (Construction Industry Institute, 
2003). The lack of identification of risks has a direct effect on the contract strategy 
selected by the owner. A lump sum contract may seem to have passed on the risks to 
the contractor but in actual fact the contractor does not have the resources and 
capabilities to assess and bear the risks involved (Camps, 1996). Camps (1996) further 
states that on top of the extra cost which owners pay for added sense of security, 
contractors can increase their profit margin and owners’ costs in more subtle ways that 
they do not show up directly in project in the contract price – this activity involves the 
clever manipulation and acceleration of the payment schedule to generate substantial 
surplus funds. While this practice increases the contractors’ profit, it also increases the 
owners’ cost and risks (Camps, 1996). A contract which does not fully consider the 
risks and the ability of the Contractor/allocated party to manage them is not an 
effective contract (Hartman, 2003). Therefore, selection of a contracting strategy 
should be based on more than allocation of risks as part of risk management. 
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Camps also expressed similar concern as those expressed by Hartman (2003) over the 
wrong choice of a contracting strategy. He added that the wrong approach to selecting 
a contracting strategy can increase cost during project financing negotiations. 
Therefore, it is not a guarantee where lump sum contracting strategy has been used that 
the contractor can deliver the project irrespective of problems or issues. Lump Sum 
contractors can go default or go broke, and the owner or investor may not have 
adequate contingencies in place for this event (Camps, 1996). 
 
Another crucial aspect to this argument is that where owners choose to shift the risks to 
the primary contractor, the primary contractors also pushes the risks down to lower-tier 
parties in the contracting arrangements. According to the findings of the Construction 
Industry Institute (CII) research study, the consequences of these actions is that (i) the 
parties with the least amount of control and influence over many of the risk-producing 
factors and decisions often carry the majority of the construction risks burden, and (ii) 
in nearly 20% of the overall impact resulted to contractors increasing their 
contingencies in response to inappropriate risk shifting by the owner (Construction 
Industry Institute, 2006b).  
 
The term ‘inappropriate risk allocation’ refers to the practice of allocating risks 
‘without separately considering which party may be in the optimum position to 
evaluate, control and bear the cost, or benefit from the assumption of the risk’ 
(Construction Industry Institute, 2006b). The proper allocation of risks between the 
owner and the main contractor and ensures that only parties that can manage them are 
assigned the risks is a crucial element in developing the contracting strategy 
(Boussabaine, 2001). The approach whereby the Principal does not perfectly insures 
the agent by given him constant wages and by bearing all risks is not an optimal risk 
sharing (Salanie, 2005). 
 
Based on the Construction Industry Institute  (2006b) case studies of estimated 17 
projects of approximately 1.2 billion dollars; the cumulative financial impact of 
inappropriate allocation of risks amounted to approximately $159 million i.e. over 14% 
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of the construction budget (Construction Industry Institute, 2006b). The financial 
breakdown is depicted below: 
 
Figure 2.3: Financial Consequences of Inappropriate allocated risks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from CII research study (2006b) for this research. 
 
Below is a consolidated extract of examples of major risks which projects do not 
properly allocate. This extract is taken from CII Research Study (2006b).  
 
No Damages for Delay, Consequential Damages, Indemnity, Ambiguous Acceptance 
Criteria, New or Unfamiliar Technology, Force Majeure, Schedule Acceleration, 
Cumulative Impact of change orders, Owner mandated subcontractors, Insurance 
Allocation, Differing Site Conditions, Design Responsibility, Waiver of Claims, and 
Standard of Care. CII study refers to them as “14 Hot-button risks” (Construction 
Industry Institute, 2006b). The details including description of each of the risks are 
contained in appendix A of this thesis. 
 
Increased overhead, 
labour, Materials (4.07%)
Additional Testing & 
Commissioning (0.88%)
Schedule Acceleration
(6.53%
Insurance (0.25%) 
Increased 
(18.74%
Consequential 
Legal Costs, Surcharge 
(0.5%
Redesign Rework
(69.03%
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In conclusion, it should be noted that one of the main challenges of risks identification 
in the real world is that corporations do not have trusted and very reliable ways of 
checking the contractor’s risk owning and managing capacity. Currently corporations’ 
uses a combination of bank guarantees and Dunn and Bradstreet reports, using market 
intelligence group to see if a company has had problems with contracts in the recent 
past and their financial strength. For long-haul projects, where risks changes with time, 
these methods of checking is surely not enough. A crucial element in developing the 
contracting strategy and tactics is the allocation of risks between the owner and the 
main contractor and ensuring that only parties that can manage them are assigned the 
risks (Boussabaine, 2001). 
 
Theory of Incomplete Contract  
This research has already established that not all variables are considered in the 
formation of contracts. It was also established that only the most relevant variables are 
selected. Hence it was concluded that contracts cannot be complete. This premise was 
studied using models that were developed in a situation where one party has more or 
better information than the other (asymmetric information). The basic assumption is 
that once the contract is signed all parties made their decisions based on their 
preference and the terms of the contract and then they go their separate ways (Salanie, 
2005).  
 
Next, this research will examine the theory of incomplete contract to further investigate 
the impact of incomplete contracts on the establishment of an optimal (cost effective) 
contract. The theory of incomplete contract is very recent and can be classified as 
maturing (Salanie, 2005). Hence the results from the work by experts (Maskin & 
Tirole, 1992; Segal, 1999; Hart & Tirole, 1988) in this area challenge ‘common view’ 
about incomplete contracting (Salanie, 2005) since the foundation of incomplete 
contract is not well-established (Tirole, 1999). 
 
For the purpose of this research, it is best to summarise the shared views of project 
managers views to provide some understanding of the properties, or at least the 
definition, of incomplete contract.  Salanie (2005) provided two main reasons why a 
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contract may be incomplete when he stated that a contract only takes into account 
variables that can be easily verified by a court or a limited number of variables that 
may be the most relevant. Tirole grouped these variables into two, ‘rationality’ and 
‘transaction costs’ but agrees that there is no clear definition of incomplete contract in 
literature (Tirole, 1999).  
 
Salanie (2005) and Tirole (1999) both agreed that the cost of writing a contract is one 
of the main reasons for using limited but most relevant variables. Tirole (1999) also 
opined that the judges are not doing enough to read the contracts in order to verify the 
evidence (Tirole, 1999). In short, not all variables are included in contracts to avoid 
ambiguities. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that all contingencies that may affect the 
contractual relationships in a contract, throughout the duration of the contract, have 
been taken into account. Hence, in the real world, a contract cannot be guaranteed to be 
a ‘complete contract’ (Salanie, 2005). Tirole specifically said that ‘actual contracts are 
or appear quite incomplete’ (Tirole, 1999). 
  
In real world, contracts appear to have a rather simple shape (often linear) and depend 
on a small number of variables only. Salanie (2005) suggested that contract should be 
‘a complex non-linear function of an a priori fairly large number of variables’ (Salanie, 
2005). However, Holmstrom-Milgrom (1991) disagrees with Salanie, suggesting that 
simple linear contracts may be more robust than more complex contracts which can be 
achieved if the agent is left with more freedom (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991).  
 
Based on the conclusions drawn from Salanie (2005), Maskin and Tirole (1992) the 
concept of complete contract is not a common practicable possibility. It is not possible 
for all the required variables to be included in a contract. There is gap in the body of 
knowledge on what should be considered as ‘small number of variables’, ‘fairly large 
number of variables’, ‘simple linear contract’, and ‘complex contracts’. But it is very 
clear that PMs cannot form a complete contract. Therefore, what is required is a 
contract which is optimal and provides the flexibility to be used in any given scenario.    
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2.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS MAKING CONTRACT STRATEGY 
DECISIONS 
 
The decisions required to be made in relations to selecting a contracting strategy are 
complex and difficult. They involve several competing objectives and drivers. These 
decisions are ‘affected by the perceived level of complexity of the environment within 
which the project is developed and delivered’ (Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014, p.12). 
For the avoidance of doubt, the main characteristics of complexity is uncertainty, 
ambiguity and decreasing levels of trust of people in their relationships or behaviours 
that suggest unexpected emergence of events that negate held assumptions about the 
situation (Remington, 2011, chapter 1 cited in Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014, p.64).  
 
There is little or no guidance for project managers on how to arrive at these decisions. 
In most cases, contract selection decisions are made in accordance with the prescriptive 
policies of corporations. Furthermore, the current approach of getting experienced 
engineers into a room for a workshop – a method referred to by Forman as BOGSAT 
(a bunch of old guys/gals sitting around talking) – is not helping the contracting 
strategy selection process. These sessions are dominated by the leader and those who 
shouts the loudest. There is hardly any analysis or facilitation (Forman & Selly, 2001). 
Yet, most corporations relies on these ‘old guys/gals’ for their corporate policies which 
drives the formation of contract strategy as well as processes and procedures.  
 
According to Walker & Lloyd-Walker (2014) ‘Complexity involves something beyond 
quantitative factors (numbers of people, social links, scope and scale etc.) to include 
qualitative factors such as the nature of influence and ability to recognise and cope 
with it’ (Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014, p. 64). Hence project managers require sound 
experience and expertise to deal with these level of uncertainties, ambiguity and 
diminishing trust. Trust is seen by Hartman (2003) as the most challenging of all the 
competencies. Hartman sees the problem with trust as ‘ethereal and so hard to measure 
and audit – at least until it is too late’ (Hartman, 2003, p.231). Hartman (2003) warned 
that trust should be used with minimal risks or exposure based on conditions 
(openness, flexibility, and fairness) as to the extent that another party can be trusted.  
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The availability of in-house expertise with the right competencies in all locations 
where capital project is executed is a major problem in the oil and gas industry and 
crucial factors to be taking into consideration for selecting a contractor. This situation 
is not helped by the ageing workforce and retirement of experienced engineers 
(Mandil, 2005). As seen from the foregoing analysis, there are a lot of critical decisions 
to be made in the selection of a contracting strategy. It is therefore required that those 
who make these decisions should be very experienced, in addition to well-informed. 
 
One of the main challenges for this research is identifying the characteristics of people 
that are formulating contract strategies and hence making decisions on which variables 
to select. Although there are severe limitations in the availability of literature on this 
subject, the Project Management competency development framework (PMCD) by 
Project management institute and Snowden Cynefin framework provides a foundation 
for this study. This research will also draw on the experience of the researcher as well 
as data collected for this research to establish the characteristics. These collections of 
information also form part of the contribution of this research to the body of 
knowledge on this topic.  
 
The three dimensions of the PMCD framework are (i) Knowledge (what a PM knows 
about applying processes, tools, and techniques), (ii) performance (How a project 
manager applies), and (iii) personal behaviour (how a project manager behaves when 
performing activities). These competencies are required to be posed by PMs in order to 
be recognised as fully competent (PMI, 2007). The Snowden Cynefin framework 
further characterised the domains of knowledge as known, knowable, complex and 
chaotic (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003, p.468). Known knowledge refers to best practice in 
tame situations. Knowable knowledge is provided by subject matter experts / technical 
authorities based on analysis of tame or messy situations and guide PMs on how to 
respond from understanding patterns and reducing ambiguity, uncertainty and linkage 
within and between systems. Complex spaces are where patterns are in a state of flux 
and there is uncertainty about how, why and when changes occur but highly expert 
people can understand the dynamics of these turbulent patterns. Chaotic is the space 
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where knowledge and thinking must be entrained then used, when and as needed, 
where assumptions are totally questioned and response to experimentation is rapid and 
intuitively applied (Walker & Lloyd-Walker, 2014, p.65). 
 
The next step, having examined the PMCD and Cynefin framework is to understand 
the main business roles, attributes and the experience of personnel that establish or 
directly contribute to establishing contracts in the oil and gas industry.  
 
Typically, those that get invited to the contract strategy formation are: (i) Supply Chain 
Executives, (ii) Contract managers, (iii) Project Managers/directors, and (iv) Contract 
Sponsors. The decisions made by these managers are required to be approved by 
contracting boards/Decision Executives.  
 
Who are these people and what are their qualifications and 
experience? 
 
 Supply Chain Executives – generally has good experience from a contracting 
perspective. But not required to be familiar with the particulars of the project. 
 Contract Manager – Leadership skills, ability to operate under stress, bottom line 
focus. 10 - 15yrs experience in project engineering / contract management 
 Contract Sponsors – these are representative of the stakeholders and national oil 
company. They may not be very experienced in contracting or engineering but 
represent the interest and views of their stakeholders. 
 Project Manager/Director – Typically with a degree in an engineering discipline, 
with a minimum of 10 - 15 years total working experience, but with minimum of 
10 years experience in project management in the onshore and/or offshore oil and 
gas projects. Large Projects usually have Project director, supported by Project 
Managers. The Project Directors are people with several years of experience in 
engineering project management. 
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In most oil and gas corporations, in addition to the general criteria used for the 
selection of a project manager - proven leadership qualities, a team player in attitude 
and interpersonal skills, and experience of at least two full project lifecycle in a senior 
project engineer/senior discipline engineer role is required. It is required that this 
person must have participated in making key decisions in projects and successfully 
handed over projects to operations and maintenance.  
 
The above person specification is indeed sufficient to successfully manage a project or 
make contract strategy decisions. However, as a result of the ageing work force and the 
progressive retirement of the experienced engineers, most of the project managers do 
not have the correct historical information and experience to base their judgements. 
Speaking to a colleague recently, he called these project managers ‘MBA Managers’.  
He was referring to their qualifications in everything but experience. Furthermore, 
there are cases where despite the fact that personal characteristics and traits of PMS are 
known, ‘management may still select the wrong person’ (Kerzner, 2001, p180). The 
selection of the wrong person (PM) is largely because companies places emphasises on 
job descriptions (deliverables and expectations) as oppose to competency (specific) 
skill (Kerzner, 2001, p1063). The wrong selection of PMs adds to the severe limitation 
in the level of practical experience of people that are developing contracting packages. 
This lack of experience is reflected in the quality of the papers submitted to approval 
boards. Using responses to questionnaires, the following are examples of poor quality 
of contract process input: (i) Poor market intelligence, (ii) Poorly thought out and 
implemented prequalification using inexperienced personnel, (iii) Poorly written scope 
of work, instruction to tenderers section, pricing schedule, special terms and 
conditions, administration instructions, (iv) Not giving tenderers sufficient time to 
prepare a competent bid, (v) Slow turnaround of tender circulars in response the 
queries and clarification requests, (vi) Inadequately thought out technical and 
commercial bid evaluation procedures, and (vii) Lack of normalization. 
 
In conclusion, it must be stressed that there are many reports in the research literature 
on decision making and the decision making techniques. Most of the techniques can be 
used in the oil and gas industry. However, the characteristics or attributes of key people 
involved in making contract strategy decisions in oil and gas are not explicitly stated in 
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literature. Hence there is a scarcity of knowledge and lack of guidance to corporations 
on how to identity these resources. This research will also contribute to the body of 
knowledge in this subject. 
 
2.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND GAPS IN LITERATURE  
Having reviewed the literature and existing theories of contracting and how they have 
been applied in the oil and gas industry. The next step is to create the theoretical 
framework to explore the background of the identified problems and to focus the data 
collection for this research (Huberman & Miles, 1994; Yin, 1994). According to 
Huberman and Miles (1994), a theoretical framework contains the main issues, 
construct and variables including their relationships to be studied. 
 
Figure 2.4: Interrelationship between parent theories and contract process and contract 
types 
 
 
 
Source: developed for this research 
  
 
In addition to the above, the details of the theoretical framework showing how each 
components fits together along with the research issues is shown below.
 
Figure 2.5: Initial Theoretical Framework of this research
 
 
Source: developed for this research
 
This research project has two main themes. Namely: the Contract process and Contract 
types. The main objective of the research is to improve the contract strategies 
formation process and provide flexible options tailored to different scenarios in the use 
of any given contract type. 
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interpret this prescriptive framework. This uncertain direction is surprising given the 
value of contracts and considering the huge potential for savings.    
 
Furthermore, in the selection of contracts, not all variables required to formulate the 
contract are considered or selected. Companies use variables which they consider the 
most relevant. This followed process is in line with the theory of contracts. Little is 
known about how these variables are identified, ranked and prioritised prior to the 
selection of the contracts. The appropriate definition of what is considered as an 
optimal contract is not known. An understanding of the attributes of what should be 
considered as optimal contract will provide PMs with the required guidance in the 
formation of contracts.  
 
Project managers are faced with the decisions to select the variables using their limited 
knowledge of contracts. There is increasing pressure on PMs to deliver a project on 
time, on budget and quality. Projects are executed in very complex environment with 
sophisticated technologies. These complexities, coupled with the progressive ageing of 
experienced workforce makes it difficult for organisation to rely on the experience of 
their workforce to supervise or manage the execution of the appropriate contracts. 
Hence, organisations are prepared to choose certain form of contracts without a 
detailed identification of the risks and allocation of the risks to the party that is best 
suited to manage the risks.  
 
Another related concern is that little is known about the characteristics of the contract 
strategy formulation team and the decision executives. Different corporations use 
personnel with varied levels of experience in preparing contracts and also making 
contract selection decisions. The quality of the contract strategies prepared by these 
personnel is judged to be substandard and full of rework. Surprisingly, there is a huge 
gap in the body of knowledge on who should be making contract strategy selection 
decisions and what their role should be. Currently, PMs are charged with the 
responsibilities to formulate contracts for their projects.   
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The final part of the framework concerns how to establish an optimal contract which 
uses a product of variables and also meets the key attributes of an optimal contract. The 
main challenge here is to carefully extract the attributes of an optimal contract from 
theory and the body of knowledge reviewed in this research. Some of the attributes will 
be studied in detail within the scope of this research. Since the scope of contract is very 
wide, it is anticipated that some of the attributes will not be studied detail in this 
research but identified for future research. Based on the literature review, the following 
attributes of optimal contract has been identified for this study. These attributes and 
any additional attributes to be confirmed from the data analysis will be examined in 
detail in subsequent chapters.   
 
Eight attributes of optimal contracts  
 Aligned (owner and contractor) objectives 
 Value for money contractor 
 Quality (valued or truthful) Information 
 Trust and Relationship management 
 Long term commitment and renegotiation 
 Optimal risks sharing 
 Optimal wage schedule 
 Optimal incentive contract 
 
2.6 RESEARCH ISSUES 
The four research issues identified in the framework (Figure 2.5) are driven by an 
overarching question which aims to establish how structured contract strategies can be 
established for oil and gas industry. The other four questions are sub questions of the 
main question. Throughout this study the overarching question will remain critical to 
establishing optimal contracts in oil and gas industry.  
 
The subject matter of this research is focussed on contracts within the project 
management environment in the oil and gas industry.  Six ‘bubbles’ have been created 
in the framework in Figure 2.5. Each bubble contains a subtopic designed using the 
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established gaps in the body of knowledge. Each bubble is linked with a series of 
research questions (RI) arranged in a logical sequence aimed to systematically lead to 
the desired outcome.  
 
The arrow RI1 which is one of the contract process related issues, links the contract 
process to the study of the methods used in the formulation of contract strategy. The 
literature shows that there is a gap in the body of knowledge in the formation of 
contracts. The existing processes are rigid and prescriptive. There are delays in 
establishing these contracts. It is not known what variables are taking into 
considerations in the formation of a contract and indeed how these variables are 
managed. Increasingly, there are copy and paste contracts from previous projects. 
These contracts are not tailored to the environment in which the project manager 
operates. Current approach does not deliver optimal contracts (Salanie, 2005).  
 
Hence, the first research issue of this study is: 
RI1: What are the methods used by corporations to arrive at the formation of 
contracting strategy? 
 
The arrow RI2 which is one of the contract type related issues, links the contract 
process to the study of the variables used in the formation of contracts. It also links to 
the contract formation method bubble because the variables are used taking into 
consideration in the formation of contracts. The literature discusses the fact that not all 
variables are taking into considerations in the formation of a contract. The most 
relevant variables are considered. Given the rigid and prescriptive processes used in the 
formation of contracts, the operating contingencies which may influence the selection 
of a given variable are not known. It is also not known how the project managers 
interpret this prescriptive framework.  
 
Hence, the next research issue is:      
RI2: How are the major drivers for Contract strategy formation identified, evaluated 
and ranked in importance and impact?  
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One of the eight (8) attributes of an optimal contracts captured from literature includes 
optimal risks identification and sharing. To achieve optimal contracts, it is required that 
as a minimum, all of the eight attributes must of included in the contract. There are no 
evidence that the current practice of contract formation takes all the attributes into 
considerations. But one of the main gaps found in literature and practice is that PMs 
select some types of contracts to enable them pass on the risks to the contractors. This 
behaviour and subsequent act defeats the objectives of outsourcing. 
 
Risk is one of the major drivers to be considered for the selection of a contracting 
strategy. RI3 links the risks identification and allocation to the contract variables 
identification. This area will be studied in detail as part of the contract types. This 
research is of the opinion that of all other attributes of optimal contract, risk 
management is the major failing point for PMs. This failing is because the risks are 
ever changing with new sophisticated technologies, and with projects executed in new 
frontiers and difficult locations. The methods of identifying the contractor’s risk 
owning capacity and the methods of allocating the risks to the contracting parties are 
not well defined across the oil and gas industry.  
 
Hence, the research issue:      
RI3: What is the impact of identifying each risks element in the respective contract 
types (Lump sum and reimbursable) and properly allocating the risks regardless of the 
contract type selected?  
 
The last bubble RI4 aims to study the characteristics of the PMs and those involved in 
the selection of contracts. The PMs are the major players in making contract strategy 
related decisions. The literature discusses lack of experience of PMs, lack of qualified 
contract personnel to give guidance to PMs, and scarcity of owner personnel. But the 
PM is accountable to establish contracts for his projects. To achieve optimal contracts, 
critical decisions are required to be made. Furthermore, personnel need to be available 
to both the contractors and the owner. RI4 links all other bubbles in terms of the 
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decisions and importance of the role which the PMs play in ensuring quality input and 
decisions are made in the formation of contracts to achieve optimal contracts. The PM 
play a crucial role in establishing an optimal contract; yet there is severe gap in 
literature in understanding the characteristics of the PM coupled with lack of guidance 
from contract experts to PMs.  
 
Thus, the final research issue is: 
 
RI4: What are the characteristics of persons, their positions, their assumed 
experience and general background that are involved in the contract strategy formation 
process? 
 
2.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
The current outsourcing and contracting method(s) do not use the product of 
consideration of issues such as world markets, company corporate policy and strategy, 
skill availability, supplier and contractor availability and integrity, environmental and 
local issues to deliver cost reduction in Capital Projects through proper allocation of 
risks. The main reasons why these factors are not fully taking into consideration in the 
selection of appropriate contracting strategies include the lack of understanding of the 
project drivers and how to fully identify them; the available processes for ranking of 
the drivers are too prescriptive; the existing risks identification methods are too 
complex and prescriptive; poor quality information available to make decisions; lack of 
quality (experienced) decision makers; and lack of a proper decision making 
methodology and system. 
 
2.8 CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the literature and theory relating to contracts. From this 
review, a contextual framework was developed and four research issues defined. The 
research issues will guide the research process that will bridge the identified gaps 
relating to the research problems. 
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The next chapter details the methodology used in this research. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter critically reviewed the existing literature on contracts, 
established gaps in the literature and framed research questions consistent with 
addressing those gaps. Examined relevant theoretical background and reviewed 
literature. This was used to define the research questions. The research questions are 
centred on the ‘What’ and ‘How’, along with ‘Why’, to develop effective contracting 
strategies. For this research, the case study design framework is chosen. This 
framework takes into account the methods used to collect the data to provide more 
perspectives to investigate the phenomena within its real life context (Easterby-Smith 
et al, 1991; Perry, 1999; Yin, 1994). Each case represents a senior project manager in 
the oil and gas industry responsible for contract strategy formulation in a context. 
Each of the case formed the unit of analysis.  
 
This research project has two main areas of interest, Contract formulation processes 
and Contract types. The benefits proposed to come from the research are the 
improvement in the contracting strategy formation process, and the provision of 
flexible options tailored to different scenarios in the use of any given contract type in 
the upstream oil and gas industry. To realize these benefits, the research method has 
as its objective the use of several methods used to collect the data to provide more 
perspectives to investigate the phenomena within its real life context (Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 1991; Yin, 1994; Perry, 1999). 
 
This chapter details the design of the research project and the methodologies used for 
the study. The chapter justifies the use of email interview survey methods used to 
collect the data, the target population, sampling strategy, interview question design, 
and strategies used to address potential bias issues (Davis & Cosenza, 1994). The 
methodology used for the data analysis is also discussed.  
 
 Figure 3.1: Outline of chapter 3
 
 
Source: developed for this research
 
3.2 RESEARCH OUTLINE
 
To achieve the objectives of this research, the study was undertaken in four main 
phases. The outputs from each phase became inputs to the next phase. 
below depicts the sequence.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 
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Figure 3.2: Research Program Phases 
 
 
 
Source: developed for this research 
 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND FRAMEWORK 
 
A research design refers to ‘the logic that links the data to be collected and the 
conclusions to be drawn to the initial questions of a study’ (Yin, 1994; Rowley, 
2002). Rowley (2002, p.18) describe research design as an action plan for getting 
from the research questions to conclusions. Denzin and Lincoln (2008) further 
describe the research design as a ‘flexible set of guidelines’ used to connect theory to 
strategies of inquiry and to methods for collecting empirical data.  
 
 Factors to be considered in choosing a particular style for a research include the 
overarching aim of the research, the specific analysis objective and its associated 
research questions (Miller & Crabtree, 1992). The applicability of these factors to 
this research has been discussed in detail in chapter 2 of this research study. The 
research objectives and four research questions to be used for this investigation were 
proposed at the end of chapter 2.  
 
Other factors include ‘the preferred paradigm, the degree of desired research control, 
the level of investigator intervention; the available resources; the time frame; and 
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judgments of sentiment and taste (aesthetics), as listed by Miller and Crabtree 
(1992).  These are discussed in the following sections of this chapter. These factors, 
including those listed in the above paragraph, were considered in the selection of a 
research design for this study. 
 
The components of a research design includes study questions, propositions, unit of 
analysis, logical link between data and the proposition, and the criteria for 
interpreting the findings (Rowley, 2002).  
 
The following sections contain the proposed research style and its justification. 
 
3.3.1 Critical Realism Paradigm 
 
A Paradigm is described as the researcher’s basic set of beliefs or as a net which 
holds the researcher’s epistemology, ontological, and methodological premises 
which guides actions   (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Patton 
(1990) stated that a paradigm reflects what is important, legitimate, and reasonable. 
Therefore, the choice of an appropriate paradigm for a research study is fundamental.  
 
Based on the above descriptions of a paradigm and since the research questions and 
issues being investigated by this research are located within their real life context; the 
choice of a paradigm for the research should take into consideration the relationships 
between the researcher and the world being investigated (epistemology), the nature 
of reality (ontology), and how to obtain knowledge from project managers the oil and 
gas industry (methodology). The paradigm of choice should also recognise the 
situational and unique challenges of this research (Patton, 1990).    
 
This research is bound by two main paradigms; positivism and interpretivism. To 
provide clarity, the main attributes of positivism and interpretivism paradigms are 
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summarized and compared below. The table is adapted for this research from 
multiple sources listed on the foot of the table below. 
 
Table 3.1: Summary and comparison of positivist and interpretist approaches 
 Item Positivism 
(Focus on discovery of reality) 
Interpretivism 
(Focus on understanding others 
action in relation to the researcher) 
 
Ontology 
(Form and nature 
of reality) 
 
Reality is real and can be 
understood. (Relativist) 
 
Reality is imperfectly and 
probabilistically understood due to 
the complexities of the world and 
human limitations.  
 
Epistemology 
(nature of reality 
between the 
researcher and 
reality) 
 
Objectivist. Findings are true. 
The world is seen through a 
single lens. Independent and 
value-free. 
 
The world is viewed with open 
mind. Observers with some level of 
participation controlled by 
triangulating data. Value-bound 
 
Methodology 
(Techniques for 
collecting data) 
 
Experiment / Surveys. Sample 
size usually large. Data 
collection is by structured 
instruments. Interview 
questions are closed with 
limited probing. 
 
Case studies/interviewing. Sample 
size is usually small. Data 
collection is by semi-structured and 
unstructured questions . Interview 
questions are open with probing. 
 
Research position / 
Goal of 
investigation 
 
Prescriptive, causal, deductive, 
theory confirming, 
ungrounded. 
 
Exploratory, descriptive, theory 
building, inductive, and analytical. 
 
Research Quality 
 
External validity and 
 
Construct validity is used to judge 
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reliability are critical for the 
research quality. 
the research quality. 
 
Type of data 
gathered 
 
Replicable, discrete elements, 
statistical. 
 
Informational, Contextual, non-
statistical, subjective. 
 
Respondent’s 
Perspective 
 
Emphasize outsider’s 
perspective.  
 
Focuses on the internal 
perspective of the respondent 
 
Data Analysis 
 
Objective, value-free, 
statistical methods. 
Quantitative. 
 
Interpretative, value-bound, non-
statistical. Qualitative. 
 
Source: adapted from (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Patton, 
1990; Perry & Coote, 1994; Yin, 1994).  
  
The approach of this study for this research is to investigate the current contract 
strategy formation practices in one major oil and gas Corporation. It was not feasible 
to carry out this study using all oil and gas corporations in the industry. The research 
questions for the present study consist mainly of ‘how?’, ‘What?’ and ‘Why?’ (Yin, 
1994). The research seeks to understand content and to deduce meaning from the 
available information. The meaningful information is used to redesign contracting 
strategies formation framework. Data from various sources were collected and used 
to establish knowledge about external reality which may not be completely true 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Within the interpretist approach, the critical realism 
paradigm is well suited to the nature of knowledge sought by this research. To 
minimize error this research relied on triangulation; it captured data from various 
sources and deduced meanings from these data (Easterby-Smith et al, 1991).   
 
The positivism paradigm sees reality’ in a completely different way. In the positivist 
paradigm reality is real and true and is seen in an objective way where inquiries take 
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place through a ‘one-way-mirror’ (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). For this research, reality 
is assumed to exist outside of the perception of the researcher but cannot be wholly 
understood because reality is too complex to be fully understood due to human 
limitations and the complexities of the world (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994; Patton, 1990; Perry & Coote, 1994; Yin, 1994).  
 
The goal of this research is to identify, describe, and analyse information from 
various sources, deduce meanings, and to develop models from empirical data which 
are seen to be true to some extent, not the absolute truth, for use in the industry 
(Healy & Perry, 2000). This research is to a large extent exploratory, descriptive, 
inductive, analytical, and elaborates established theory. These investigation goals 
adopted by this research can be achieved within the critical realism paradigm. 
Therefore, the next task for this researcher was to choose an appropriate 
methodology to meet the requirements of the realism paradigm. 
 
3.3.2 Justification for a Case Study Approach 
This section provides the justification for the use of case study approach. Yin (1994, 
p. 13) defines case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” Yin (1994) and Perry (1999) 
describes case studies as rigorous research approaches concerned with the collection 
of multiple evidence, in a real life context, about a specific aspect of interest. Perry et 
al. (1999) also used key words such as ‘contemporary’ and ‘real life’ but stated 
further that case study is a methodology which focuses on a particular part of an 
organisation or industry within its context, using variety of evidence, to rigorously 
explore and analyse contemporary real life experiences (Perry, Reige, & Brown, 
1999). Rowley (2002) emphasised the importance of case studies research as the 
ability to undertake an investigation into a phenomenon in its context. 
 
The factors taken into consideration in selecting the best research methods for this 
study were discussed in the preceding sections of this thesis. These include the type 
of questions, the extent of the researcher’s control over behavioural events, and the 
 62 Chapter 3: Methodology 
degree of focus on contemporary issues (Miller & Crabtree, 1992). The different 
forms of research questions and methods for investigating them are captured in the 
table below: 
 
Table 3.3: Choosing a research strategy  
Strategy Form of Research Question 
Experiment 
Survey 
Archival analysis 
History 
Case Study 
How, why 
Who, what, where, how, many, how much 
Who, what, where, how, many, how much 
How, why 
How, why 
 
Source: adapted from (Yin, 1994, p. 6) 
 
The definitions discussed above clearly suits this research study because the research 
will be conducted within its real life context ‘oil and gas’; the focus is on ‘contract 
formulation strategies’; the empirical evidence includes data from various sources 
which will be analysed to deduce meanings and draw conclusions for the research. 
This activity further underlines the usefulness of a case study research which 
includes its ability to investigate in detail and in-depth ‘how?’ and ‘why?’ questions 
about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control 
(Yin, 1994). The research questions for this study are mostly seeking to know ‘why’ 
and ‘how’. 
 
This research is focused heavily on a specific industry (oil and gas); and is 
investigating contemporary events using research questions and relying on multiple 
data sources. The goal of the investigation, based on the interpretist paradigm, is 
exploratory. Therefore, exploratory case study, as opposed to descriptive and 
explanatory, is most appropriate. However, there are some elements of explanatory 
case study in this research since it also investigates ‘how’ the current contracting 
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strategies are formed in the oil and gas companies. Such a mixed approach is 
supported in case study methodology (Yin, 1994).      
 
In case study research, a variety of evidence from different sources can be used 
(Rowley, 2002). Evidence from primary sources are electronic and hardcopy 
documents (such as minutes of meetings, reports, and emails). Other sources of 
evidence include email interviews (structured, unstructured, and semi-structured), 
archival notes (organisation charts), and file notes. Evidence from secondary sources 
such as media reports and literature are considered as one of the sources (Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2003). Case study can be based on any mix of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches (Rowley, 2002). The identified instrument for data gathering 
and primary sources for this research includes email interviews, emails, and file 
notes if they have been provided as supporting evidence by participants.  
 
 
3.3.3 Justification for Qualitative Methodology 
 
This section considers the methodology for inquiry, in particular as to whether it 
should be qualitative or quantitative. 
 
Methodology provides a logical way in which the research should proceed. The 
paradigm should provide answers to how to study the world, what is worth knowing, 
the questions to be asked and how the researchers and participant should engage in 
this inquiry (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Patton, 1990; Perry & Coote, 1994). This 
research is looking at contract strategy formation process. Langley (1999) described 
research which focuses on strategy or process as ‘more complex phenomena’ and 
‘even harder to isolate’ due to the ‘messy’ nature of the data. Process data has the 
following characteristics: ‘tends to be eclectic, drawing in phenomena such as 
changing relationships, thoughts, feelings, and interpretations’ (Langley, 1999, p. 
692). 
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All variations in human experience cannot be fully handled by a single method. This 
research is looking at capturing data from one major oil and gas corporation for the 
studies. The targeted participants are in various countries in the world. Therefore, the 
peculiarity of this case that is participants working in one company but in different 
locations, needs to be considered in choosing the data gathering techniques and 
instrument of inquiries. Hence there is a need to ensure that the strategy selected for 
this research is able to ‘deploy a wide range’ of interconnected interpretive methods. 
This is possible only in qualitative methods (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). This level of 
flexibility is also crucial, considering the ‘messy’ nature of the data and the need to 
take into account the ‘context’ of the data. Therefore, the methodology selected for 
this research is qualitative. Further, the case for the use of qualitative methodology 
for the analysis of the data can be established from the point of view that the data 
meet the following criteria adapted by Saunders et al (2003) from Dey (1993) and 
Healey and Rawlinson (1994): 
     
Table 3.2: Comparison of Quantitative and Qualitative data approach criteria 
 
Quantitative Data Qualitative Data 
Based on meanings derived from 
numbers 
 
Collection results in numerical and 
standardized data 
 
Analysis conducted through the 
use of diagrams and statistics 
Based on meanings expressed through 
words 
 
Collection results in non-standardised data 
requiring classification into categories 
 
Analysis conducted through the use of 
conceptualisation 
     
Source: extracted from (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2003, p. 378). 
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In addition to the above, Miles and Huberman (1994) and Marshall and Rossman 
(1995) stated that in the selection of qualitative over quantitative methodology the 
researcher should be able to answer yes to one or more of the following six criteria 
adopted from Lee (1999, p. 41): 
 
 Is it important for the researcher to understand the in-depth processes that operate 
within the organisation or industry? 
 Do the research issues involve poorly understood organisational phenomena and 
systems? 
 Is the researcher interested in the differences between stated organisational 
policies and their actual implementation (e.g. strategic versus operative plans)? 
 Does the researcher want to study ill-structured linkages within organizational 
entities? 
 Does the study involve variables that do not lend themselves to experiments for 
practical or ethical reasons? 
 Is the point of the study to discover new or thus far unspecified variables? 
 
For this research project, the above questions are applicable. It is the aim of this 
research to understand the in-depth processes used by project managers or contract 
managers in the oil and gas industry through the analysis of ‘messy’ data in order to 
deduce meanings which will be used to redesign the contracting strategies formation 
processes and also further elaborates the existing theories. This research seeks to 
address the processes of contracting strategies formation through the understanding 
of the holistic nature of interrelationships between contracting formulation strategy 
and their context.  
 
Based on the nature of data collected, and since the present investigation represents 
exploratory field work which seeks to determine the processes currently used in the 
formation of contracting strategies in the oil and gas industry and based on the 
foregoing criteria, qualitative approach is most appropriate for this research study  
(Crabtree & Miller, 1992; Gahan & Hannibal, 1998; Langley, 1999; Yin, 1994). 
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3.3.4 Strategies for Inquiry 
 
This research is aimed at establishing the current practices of ‘how’ oil and gas 
corporations form contract strategy and also to investigate ‘why’ they use the current 
approaches. Therefore the strategies for inquiry have to focus on the research 
questions, the purpose of the research, and the information that will most 
appropriately answer specific research questions and which strategy is most effective 
for obtaining the information’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008, p. 33).  
 
Most literature on research interviews agrees that the type of questions to be 
answered is most significant in selecting the strategies for inquiries (Yin, 1994; 
Rowley, 2002). The extent of the researcher’s control over behaviours and the degree 
of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events is also very important (Yin, 
1994). Hence, the researcher should as far as possible exercise some flexibility in 
choosing the set of guidelines to be used for inquiries. Oil and gas practitioners work 
in different locations in the world. They are not concentrated in one location which 
might permit the use of a single strategy of inquiry. Prior to selecting the strategy for 
inquiry, the following attributes of email interviews (i.e. self-administered and 
interviewer administered) was examined for applicability to this research. Self-
administered email interview are completed by the respondent; they are delivered 
using email, internet, postal system, or by hand. Researcher administered interview 
are carried out in face-to-face meetings or over the phone. Responses are recorded 
(notes) by the interviewer (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2003).  
 
Table 3.4: Main attributes of Email Interview  
 
Attribute Postal 
 
Telephone 
Interview 
Structured 
Interview 
Implications for 
this Research 
Population 
characteristics 
for which 
Literate 
individuals who 
can be contacted 
Individuals 
who can be 
telephoned; 
Any individual; 
selected by name, 
organisation in the 
The participants in this 
research are engineers, 
supply chain managers, 
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suitable by post; selected 
by name; 
organisation 
selected by 
name, 
organisation 
street and project managers. 
They are literate and 
hold at least a BSc 
degree. The names of the 
individuals and contact 
details are available to 
the researcher.  
Confidence that 
the right person 
has responded 
Low High High Email interview shall be 
administered sent / 
returned using email. 
Hence ‘greater controls’ 
(Saunders et al, 2003).  
Likelihood of 
contamination 
or distortion of 
respondent’s 
answer 
May be 
contaminated by 
consultation with 
others 
Occasional 
distorted or 
invented by 
interviewer 
Occasional 
contaminated by 
consultation or 
distorted  / 
invented by 
interviewer 
Respondents will 
complete the Email 
interview themselves in 
electronic form. 
Responses will not be 
tempered.  
Size of sample Large, 
Geographically 
dispersed  
Dependent on number of 
interviews 
It is not feasible to reach 
most of the participants 
for this research in their 
various locations 
worldwide. The 
participants fall into the 
‘hard (not feasible) to 
reach group’ (Jupp, 
2006)  
Likely 
Response rate 
Variable, 30% 
reasonable 
High, 50 – 
70% 
reasonable 
High, 50 – 70% 
reasonable 
Precautionary measures 
were taking to ensure 
high response rate (Snow 
& Thomas, 1994). The 
actual response rate for 
this research is 73%. 
Feasible length 
of email 
interview 
6 – 8 A4 pages Up to half an 
hour 
Variable 
depending on 
location 
The length of the email 
interview questions are 
not more than five (5) 
A4 pages. 
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Attribute Postal 
 
Telephone 
Interview 
Structured 
Interview 
Implications for 
this Research 
Suitable types of 
question 
Closed questions 
but not too 
complex, simple 
sequencing only, 
must be of interest 
to respondent 
Open and 
Closed 
questions, but 
only simple 
questions, 
complicated 
sequencing 
fine 
Open and Closed 
questions, 
including 
complicated 
questions, 
complicated 
sequencing fine 
Mostly open questions, 
with simple sequencing. 
Complex questions and 
jargon were avoided. 
Prior introduction at 
learning events and 
researcher’s network was 
used to get the 
participants interested in 
the research.  
Time taking to 
complete 
collection 
4 – 8 weeks from 
posting (dependent 
on number of 
follow-ups) 
Dependent on sample size number 
of interviews, but slower than self-
administered for same sample size 
Email interviews were 
returned within 4 weeks 
of distribution.  
Main financial 
resource 
implications 
Outward and return 
postage, 
photocopying, 
clerical support, 
data entry  
Interviewers, 
telephone 
calls, clerical 
support. 
Photocopying 
and data entry 
if not using 
Computer 
Aided 
Technology 
(CAT); 
programming 
software cost 
if using CAT 
Interviewers, 
travels, clerical 
support. 
Photocopying and 
data entry if not 
using Computer 
Aided 
Technology 
(CAT); 
programming, 
software cost if 
using CAT 
No additional cost for 
completing and returning 
the Email interviews. It 
was all done by email. 
Also data was directly 
typed by the respondent 
in Microsoft Word to 
ensure ease of input into 
data analysis tool. The 
licence for NVIVO (data 
analysis tool) is provided 
by QUT. 
Role of the 
Interviewer / 
Field worker 
None Enhancing respondent participation, 
guiding the respondent through the 
questionnaire, answering 
respondents’ questions 
Researcher spent most of 
his time making phone 
calls including 
responding to emails to 
clarify participants’ 
questions. Follow-up 
(Cont’d) 
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questionnaires were used 
to seek clarity or explore 
points raised in previous 
response returned by the 
participants.  
Data Input Closed questions 
can be designed so 
that responses may 
be entered using 
optical mark 
readers after 
questionnaire has 
been returned 
Response to all questions entered at 
the time of collection using CAT 
 
All responses were 
directly typed by the 
respondents into the 
email interview in 
Microsoft word 
document.  
 
Source: adapted from (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2003, p. 284). 
 
The main data collection instrument is a semi - structured interview but the 
administration of the tool is different from the traditionally known techniques of 
face-to-face or telephone interviews. Such flexibility is acceptable in modern 
research. A mixed but flexible strategy of inquiry which takes into account access to 
the participants, convenience of the participants, and most effective for obtaining the 
information will be used for this research (Lee, 1999). The researcher is located in a 
very remote part of Malaysia requiring over two hours flight to the main capital of 
Malaysia. This field study involves real managers and organisation. The participants 
in this research are engineers, supply chain managers, and project managers working 
in different locations of the oil and gas corporation worldwide.  
 
The target of the data collection effort is to seek responses from over seventy 
participants in different parts of the world. Taking into consideration the need for a 
flexible strategy of inquiry, the email interview designed for this research shall be 
self-administered by email in conjunction with telephone interview. Furthermore, 
‘written interviews’ provides the added advantage to generate larger sample of data, 
access to wider audience of participants, and at cheaper cost compared to interviews 
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(Snow & Thomas, 1994). Therefore, the recommended strategy for inquiries for this 
research is the interview schedule emailed to respondents.  
 
3.3.5 Data Collection 
 
This section outlines the procedure for data collection. Based on the above section, 
the interview questionnaires were designed in such a way that the respondents could 
understand and answer the questions without any need for face-to-face interview 
guidance. However, the researcher’s contact details were provided so that 
respondents could clarify the intent of questions if this was required. Moreover, there 
was follow up with the respondents by telephone or subsequent email which also 
provided an opportunity for clarification. 
 
Saunders et al (2002) describes qualitative data as based on meanings expressed 
through words; collection results in non-standardised data requiring classification 
into categories; analysis conducted through the use of conceptualisation. 
 
The paradigm and methodology chosen for this research is interpretist, exploratory, 
qualitative case study (Perry & Coote, 1994). The exploratory nature of this research 
is most appropriate for the inquiry which requires the researcher to ‘make sense’ or 
deduce meanings from the non-standardised data collected. The interview questions 
investigates each sub-units individually to produce results which will be aggregated 
to establish a view of contract formulation processes in the oil and gas industry. The 
participants are based in various countries worldwide including Malaysia, Brunei, 
Nigeria, Canada, Brazil, UK, Oman and the Netherlands. The case study nature of 
this research requires each respondent to contribute data based on their experiences 
and work environment.  
 
The decision to self-administer (email) the interview schedules as opposed to face-to-
face interviews hinges on the following: the spread of the participants in terms of 
location (worldwide), the time and feasibility for the researcher to conduct the 
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interviews; and the cost of collecting the data. Whilst it is recognised that this 
research will benefit from the numerous advantages of Interview schedules which 
includes ‘written interview that can be mailed’, ‘efficiency - speed, low cost – to 
generate large amount of data’, and the benefit of being able to collect data over a 
long period’ ( (Snow & Thomas, 1994); (Dess & Davis, 1984); (Norburn, 1986)). 
The researcher needed to be mindful of the major drawback in the use of Email 
Interview schedules which includes ‘low response’ rate Gaedeke and Tootelian 1976 
as cited by Snow and Thomas (1994). The issues of low response has to be addressed 
both in the design of, and in the administration of, the interview schedule. Detailed 
precautionary measures to address this drawback in this research are discussed 
below.  
 
The following precautions were taken in the administration of the email interview q 
to avoid the pitfalls of using email interviews such as those listed above.   
 
(i) Participants were recruited at oil and gas companies learning events. The 
researcher arranged with the Learning Event Coordinators to get five minute slots to 
brief engineers, supply chain managers, and project managers about the research and 
to solicit informed consent for their participation in completing the research 
questionnaires, thereby obtaining informed consent and establishing prior contact 
which will lead to a higher response rate (Snow & Thomas, 1994). The names and 
contact email of volunteers were collected and used to forward the email interview to 
them.  
 
(ii) The researcher used his industry network to request colleagues and senior 
managers to complete the email interview. It is ethical and acceptable for the 
researcher to use his influence and relationships (Kirk and Miller, 1986), to get 
qualified participants to participate in the research. Industry contacts and networks 
built for many years in the researcher’s previous work postings and work 
assignments were used for this purpose. Without these trust-based relationships, the 
access to respondents and the quality of the responses and thus the findings would 
have been compromised.  
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(iii) The researcher also used snowballing techniques, that is, relying on existing 
networks and colleagues from other oil and gas companies to circulate the 
questionnaires to their colleagues to seek participation from the industry. This 
method of convincing top managers to distribute survey is recognised by Hambrick 
(1982) as effective for yielding high response rates. 
 
Another precautionary measure taken to maximise the response rate and avoid 
pitfalls is to use the survey in conjunction with telephone interview (Hambrick, 
1981). This is in the recognition of that respondents are top-level managers and are 
frequently time-poor. Some of the participants may not have the time to complete the 
survey or complete the email interview. For these managers and other participants in 
this group, telephone interviews were used to solicit responses and to complete the 
emailed interview schedules.  
 
To further maximize the response rate, confidentiality of the responses and that of 
the participants was assured and promised to the participants using the QUT Ethics 
Participants Information Sheet. All responses are treated as anonymous. The names 
and identity including Company name/employer of the respondent have been 
removed from the original questionnaire responses submitted by the participants or 
interview transcripts. This action encouraged the participants to freely complete and 
return the questionnaires. Yin ( 2003) indicated that where feasible, the researcher 
can seek compromise to allow future replication of studies.  
 
The case for anonymity in the collection of the data and in handling the participant’s 
personal information is critical considering that the respondents are practitioners in 
the oil and gas industry. They are currently employed by these companies. Most of 
these employees have signed confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements with 
their various employers. Furthermore, the nature of any research that could be seen 
as likely to expose weaknesses in the current practices of contract strategy formation 
may contribute to error, bias, or skewness in the response data, based on informal 
social or ‘political’ pressure in operating companies, or fear of reprisals on the part of 
respondents. Hence Yin’s (2003) suggestion to disguise identity to protect 
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respondents was thought appropriate in accordance with QUT ethics. Jupp (2006, p. 
3) further made it clear that ‘in qualitative research, identifiers such as names, 
geographical clues and vernacular terms can also be removed in the writing up 
stage’. This approach is also supported by Saunders et al (2003, p. 140). 
 
3.3.6 Criteria for Selection of Participants 
 
Selecting the sampling strategy should depend primarily on ‘what you want to find 
out, what will be useful, what will have credibility, and what can be done within your 
available resources’ (Patton, 1990). Since the strategy for this research is to collect 
qualitative data; non – probability, as opposed to probability sampling, techniques 
was selected. In particular, the sampling techniques used are purposive sampling and 
snowball sampling techniques. These techniques are relevant because it does not 
specify any rule for the sample size (Saunders et al, 2003).  Furthermore, it is most 
difficult to reach some of the participants for this research in their various locations 
around the world. Hence the need to strike a balance between what is practical and 
feasible (Patton, 1990; Jupp, 2006).  
 
The choice of the snowballing sampling techniques is critical to this research because 
of the nature of the ‘restrictions’ placed by most oil and gas companies on the 
provision of information to external parties. Therefore, practitioners may feel obliged 
to provide particular responses if requested to do so by trusted sources, or even 
managers (Hambrick, 1982; Snow & Thomas, 1994).  
 
The following selection criteria were used for the survey participants:  
1. The participant shall be oil and gas project management personnel or specialists 
in contracting and/or users of contracts in one oil and gas company.  
2. The selected participants shall be those with over ten-year experience in oil and 
gas industry, and at least six-years experience in capital projects.  
3. A capital project refers to long-term investment projects requiring significant 
resource investment to design, build/construct, or maintain facilities or assets in 
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oil and gas  (Berends & Dhillon, 2004). The participants in this research are 
engineers, supply chain managers, and project managers in oil and gas industry 
worldwide. 
 
3.3.7 The Case Study protocol 
 
The case study protocol used for this research includes the design and administration 
of the email interview The email interview are designed to meet the case designs 
protocol presented in Rowley (2002). The case study selected for this research is the 
multiple case design which aims to produce ‘literal replications (i.e. similar results) 
or contrasting results but for predictable reasons (theoretical replication)’ (Rowley, 
2002). 
 
Seventy (70) participants were selected to complete the emailed interview schedules. 
A total of 51 questionnaires were completed and returned by the respondents. Each 
respondent represents a case. According to De Ruyter and Scholl (1998); a range of 
10–40 cases are considered the minimum number of cases where 60 is the maximum 
number of cases required for a study at this level to achieve redundancy. Rowley 
(2002) and Nair and Reige (1995) both agreed that six cases should be sufficient to 
achieve stability. In particular, Rowley (2002) suggested that 6 –10 cases might be 
used to achieve literal replication. The completed number (51 cases) of responses 
received from the participants is above the minimum number of recommended cases. 
For this research, it is anticipated that the 51 cases can be used to reach a point of 
redundancy or saturation, that is, no new information is uncovered through the 
further continuous gathering of data (Guba & Lincoln, 1982).  
 
The details of the participants who completed the questionnaires are in Table 3.5 
below. The table contains the participants’ Job titles/ job category, their current work 
location, their specialisations, industry and project management experiences. Each 
respondent is represented with a unique identity ‘Respondent ID’ in keeping with the 
agreement of non-disclosure of identities of the participants (Perry and Coote, 1994; 
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Yin, 2003).  Samples of the consent to provide data and the questionnaire are in 
appendix B and appendix C respectively. 
  
Table 3.5: Email Interview Respondents for this Research 
 
Respondent 
ID 
Job 
Classification 
Work 
Location 
Specialisation Sex Industry 
Experience 
(Years)  
Project 
Management 
Experience  
(Years) 
CS001 Senior Lecturer 
Oil and Gas 
Projects 
Texas, USA Project 
Management  
M 25 12 
CS002 Discipline 
Engineer  
USA Project 
Management 
M 12 9 
CS003 Operations 
Engineer 
Australia Plant Operations M 20 11 
CS004 Project Manager France Project 
Management 
M 22 15 
CS005 Team Leader 
Cost  
Netherlands Cost 
management 
M 23 21 
CS006 Estimating 
Engineer 
Netherlands Cost & Planning M 12 12 
CS007 Discipline 
Engineer 
Netherlands Project 
Management 
M 18 15 
CS008 Project Manager UK Project 
Management 
M 23 18 
CS009 Operations 
Engineer 
Norway Project 
Management 
M 33 25 
CS010 Operations 
Engineer 
Denmark Plant Operations M 28 12 
CS011 Project Manager Netherlands Project 
Management 
M 28 24 
CS012 Discipline 
Engineer 
Kuala 
Lumpur 
Project 
Management 
M 21 15 
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CS013 Project Manager Netherlands Project 
Management 
M 22 14 
CS014 Senior Lecturer 
Oil and Gas 
Projects 
Texas, USA Contract 
strategy  
M 30 12 
CS015 Learning 
Manager Oil & 
Gas Projects 
Australia Project 
Management 
M 30 25 
CS016 Project Manager UK Project 
Management 
M 30 26 
CS017 Contract Team 
Leader 
Malaysia Supply Chain 
management 
M 15 9 
CS018 Project Manager UK Project 
Management 
M 35 32 
CS019 Contract 
Manager 
Canada Supply Chain 
management 
M 26 20 
CS020 Contract 
Engineer 
Brunei Supply Chain 
management 
M 28 13 
CS021 Project Manager Brunei Project 
Management 
M 30 18 
CS022 Project Engineer Canada Project 
Management 
M 18 15 
CS023 Discipline 
Engineer 
Brunei Project 
Management 
M 22 18 
CS024 Project Services 
Leader 
Brunei Project 
Management 
M 27 25 
CS025 Field Engineer Brunei Project 
Management 
F 14 14 
CS026 Procurement 
Manager 
China Supply Chain 
management 
F 25 22 
CS027 Engineering 
Manager 
Singapore Project 
Management 
M 29 27 
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Respondent 
ID 
Job 
Classification 
Work 
Location 
Specialisation Sex Industry 
Experience 
(Years)  
Project 
Management 
Experience  
(Years) 
CS028 Project Leader Nigeria Project 
Management 
M 18 15 
CS029 Project Engineer Oman Project 
Management 
F 20 16 
CS030 Planning 
Engineer 
UK Project 
Management 
F 23 17 
CS031 Head Contracts  Brunei Supply Chain 
management 
F 26 12 
CS032 Contract 
Manager 
Nigeria Project 
Management 
M 27 23 
CS033 Project Engineer Brazil Project 
Management 
M 10 8 
CS034 Project Services 
Lead 
Nigeria Project 
Management 
M 17 12 
CS035 Cost Engineer Netherlands Project 
Management 
M 12 7 
CS036 Contract 
Engineer 
Netherlands Supply Chain 
management 
M 18 12 
CS037 Project Engineer Netherlands Project 
Management 
M 16 10 
CS038 Project Services 
Manager 
Philippines Project 
Management  
M 22 18 
CS039 Project Delivery 
Manager 
Kuala 
Lumpur 
Project 
Management 
M 28 24 
CS040 Project Engineer Qatar Project 
Management 
M 25 21 
CS041 Project Engineer Nigeria Project 
Management 
M 26 18 
CS042 Project Engineer Malaysia Project M 28 24 
(Cont’d) 
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Management 
CS043 Project Engineer Malaysia Project 
Management 
M 21 18 
CS044 Discipline 
Engineer 
Brunei Project 
Management 
M 18 10 
CS045 Project Engineer Nigeria Project 
Management 
M 30 26 
CS046 Project Manager Nigeria Project 
Management 
M 28 25 
CS047 Project Manager France Project 
Management 
M 27 24 
CS048 Contract Lead Nigeria Supply Chain 
management 
M 30 25 
CS049 Project Engineer Nigeria Project 
Management 
M 13 12 
CS050 Maintenance 
Engineer 
Nigeria Plant 
Maintenance 
M 17 15 
CS051 Team leader 
Contracts 
UK Supply Chain 
management 
M 26 21 
 
Source: developed for this research 
 
 
3.3.8 The Interview Questions 
 
One of the major challenges in data collection is ensuring that the data collected 
would enable the research questions to be answered in order to deliver on the 
objective of the research (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2003). Saunders et al (2003) 
developed ‘data requirements’ framework to enable researchers to check that all the 
investigative questions for the research are satisfactorily answered. Using this 
framework, this research should be able to determine the type of responses required 
for each questions and the variables for which data is required to be collected. For 
this research a ‘data requirement’ table is created below using the Saunders et al 
(2003) framework.  
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The interview questions are semi-structured. The level of the questions in sections A 
and B of the email interview are in line with the parameters defined by Yin (2003) as 
follows: Section A of the email interview asked questions about the background (job 
title, specialization, work location and experiences) of the respondents. Section B – 
contains questions designed to explore specific areas and issues in contracting in the 
company selected for the case study; questions designed to identify patterns in the oil 
and gas industry; questions developed from literature survey; and questions designed 
to draw conclusions and recommendations. Therefore to a large extent the email 
interview schedule is designed to contribute to rapport building and also pose 
questions which address the research questions (Yin, 2003). Refer to the table below 
for the listing of the specific questions and the target issues including sequencing of 
their occurrence (Lee, 1999).  
 
Table 3.6: Research Questions and relevant investigative questions 
 
Investigative 
Questions  
Variables Required Research Issue (RI) to be 
answered by the each 
question 
SECTION A 
Please complete section A: 
 
1) Job Title 
2) Work Location 
3) Specialisation* 
4) Sex 
5) Industry 
Experience (Number of 
Years only) 
6) Project 
Management Experience 
(Number of Years only) 
7) Date this 
Background of the 
respondents  
Remark: Information provided will 
be used to further screen the 
participants whether they meet the 
qualifications and experiences 
required to participate in this 
research 
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questionnaire was 
completed 
 
*this refers to the 
appropriate categorisation 
for your present job. 
Example: Supply Chain 
Management, Project 
Management, etc 
SECTION B 
Q1: Describe the current 
contracting strategy 
formation process in your 
organisation? 
Description of current 
contracting process steps.  
RI1: What are the methods used by 
corporations to arrive at the 
formation of contracting strategy? 
 
Q2: What are the main 
issues or problems with 
the current contract 
process?  
Raise issues or problems 
including opportunity for 
improvement of the current 
contracting processes.  
Q3: List the most popular 
contract types used under 
the current contracting 
environment? 
 
Sub Question 
What do you consider, if 
any, the advantages of 
reimbursable contracts over 
lump sum contracts, as 
applied to your Corporation 
Projects? 
Why some contract types are 
preferred over the others; 
Advantages & disadvantages 
of each contract types. 
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Investigative 
Questions  
Variables Required Research Issue (RI) to be 
answered by the each 
question 
SECTION B 
Q4: What are the reasons 
for the selection of these 
popular contracting types?  
 
Sub Questions 
a) What do you consider as 
the main drivers for the 
selection of a Contracting 
Strategy for Capital 
Projects?  
b) How are these drivers 
implemented and managed 
during the CAPEX phase of 
the Project. 
List of drivers used for 
contracting strategy selection; 
Methods of identifying, 
evaluating, ranking the 
drivers; Drivers identification 
and selection issues.  
 
RI2: How are the major drivers for 
Contract strategy formation 
identified, evaluated and ranked in 
importance and impact?  
 
 
Q5: Does the process for 
selection of Contract 
strategy change depending 
on Contracting type 
selected? 
Relationships between 
Contract Types & Drivers 
Selection; Drivers 
identification and selection 
issues. 
RI2: How are the major drivers for 
Contract strategy formation 
identified, evaluated and ranked in 
importance and impact?  
 
Q6: How do you define 
what a ‘correct’ or ‘optimal’ 
contract is? 
Respondent definition of 
optimality in contract; 
How to achieve optimal 
contract or a complete 
contract. 
 
RI1: What are the methods used by 
corporations to arrive at the 
formation of contracting strategy? 
 
Q7: List potential areas in 
the contracting process that 
costs could be reduced?  
 
How to achieve effective 
contract strategy; How to 
reduce cost in Contract 
process; Contract related 
RI1: What are the methods used by 
corporations to arrive at the 
formation of contracting strategy? 
 
(Cont’d) 
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Q8: How can cost reduction 
be achieved in the listed 
contracting process? 
issues at each phase of the 
Project lifecycle. 
  
 
Q9: What are the payment 
structures used for a given 
contract?  
 
How are the Payment types 
identified / selected? 
 
RI2: How are the major drivers for 
Contract strategy formation 
identified, evaluated and ranked in 
importance and impact? 
Q10: What are the factors 
taking into considerations in 
the design of payment 
structure for a given 
contract? 
 
What are the most popular 
payment types  
 
What are the relationships btw 
payment types / Contract 
types? 
Q11: What are the 
characteristics of a person, 
their positions, their 
assumed experience and 
general background 
involved in contract strategy 
formation? 
 
Who (What type of animal) 
background / experience 
 
People competencies / 
experiences issues or 
opportunity for improvement 
 
RI4: What are the characteristics of 
persons, their positions, their 
assumed experience and general 
background that are involved in the 
contract strategy formation process?  
 
Q12: What do you consider 
adequate qualifications, 
experience, and background 
for a person to be able to 
develop a contract strategy? 
  
Q13: What tool(s) are used 
by your company to arrive at 
a decision for selecting 
appropriate Contracting 
Strategy? Is this tool adding 
value to the process? Why?  
 
What tools used for the 
selection of contracting 
strategies  
 
Benefit and/or issues with 
usage of tool or non-usage 
RI1: What are the methods used by 
corporations to arrive at the 
formation of contracting strategy? 
 
Q14: What is your 
experience in designing and 
How are incentives designed 
 
RI2: How are the major drivers for 
Contract strategy formation 
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using positive and/or 
negative incentives? 
 
Sub Questions 
How is owner / contractor 
objective aligned? 
 
Issues and/or opportunity for 
improvement of current 
incentive design  
 
identified, evaluated and ranked in 
importance and impact?  
Q15: How is contract 
associated risks identified in 
a capital project 
 
How are the risks identified? 
 
RI3: What is the impact of 
identifying each risks element in the 
respective contracting types (Lump 
sum and reimbursable) and properly 
allocating the risks regardless of the 
contracting type selected.  Q16: How is the contract 
associated risk assigned 
between contractors and the 
owner  
How risks assigned between 
owner Contractors? 
 
 
Source: developed for this research 
 
To achieve convergence, which is one of the main strengths of the semi-structured 
interview in case studies (Yin, 2003; Rowley, 2002), this research drew on the 
benefit of the researcher’s professional network: this network enabled helped the 
researcher review and forward additional questions to the respondents to clarify or 
probe further information previously provided (Davis & Cosenza, 1994). 
Convergence is defined as exploring data/evidence from multiple sources 
(triangulation) to corroborate different sources or findings until a common pattern 
(convergence) can be achieved (Rowley, 2002). This research study will use multiple 
sources of data collection to assure construct validity. Methodological triangulation, 
that is, using multiple methods to study the problem, will help to achieve validity and 
reliability (Patton, 1990). In semi-structured interviews, follow-up questions to probe 
further answers provided by the interviewee can be very useful to achieve the sought-
after convergence.  
 
 84 Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.3.9 Data Analysis 
 
The main steps taking to collect data for this research are detailed above. This section 
deals with the next step of how to systematically analyse the data collected in such a 
way that it allows for meaningful conclusions to be drawn. The overarching aim of 
data analysis in a qualitative research is to allow the true meaning of data to emerge  
(Maykut & Morehouse, 1994; Perry, 1999).  
  
Miles and Huberman (1994) describe data reduction, data display and 
drawing/verifying conclusions as three concurrent activities in the process of data 
analysis. The activities involved in the data reduction process ranges from selecting, 
focusing, simplifying to transforming the data into meaningful piece of information. 
Data display can be achieved through coding to organize and compress the data to 
facilitate drawing conclusions. The main focus of data analysis based on the Miles 
and Huberman’s process is the ability to explore and transform the data to make 
sense of the Respondents’ experience of contract formulation strategy. Coding has 
been used by many qualitative researchers to facilitate the process of transforming 
the data (Rowley, 2002). 
 
The coding process involves three passes, – open coding (that is, assignment of 
labels to themes and categories); axial coding (that is, discover interactions and 
relationships including new ideas and new areas for coding); and selective coding 
(that is compare, contrast, and generalization) (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Neuman, 
1994). Saunders et al (2003) refers to the process of analysing data as generating 
categories and reorganizing data or designing a matrix and placing data together 
within cells. A thorough generalization involves adherence to the following 
principles which are the attributes of a good case research Yin (1994) and Rowley 
(2002, p. 24): 
  
1. The analysis makes use of all the relevant evidence. 
2. The analysis considers all of the major rival interpretations, and explores each of 
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them in turn. 
3. The analysis should address the most significant aspect of the case study. 
4. The analysis should draw on the researcher’s prior expert knowledge in the area 
of case study. However, the researcher needs to adopt a cautious attitude to 
reduce bias. 
 
For this research, the following measures were taken to increase generalisability. All 
evidence collected was thoroughly examined for relevance and interpreted 
accordingly using codes and hierarchical data structure. The research question 
focussed the analysis to address the most significant aspects of the case. Since this is 
a value-bound research, the researcher’s experiences in the oil and gas industry was 
valuable to ensure appropriate interpretation of the data.  
 
The task of data analysis, according to several authors, is not straightforward 
(Huberman & Miles, 2002; Rowley, 2002). Also, the challenge of the extent and 
complexity of the data analysis is also pointed to by statement that ‘data analysis of 
the rich resources - which includes a multitude of different evidence from different 
sources - is based on examining, categorising and tabulating evidence to assess 
whether the evidence supports or otherwise the initial proposition of the study 
(Rowley, 2002 p. 24). Huberman and Miles (2002) describe potential sources of bias 
in data analysis namely (i) ethical compromises or distortions, (ii) background 
experience of the evaluator, and (iii) limitations in human information processing 
abilities (Huberman & Miles, 2002).  
 
For this research, measures have been taken, as shown in preceding sections, to 
address the biases stated above. The design of the email interview based on the 
research questions and the fact that the respondents directly completed the email 
interview helped to manage the issues of compromises and distortions (Saunders et 
al, 2002). The potential limitations of the biases of the human information processing 
abilities in coding a large qualitative data set were addressed by the use of the data 
processing tool NVIVO (Gahan & Hannibal, 1998).  
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NVIVO is an off-the-shelf computer based tool used for the analysis of qualitative 
data. NVIVO helped to reduce the collected data and presented it in the simplest 
possible way. It provided a faster coding process of ideas from the respondents and 
documents, preventing delays during the data analysis (Bazeley & Richards, 2000). 
For this research, open codes (referred to as tree nodes in NVIVO) were created and 
organised into hierarchical structure of data. The creation of codes facilitated the 
discovering of interactions and relationships including new ideas and new areas of 
data for additional coding. The tree nodes and hierarchy were then queried. The 
reports were compared and contrasted for generalisation to elaborate the existing 
body of knowledge and theory, where there was evidence from the data. The 
meaningful information was used to construct a framework of the current practices of 
contracting strategies formation. NVIVO also served as the ‘case study database’ 
containing multitude of evidence from different sources gathered for this research. 
Having this database strengthened one of the outcomes of the research which is the 
repeatability of the research thereby increasing the transparency of the findings. 
Furthermore, the use of NVIVO for data analysis purposes had many benefits, such 
as quick access to the data, easy location of the data, easy to find details in the data, 
visualisation capabilities, and easy retrieval of emails..  
 
In the analysis of the data collected, the main objectives was to ‘look for regularities’ 
through the study and interpretation of the interview scripts and responses to the 
email interview in order to tell the story of how the themes are related and how the 
characteristics of the speaker accounts for the existence of the themes (Bernard & 
Ryan, 2010). This analysis also achieved the exploratory objective of this research 
which was to establish initial themes and patterns and to build the framework of how 
contract strategy is formulated in the oil and Gas Corporation. Therefore, the 
intention of the analysis is to find themes, code the themes, discover codes and build 
the categories.  
 
To begin the analysis of the data – the following tasks were carried out:(i) Discover 
themes and subthemes, (ii) describe elements of the themes, (iii) build hierarchies of 
the themes and codebooks (iv) attach themes to chunk of data or texts, and (v) Link 
themes into theoretical model (Bernard & Ryan, 2010).  The technique used for 
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discovering the themes was line-by-line analysis which is labour intensive and 
according to (Bernard & Ryan, 2010) is something ‘only people can do’. In addition 
to the above manual analysis, NVIVO was also used to provide further 
computational analysis and key word search. The word tree of NVIVO was also very 
useful in building the word string. However, based on my experience in the course of 
analysing the data using NVIVO, I discovered that the tool cannot deliver the line-
by-line analysis which is required to achieve clarity to interpret the data and hence 
deduce true meaning.  NVIVO suits short responses, but to derive useful meaning 
from longer responses, it was necessary for the researcher to manually examine the 
raw data from the interviews, and to interpret it for significance.  
 
3.3.10 Validity and Reliability 
 
Whilst it is noted that the criteria for judging interpretative research are still fluid and 
emergent; validity has remained the main issue in the legitimacy of a qualitative 
research  (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Huberman & Miles, 2002; Kvale, 1996; Kirk & 
Miller, 1986; Eisenhardt, 1989). There is continued debate on the usefulness or 
legitimacy of validity in qualitative inquiry. Wolcott (1990) and Huberman and 
Miles (2002) both agreed that ‘understanding is a more fundamental concept for 
qualitative research than validity’ (Wolcott, 1990 p. 146) as cited in Huberman & 
Miles, 2002). Guba and Lincoln (1982) argued that the term ‘validity’ belongs to the 
positivist school of thoughts and should be replaced with the concept of 
‘authenticity’.  
 
Given that in the field of management research, validity and reliability is generally 
regarded as the basis for the acceptance of a given piece of research as knowledge 
(Rowley, 2002), the testing of this research will use a similar model. The tests used 
to establish the quality of this empirical qualitative research are tabulated below. This 
study seek to satisfy four criteria to establish the quality of empirical qualitative 
research tabulated below. The table is adapted from Shenton (2004, P. 63) 
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Table 3.7: Testing of Case Study design 
 
Tests What is it? Tactics Phase of 
research in 
which tactics 
occurs 
Credibility  
 
 ‘How congruent 
are the findings 
with reality’ in 
establishing 
‘trustworthiness’ 
(Shenton, 2004, 
p.64 
Adopt well established research 
methods. Where possible 
methods used in comparable 
studies in the past; Early 
familiarity with the culture of 
participating organisation; 
random sampling; 
triangulation; honesty in 
informant iterative questioning; 
negative case analysis; frequent 
debriefing; peer scrutiny of 
research project; researcher’s 
reflective commentary; 
background, qualifications and 
experience of investigator; 
member check (i.e. on the spot 
check of accuracy of data 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1985); and 
detailed description of the 
phenomena under scrutiny; 
examination of previous 
research finding 
Data 
Gathering and 
Data Analysis   
Transferability  Demonstrating 
that the result of 
the work can be 
applied to a 
Assume each unique case as an 
example within a broader 
group; provide sufficient 
contextual information to 
Research 
Design; 
Data Analysis 
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wider 
population 
enable practitioners relate the 
findings to their own position; 
convey the boundaries of the 
study; and provide the results 
within the context of the 
particular characteristics. 
Dependability  In-depth 
methodological 
description to 
allow study to 
be repeated 
Report the process within the 
study in detail – this includes 
the research design and its 
implementation; the operational 
detail of data gathering; and the 
reflective appraisal of the 
project  
Research 
Design 
Confirmability  Investigator’s 
comparable 
concern to 
objectivity  
Triangulation to reduce effect 
of researcher’s bias; admission 
of researcher’s belief and 
assumptions; recognition of 
shortcomings of the study 
methods; In-depth 
methodological description to 
allow to allow integrity of 
research results; and the use of 
diagrams to demonstrate audit 
trail.  
Research 
Design, Data 
Analysis  
 
Source: Adapted from Shenton, 2004, p.63). 
 
3.3.11 Credibility of the Researcher 
 
Qualitative research is in social science that depends on watching people in their own 
territory and interacting with them in their own language and in their own terms. 
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(Kirk & Miller, 1986, p. 2). This research is qualitative. It is rooted in social science. 
A qualitative research has to be ‘naturalistic, ethnographic and participatory’ (Kirk 
and Miller, 1986). If qualitative research has to be truly naturalistic, ethnographic 
and participatory, the researcher should to a large extent be sufficiently aware of 
cultural context of the research so as to confidently interpret the findings (Kirk and 
Miller, 1986).  
 
Guba and Lincoln (1982) distinguished rationalistic and naturalistic paradigms of 
inquiries. While naturalistic see the relation of values to inquiry as ‘value-bound’, the 
rationalistic sees it as ‘value-free’. What does this all mean? Value-bound means that 
the ‘inquiry is inevitably grounded in the value systems that characterized the 
inquirer, the respondent, the paradigm chosen, the methods selected, and the social 
and conceptual contexts (Guba & Lincoln, 1982). The rationalistic school of thought, 
presupposes that inquiry is value-free, that is, the data speaks for themselves’, 
transcend the value of the inquirer and respondents, and outcomes of the inquiry are 
guaranteed by the methodology chosen (Guba & Lincoln, 1982). Miles and 
Huberman (2002) averred that to study society naturalistically is in ‘a spirit of 
unfettered inquiry’, that is, ‘researcher positions himself as a witness to a social 
situation or setting’.   
 
The researcher is an oil and gas industry practitioner with significant experience in 
formulating Contracts in Capital Projects. However, the fact that the researcher is an 
experienced oil and gas professional may be perceived as a cause of bias in the 
collection and interpretation of the data for this research. Providing that appropriate 
measures are taken to ensure that such expert knowledge or experience does not lead 
to bias, it is submitted that it is an advantage because the researcher can speak and 
understand the jargon of the oil and gas engineers, and is able to identify the 
presence or absence of the required data for the research (Kirk and Miller, 1986).  
 
This judgement brought by the researcher is described by Miles and Huberman 
(2002) as ‘deep familiarity’ which involves researchers subjecting themselves to the 
environment under examination so that they can physically penetrate the cycle of 
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response of the participants’ social situation or work situation. The caution is that 
this situation of deep familiarity can also be seen as a source of bias, if it results in ‘a 
tendency for the researcher to collect data, and/or to interpret and present these data 
in such a way as to favour false results’ (Jupp, 2006).  
 
To avoid biases on the part of the researcher, the general tendency is for the 
researcher to document all his initial assumptions so that they can be cross checked 
for bias at the conclusion of the research for biases Jupp (2006). Further, it is argued 
that a researcher has to be ‘objective’ and to pursue the research with commitment to 
discovering the truth just like ‘anyone’ regardless of their ‘personal characteristics or 
social position’ Jupp (2006).  
 
This allows the characteristics of a good researcher to be presented as: Sound 
familiarity with the phenomenon; a multidisciplinary approach; good investigative 
skills and the ability to ‘ward off premature closure. Miles and Huberman (1994) 
 
It is of obvious value for the present researcher to possess these characteristics. The 
idea of ‘value-free’ can be left to history in favour of ‘value-bound’ research. 
Furthermore, as a social science, Qualitative research is empirical. Therefore, true 
knowledge can be built from the foundation through logical means.  
 
3.4 ETHICAL ISSUES 
 
In terms of the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) ethics compliance 
requirements, this research is considered to be of a general low risk. This assessment 
is based on potential risks identified for a project. Given the research topic and the 
methods used in administering the interview questionnaires, there were no 
foreseeable risks of harm or discomfort for the participants as a result of their 
participation. The research participants faced no additional risk other than that 
associated with their normal day-to-day living. However, it is a mandatory 
requirement of QUT to ensure that all research involving humans complies with 
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ethics requirements. This is also supported by Cooper and Emory (1995) who 
advocated that responsible researchers must take appropriate and proactive steps 
during planning to handle anticipated ethical issues in the research.  
 
Thus, prior approach to the participants in company’s learning events was essential 
to brief engineers, supply chain managers, and project managers about the research 
and to solicit informed consent for their participation in completing the research 
interviews. The participants were advised that their participation was voluntary. They 
were assured that nothing about their participation, name, or company name will be 
reported as part of the interview – anonymity agreed (Patton, 1990).  
 
Each participant was issued with the participant information sheet (PIS) which 
contained descriptions of the research, what they were expected to do, how the 
information provided by them will be used including their rights. The participant’s 
name and identity including Company name/employer of the respondent was 
removed from the original email interview responses submitted by the participants. 
The need to assure confidentiality through disguising the case study or information 
supplied is supported by Yin (2003). The data captured is restricted to the researcher 
to protect the identity of the respondent from being made public.  
 
3.5 LIMITATIONS AND KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The major limitations for this research are as follows: 
 
Limitation as a result of the methods used in the administration of the interview 
schedule - email. Traditionally, semi-structured interview are administered face-to-
face.  There is also the added advantage to probe in-depth and follow-up statements 
and answers provided by the interviewer. But it should be noted that the main 
criticism of the in-depth interview is its ‘heavy’ dependence on the interview skills 
and ability of the interviewer (Zikmund, 1997).  
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This research has elected to forward the semi-structured interview schedule by email 
to the participants. This approach has advantages and disadvantages. Not least, it 
eliminates the ‘weaknesses’ of the interviewer; but it should be noted that the 
respondents are well-educated people and with sound working experience. 
Completing an exploratory email interview was unlikely to be a problem. Points 
needing clarifications could be settled by provision of the researcher’s phone number 
and email address. Follow-up or further probing can be carried out via emails or 
telephones after a review of initial submission of the interview questions.  
 
Sampling limitation as a result of restricting the study to one oil and gas company, if 
argued as non-representative of the entire oil and gas companies, may become an 
issue. But the issues affecting one oil and gas corporation can indeed be generalised 
to be similar to those experienced by other oil and gas companies in the industry. 
Therefore, it is safe to generalise the outcome of this research, within certain 
limitations, to be applicable to all oil and gas companies, thus enhancing its utility. 
     
3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how the research questions and issues 
raised in the preceding chapter on literature review were investigated. The research 
paradigm which will guide the researcher and the selection of the most appropriate 
methodology for the research was also selected and discussed in details.  
 
This research is an exploratory, case study research using the qualitative 
methodology. The research instruments for data gathering were carefully selected 
based on the chosen methodology; but with some flexibility in the administration of 
emailed semi-structured interview questions. This chapter also highlights the 
challenges and precautions taken to ensure that the flexibility in the data collection 
approach do not impact the response rate of the participants. The actions and 
limitations of this research are guided by the QUT ethics compliance requirements. 
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The participants in this research and their responses to the questionnaires were and 
will be treated as anonymous.  
 
The overarching aim of data analysis in a qualitative research is to allow the true 
meaning of data to emerge. The next chapter will discuss the data analysis in detail. 
The data analysis chapter will build on the summary given in 3.3.6 above. This 
chapter provides details on how the data collected were systematically analysed to 
allow meaningful conclusions to be drawn.  
 
 
 Chapter 4: Data 
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter described 
address the research question; (how structured contract strategies can be formulated 
in the oil and gas Industry.
data collected to address this question. The purpose of this analysis is to develop a 
model of the current contract formulation strategies employed in the oil and gas 
industry. This model then cont
contract formulation strategy (
main sections. The first and second section
and present the details and descripti
sections contain the detailed analysis of the data for the research issues and summary 
of findings including current contract formation framework
 
Figure 4.1: Outline of chapter
Source: developed for this 
Analysis 
 
and justified the research methodology employed to 
 This chapter presents the findings of the analysis of the 
ributes to the development and test of an optimal 
see Chapter 5). The chapter is structured into four 
s contain the introduction to this chapter 
on of the respondents. The third and fourth 
.  
 4 
 
research 
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4.2 DATA CODING 
This research used one main question and four sub questions in the study.  
The main question is: how can structured contract strategies be established in the 
oil and gas industry? 
 
The following four sub questions were used in investigating the main question.  
RI1: What are the methods used by corporations to arrive at the formation of 
contracting strategy? 
RI2:  How are the major drivers for contract strategy formation identified, 
evaluated and ranked in importance and impact?  
RI3: What is the impact of identifying each risk element in the respective contract 
types (Lump sum and reimbursable) and properly allocating the risks regardless of 
the contract type selected? 
RI4: What are the characteristics of persons, their positions, their assumed 
experience and general background that are involved in the contract strategy 
formation process? 
 
As a result of rigorous, detailed and intensive analysis of the content of the 
responses, documents, and field notes, meaningful themes in the data were 
established through code development.  Theses codes provided the opportunity to 
look for more common themes (Creswell, 1998). Based on this approach, matrices 
that were developed from responses to the questions (Miles & Huberman, 1994) are 
presented in figures and tables. 
 
Based on the above, Nine (9) themes were identified in the data. These themes are 
both descriptive (how oil and gas industry contracts are being formulated and 
Analytical (why contracts are being formulated in this way). It covers the ‘What’, 
‘How’, and ‘Why’ which are typical questions in a project management context. The 
nine themes emerge from a comprehensive analysis of some 100 pages of data. 
However, it is acknowledged that there are no authoritative rules on the number of 
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themes (Patton, 2002). The number of themes depends on the data, the research 
problems and issues. The themes were synthesised from the ‘rich qualitative sources 
on which they were based’ (Perry, 2002, p. 36)  and depicted below.   
 
Table 4.1: Research Issues and Findings 
 
Source: developed for this research 
 
 
4.3 ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH ISSUES  
 This section presents the data that emerged from an analysis of each of the four 
research issues indicated in Table 4.1. This section is detailed because of the richness 
Research 
Issues (RI) Themes Findings
Theme 1.1                         
(What, Why)
Finding 1: Contract strategy formulation process is too lengthy and prescriptive hence the 
delay in establishing contracts for Projects.
Theme 1.2                                 
(Why, How)
Finding 2: The selection of a value for money contractor is the most practical  option to 
reduce the cost of projects through Contracts
Theme 2.1                              
(How)
Finding 3: For the successful execution of a given contract strategy the alignment of Drivers 
between Contractor and Owneris crucial to ensure a common goal to deliver the project 
objectives.
Theme 2.2                                        
(What)
Finding 4: The risks of selecting a suboptimal contract strategy is very high due to National 
Oil Company or Joint Venture directives  and interferences.
Theme 2.3                          
(How, Why)
Finding 5: Corporate policy prescribes drivers for the formation of contracts hence lack of 
flexibility and non inclusion of some drivers in the contract strategy formation for projects.
Theme 2.4                           
(Why)
Finding 6: Reimbursable contracts produce better quality work at lower cost than Lump 
Sum contracts but companies prefers Lump Sum Contracts
RI3
Theme 3.1                                
(Why)
Finding 7: The basic principles of risks allocation/assignment are not complied with in the 
allocation of Risks in a given Contract.
Theme 4.1                              
(What)
Finding 8: Personnel responsible for making Contract strategy decisions should have sound 
local experience which includes good knowledge of the local market and local 
stakeholders.
Theme 4.2                                                       
(What)
Finding 9: Project Managers feels exposed to the risks of suboptimal contracts by not 
having experienced Contract professionals in the Project team.
RI1
RI2
RI4
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of the data and many readers expect many details with empirical evidence from the 
one hundred pages of data collected (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). A summary of 
the findings is in section 4.4 below.  
 
4.3.1. Research Issue 1: What are the methods used by corporations to arrive at 
the formation of contracting strategy? 
This research issue examines the current contract strategy formulation methods used 
by oil and gas corporations. This research issue is a critical step in establishing the 
current methods which will (1) contribute to constructing the framework of the 
current contracting strategy, and (2) ascertain what the current issues and gaps are in 
the formation of contract strategy hence establish the effectiveness of the current 
methods. It was also the intention of this researcher to learn from the rich experience 
of the project managers on how to put in place an optimal contract strategy.  
 
Based on the analysis and interpretation of the data, two main themes arose for 
Research Issue 1. One of the themes relates to the ‘what’ and ‘why’. The other 
relates to the ‘How’. This research shall first examine the findings relating to the 
‘what’ and ‘why’ theme. 
 
Theme 1.1. The contract strategy formulation process 
The first finding out of research issue 1 is that contract strategy formulation 
process is too lengthy and prescriptive hence the delay in establishing contracts 
for Projects. This finding can be looked at broadly in two main aspects. One is the 
process issues and the other people issues. The process issues deals with the number 
of organizationally prescribed steps to put a contract in place. While the people 
aspect of the finding looks at the issues with getting relevant skilled and experience 
contract personnel to manage the contract formation steps. The people issue is 
addressed in theme 4.1.  
 
The steps involved in formulating the contracting strategy according to CS025 are as 
follows ‘… (a) establish scopes and spend (b) develop strategy (c) develop tender 
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package (d) tender (e) evaluate and award’. In addition to the above steps, CS028 
stated that following the approval of the contract strategy ’… a contract tactics 
workshop will follow to establish the most effective tactics for realizing the objectives 
of the contract strategy’. This process is heavily criticized by PMs as too lengthy and 
prescriptive. CS025 noted amongst others that the drawback of the current process 
includes ‘… insufficient tender information, lengthy tendering process…, wrong 
strategy..., contract document poorly prepared…’. CS028 added that the ‘... time 
between strategy development and award is variable but is typically 2 to 4 years, by 
which time market conditions and the operating environment would have changed 
significantly’.  
 
In addition, CS031 a head of contract department, stated that ‘… the contract process 
is probably as clear as mud …’. Other respondents such as CS009, Operations 
engineer with over 33 years industry experience, noted that the ‘… C&P (i.e. 
Contract and Procurement) strategy development: is more a tick in the box exercise 
rather than a fit for purpose solution’. Similarly, respondent CS034 (Project Services 
Lead) in reference to the end-to-end process steps and the required activities to 
establish a contracting strategy stated that ‘…it is taking too long to arrive at firm 
conclusions....,  taking too long to approve and award execution phase contracts’.  
Hence a ‘suboptimal contract strategy’ is used from the start of the project. 
The importance of timely establishment of a contracting strategy was further 
highlighted by CS008. He stated that ‘… it is very important that as much effort is 
put into early contract strategy and planning as soon as is possible’. 
 
A review of each of the steps listed above by CS025 on the formation of contract 
strategy to determine which of the activities could be contributing the most to time 
wastage or delay shows as follows: 
 
A. Establishing the scope of the work using the organizations approved process is a 
major challenge. The choice of the contract strategy to be used depends on the 
completeness of the scope of work. Using NVIVO queries, this research carried out 
key word search for ‘Scope’. The main reason for doing this was to find out from 
 100 Chapter 4: Data Analysis 
project managers if there were any issues with scope definition. It was found that 
words such as time, unclear, inadequate, poor, proper, incomplete, change, creep, 
growth, well-written, and well-defined were used as leading adjectives or trailing 
words to qualify ‘scope’. Out of the 89 times that the word ‘scope’ was used in the 
responses, it had one of the above words in the same sentence 58 times (65%). This 
is a clear indication of the concerns and issues relating to scope definitions and 
clarity of scope. Some of the respondents were very particular about the time 
required to define a firm scope of work.  CS029 in his response implied that one of 
the checks should be whether sufficient time has been invested in defining scope of 
work; ‘… have I invested time to come with clear scope of work?’  
 
Another comment which is very critical to this discussion was raised by CS041 on 
the need for a ‘… Well written and complete scope of work’. However important this 
two comments are. One of the major challenges which corporations face is the lack 
of adequate and experienced personnel to prepare the scope of work and also manage 
the work. Hence it is not uncommon to see contractors and owners selecting contract 
strategy based on lack of clarity / incompleteness of the scope of work as in the 
example given by CS014: ‘Inadequate scope development does not favor fixed price 
contracting ... the advantage of the reimbursable contract is that you can work with 
poorly defined scope’. 
 
B. Pre-selection of contractors is a very important step in the contractor selection 
process. The pre-selection exercise is aimed at producing a short list of contractors 
that a tender package will be issued to as part of the tender process for bidding. In 
some organisations, this step is called pre-qualification (PQ). The major objective of 
the prequalification is to save time in evaluating tenders since only bidders that have 
been shortlisted will be invited to bid. Asked to provide some pros and cons of the 
practices by some companies to prequalify vendors and contractors: 14 (56%) out of 
25 respondents, criticised the practice of pre-qualification as complex, time wasting 
resulting in schedule delay, lacking quality and information required to properly 
conduct the exercise, lack of experienced personnel to carry out the exercise, and in 
some cases, prequalification is not allowed by some National Oil Company (NOC).   
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Table 4.2 contains responses given by project managers on the practices of 
prequalifying contractors and the meanings deduced from the quotations.  
 
Table 4.2: The practices of prequalifying contractors 
 
Source: developed for this research 
 
The intention of the practice of pre-qualification in the selection of contractor is 
aimed at proving ‘... that the Contractor is capable to do the work in the first place’ 
(CS004) and ‘...saves time in the final evaluation of the bids’ (CS006). But ‘the 
challenge and pressure to get the pre-qualification right … for example a team may 
be required to carry out ... 12 rounds of pre-qualifications ... consisting of in excess 
of 200 clarifications’ (CS012) will surely impact on the time to complete the 
selection of the contractor and also the quality of the exercise. The challenge is even 
more daunting with only very few competent and experienced contract personnel in 
the owner’s team. 
 
Respondent Role/Position Quotes Conclusion / Meaning
CS027 Engineering 
Manager
.. PQ (PreQualification) questionnaire is not in simple and easy 
to follow language ... and it is a challenge to compile such a 
questionnaire
Complex
CS036 Contract Engineer ... In some cases, pre-qualification not necessary. Where used, it 
should be focused ... on project specific issues, pre-qualification 
is rather based on general competence.
Not required
Discipline Engineer ...Prequalification not required..... Not required
...access to all information required in proper contractor pre-
qualification...
Lack of information
CS001 pre-qualification not done thoroughly enough. Lack of Quality
CS028 Snr Lecturer ... rigorous pre-qualification of bidders ... Lack of Quality
CS003 Operations 
Engineer
process needs to be supported by experienced personnel from 
‘COMPANY X’ side, not by people new to the position.
Lack of experienced 
Personnel 
CS005 Team Leader Cost ... Previous work record looked in at pre-qualification/technical 
evaluation phas.
Lack of information
CS021 Project Manager ... will avoid some of the pre-qualification and tendering that we 
have to go through for every project and should help avoid 
schedule delays.
Time Delays
CS011 Project Manager risks of eliminating good contractor during the pre-qualification. Lack of Quality
CS031 Head Contracts Elements included in the pre-qualification are usually not 
defined properly.  Process is also not clearly routed.
Lack of quality
CS036 Contract Engineer failure to focus the pre-qualification on project specific issues, 
pre-qualification is rather based on general competence
Lack of quality
CS017 Contract Team 
Leader
Based on ...(NOC) procedure, prequalification of bidders via 
certain set of criteria is not allowed.
NOC/JV Directives
CS023
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The next step in the process of contract formation is the tendering of the work 
packages to preselected contractors. Out of a total of 25 respondents, 28% believe 
that this process requires improvement. The main criticism of the process of 
tendering are as follows: ‘Insufficient tender information, lengthy tendering process, 
..., and Inefficient tender board process’ (CS025); ‘late tender planning and slow 
turnaround of tender circulars in response the queries and clarification requests’ 
(CS041), and ‘poorly presented project supply chain council or tender board paper’ 
(CS041). Other issues include the ‘competence of members of Project Supply Chain 
Councils and Tender Boards’, (CS041), and ‘... the time required to tender the 
work...’ (CS015). 
 
As seen above, one contributing factor to the lengthy tender process is the lack of 
experience and competence in the owner team, both in the preparation of the tender 
papers, simplifying the tender process, and in making decisions in the tender board or 
Supply Chain Council. 
 
In conclusion, it can be seen that corporations have processes for the formation of 
contracts. These processes are complex (described by one PM as “clear as mud”) and 
also very prescriptive. The major limitation for the PMs is the amount of time and 
effort required to put a contract in place. Some of the steps in the process of 
formation of a contract are not necessary but required to be complied with by the 
corporations. This not very efficient requirement contributes to the delays in 
establishing a contract as well as lead to the selection of suboptimal contracts. The 
PMs are also affected by the lack of experienced contract professionals. Finally, it is 
still not known how PMs utilise this prescriptive framework.  
 
Refer to appendix D for some illustrative quotes / extracts captured from email 
interview respondents.  
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Theme 1.2. The contract selection criteria 
The second finding out of research issue 1 is that the selection of value for money 
contractor is the most practical option to reduce the cost of projects through 
Contracts. This theme is related to the ‘why’ and ‘how’ themes of the contract 
strategy formation. It explains ‘why’ the costs of projects are high, and ‘how’ the 
selection of lowest bidder contractor could result in high cost. Project Managers and 
indeed corporations are concerned about the high cost of capital projects. The 
selection of the most appropriate contracts (optimal) also includes the selection of the 
best placed and qualified contractor to execute the work. A contract strategy cannot 
be complete if it doesn’t consider all aspects of the contracting process from how to 
select contractors to how to close out the contracts (Hartman 2003). Once the scope 
of work has been agreed and the tender approved by the Supply Chain Council, the 
successful delivery of the work package is in the hands of the selected contractor. 
Hence this process of ensuring that the best available contractor is selected is critical. 
 
The decision of which contractor to engage is based on a number of factors dictated 
by the current practice in the corporation. It is required that the successful contractor 
should be selected through a competitive tender. The successful contractor will be 
the one which meets the set criteria and prove to be technically qualified and 
commercially the lowest bidder. This practice is seen as a way to select a technically 
good contractor but yet come in at a low cost. Based on the experience of project 
managers, ‘Lowest bidder is not always cheap in a lifecycle cost...’ (CS026). 
Similarly, CS025 summed up his experience of working with a lowest bidder 
contractor as ‘... lack of competent personnel, inadequate tools/equipment and 
contractor’s staff complained about low salary …’. In addition, CS036 stated that: 
‘lowest bidders: cut corners/quality of work, look for every possible change’. Based 
on the above, it is apparent that Project Managers recognize that being the lowest 
bidder does not mean that the project will be completed at a low cost and good 
quality. The Project managers also recognize that there are various reasons why the 
bid may be low. One of the reasons given by CS013 is that the lowest bidder price 
may be low because ‘… he did not fully understand the scope of work, … have 
priced the scope of work incorrectly… as he is inexperienced with the type of project 
… Or … coming in low, just to win the job, and then later on recover his costs via  
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aggressive claims’. In supporting this statement, CS018 gave example of a plant in 
Buenos Aires where ‘...a very special membrane filtration unit failed twice, because 
it was from a cheaper supplier rather than a proven one’.  
 
Based on the above, this research carried out further detailed analysis of the data to 
confirm the concerns of project managers on lowest bidders. Project Managers share 
the same opinion about lowest bidding contractors. Based on responses from 15 
respondents that answered the questions which compared lowest bidder versus value 
for money contractor, 12 (80%) expressed the following concerns: 
 
Table 4.3: Attributes of lowest bidder contractor 
 
Source: developed for this research  
 
Using NVIVO word count, the number of responses which matches one or more of 
the following attributes of a lowest bidder were further tabulated based on frequency 
of each related answer. The attributes are: Low staff morale, Low efficiency and 
productivity, desperate to secure the job, scope understanding/changes to scope, 
expensive/costly, and incompetent. These attributes were deduced from the above 
quotes. The table below shows the percentage of the number of respondents that 
agreed with one or more of the attributes.  
 
 
Responses Interpretation/Attributes
  Low salary to staffs Low morale
  Low efficiency and productivity, not a good contractor..... Low efficiency and productivity
  Estimates might be bid to low to get the job Desperate to Secure the job
  Lowest bidder has come in low because he is desperate for ... Desperate to Secure the job
  Vendors always bid low in order to secure a.... Desperate to Secure the job
  Or is he coming in low just to win the job Desperate to Secure the job
  Or is he coming in low because he did not fully understand the scope Do not understand scope, changes/variations
  Or is his price low because he did not fully understand the scope Do not understand scope, changes/variations
  …. are they buying the work on potential for Change Do not understand scope, changes/variations
  Lowest bidder is not always cheap in a lifecycle cost when ... Expensive/Costly
  ... is always costly to have cheap contract initially but a lot.... Expensive/Costly
  .... may not be as technically competent for the job as a..... Incompetent
  … cut corners/quality of work, look for every possible change  … Low efficiency and productivity
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Table 4.4: Statistical analysis of the attributes of a lowest bid contractor 
 
Note: the total number of respondents for this analysis is 15. 
Source: developed for this research  
 
As seen in the analysis above, a majority (64%) of the respondents agreed that the 
lowest bid contractor do not understand project scope. Lack of understanding of 
project scope could lead to inaccurate pricing of the work. CS013 supported this 
statement. He stated that the lowest bid contractor may have ‘… priced the work 
incorrectly (in this case too low) as he is inexperienced with the type of project…’ A 
very important findings of the analysis is that most of the respondents that stated that 
the lowest bidder may not have a good understanding of the scope, also suggested 
that the lowest bidder may have intentionally priced low so as to secure the job.  
 
The above suggestions ‘intentionally priced low’ further implies that the lowest 
bidder may have hidden plan/information to recover cost and make profit through 
‘aggressive claims’ (CS013). This action further confirms the theory of adverse 
selection. The owner may decide to seek ‘value or truthful’ information. But within 
the dictate of the company prescribed contract framework. Hence, he is forced into 
selecting the lowest bidder to comply with corporate policy. Another point worth 
mentioning is the fact that 36% of the respondents associated the lowest bidder 
contractor with not being competent and low staff morale. One of the respondents 
(CS025) stated that where lowest bidder is selected, ‘… problems start to develop 
during contract’s execution e.g. lack of competent personnel ... and contractor’s staff 
complained about low salary’. 
 
There is a strong correlation in the data between those respondents who suggested 
that the lowest bidder does not understand the scope, and that the lowest bidder is 
more expensive and hence high cost. On a one-to-one matching of the responses, 
Respondent
Low staff 
morale
Low efficiency and 
productivity 
desperate to 
secure the job 
Do not understand 
scope, changes / 
variations  expensive/costly  Incompetent 
Response % 14% 21% 29% 64% 64% 36%
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67% of respondents shared this view. CS031 warned that ‘…very often these bidders 
turn out to be not-so-lowest-cost contractors’. In addition, CS030 also stated that ‘… 
often the lowest bidder may end up being more expensive’. This is supported by the 
analysis in the above table; where over 64% of the respondents stated that the lowest 
bidder is expensive and costly. 
 
On the other hand, the selection of a value for money contractor is seen as the most 
practical option to lower the high cost of projects. CS029 defines value for money 
contractor as a contractor who can ensure that ‘… the money you pay to the 
contractor is commensurate to the technical merits and quality of work being 
delivered’. In addition, he stated that ‘… the best value for money contract is the one 
that emerged from the competitive bidding…and demonstrates value for money 
through establishing a competitive price’. In order to ascertain the value add through 
cost reduction by selecting a value for money bidder, the company estimates must be 
established taking into considerations the total cost of ownership (TCO) versus the 
initial capital expenditure (CAPEX) cost (CS011). According to CS026, ‘value for 
money bidder may seem expensive at first glance, but the TCO will throw lights on 
the lifecycle cost’. 
 
The main advantages of the use of value for money contractor includes: ‘… more 
control, more transparent, better quality work…’ (CS036); ‘… safely, timely and 
within budget … with no claims and variations…’ (CS025). Where timely 
establishment of a contract and the speed of delivery of a project has become critical 
success factor for the project, ‘then the value for money contractor should offer 
project managers the “best value proposition” (CS041). 
 
Whilst value for money contractor may be the ‘… most preferred option…’ (CS037) 
by project managers, CS020 stated that there is always ‘… high pressure from 
project developers and financers to go for the lowest price’. This statement is 
supported by CS028. He added that ‘… JV partner directives also introduce stringent 
conditions for deviating from the lowest bidder approach’.  
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Despite the overwhelming support for the use of value for money contractors, some 
project managers still believe that not all work should be executed using value for 
money contractors. For example, CS030 is in favour of using lowest bidder 
contractor for ‘… a small, simple short project’. This type of work, he said ‘… could 
easily go to the lowest bidder’. This suggestion does not change his preference to use 
value for money contractor for ‘larger and more complex projects’.  He stated that 
for larger projects, ‘… it is important that the bidder has fully understood the work 
scope and often the lowest bidder may end up being more expensive’. 
 
The concept of ‘sub-optimal’ contract strategy was also discovered in the analysis of 
the data. This concept was used to describe the type of contracts put in place through 
the selection of lowest bidder. Some of the project managers advised against the use 
of ‘sub-optimal contract strategy’ (CS028) because a contract that is not optimal will 
lead to ‘… scope creep and cost increase through multiple changes’ (CS030). In 
addition, there will be a lot of overhead to manage this type of contract hence a large 
owner team may be required (CS021).  
 
The warning given by CS007 on the selection of lowest bidder contractor cannot be 
overlooked in closing out these findings. He stated that with lowest bidders executing 
your work, ‘the joy of a discount will be long gone over the joy of quality’. He 
further warned, ‘always be careful with this. Is it quantity or quality you’re after?’ 
Hence, if one is looking for quality and the ‘most cost-effective’ (CS002) contractor, 
then value for money contractor are the only option. Therefore, it is correct to 
conclude that the lowest bid contract ‘…does not necessarily mean the … lowest 
price’ (CS001) and also the lowest bid ‘… does not usually offer …’ the best value 
proposition’ (CS041).  
 
In summary, the data further confirm three of the attributes of an optimal contract 
strategy which is (i) the use of value for money contractor, (ii) the need for quality 
(valued or truthful) information, and (iii) the use of trust and relationship to ensure 
efficient contract management. The data also throw more light on the attributes of a 
value for money contractor. This attributes includes – quality work, no scope creep, 
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low changes, lack of disputes, good and competent workers, trust, and good 
relationships. 
 
Refer to appendix E for some illustrative quotes / extracts captured from email 
interview respondents.  
 
4.3.2. Research Issue 2: How are the major drivers for Contract strategy 
formation identified, evaluated and ranked in importance and impact?  
This research question examines how the drivers used for the formation of contract 
strategy are identified, evaluated and ranked in importance and impact. The need to 
have well designed drivers for a project was examined in detail in the literature 
review (see Chapter 2). The drivers, amongst others, enable the owner to develop an 
effective payment terms, identify the behaviour to incentivize, and the type of 
contractors required to do the work. Hence tailor the tender package to attract a value 
for money contractor. These attributes are some of the main characteristics of 
optimal contracts which here listed in chapter 2 (section 2.5). Furthermore, little is 
known about how project managers utilise the prescriptive framework or the 
operating contingencies that influence how project managers interpret this 
prescriptive framework. It is the aim of this research issue to further establish how 
the prescriptive framework is used and also how PMs select the drivers used in the 
formation of contracts.   
 
The questions used to solicit response on this research issues were aimed to establish 
drivers used for contract strategy selections, methods of identifying, evaluating, 
ranking the drivers, and driver identification and selection related issues. Three main 
themes and findings were discovered in this analysis. The themes points to the 
‘How’, ‘What’, and ‘Why ‘derived through findings 2.1 (the alignment of drivers 
between contractor and owner is required to ensure a common goal to deliver the 
project objectives), findings 2.2 (the risks of selecting a suboptimal contracting 
strategy is very high due to National Oil Company or Joint Venture directives  and 
interferences), findings 2.3 (Corporate policy prescribes drivers for the formation of 
contracts hence lack of flexibility and non-inclusion of some drivers in the contract 
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strategy formation for projects), and findings 2.4 (Reimbursable contracts produce 
better quality work at lower cost than Lump Sum contracts but companies prefers 
Lump Sum Contracts). Each of the findings is examined below. 
 
 
Finding 2.1: Project Objective – alignment of project goals 
The third finding of this research project is that the alignment of drivers between 
contractor and owner is crucial to ensure a common goal to deliver the project 
objectives. This finding was discovered in the process of identifying the main drivers 
for the selection of contract strategy. Based on the analysis, there were patterns in the 
examples given by respondents which suggested that the contractors had different 
objectives from those of the projects. Though in real life this is not unexpected, it is 
worth checking to what extent the unaligned drivers or objectives have affected the 
successful delivery of the project.  
 
A close look at some of the examples given by the respondents such as CS020 
showed that Project Managers are concerned that their expectations are not met as a 
result of the non-aligned objectives of the contractors. This discovery is supported by 
CS009. He described the situation as ‘… no trust and professionalism, different 
agendas...’. CS009 also cited ‘...different values and norms...’ as issues resulting 
from the non-aligned objectives. CS020 gave the following example of his 
experience to buttress his point.  In his example, he stated that ‘the contractor chose 
(obviously) for the cheapest suppliers and equipment, meeting the specs but often not 
our expectations’. He also stated that the ‘… HSE-culture difference between … 
contractor and … standards would have been obvious’ if the objectives of the owner 
and contractor were aligned. The need to ensure that objectives of the owner and 
contractors are aligned is further supported by CS015; he warned that ‘Any mismatch 
can lead to friction which will then detract from the completion of the work’. The 
recognition that contractor/owner processes could be different is supported by 
CS010; ‘...sometimes there are different process methods with licenses owned by 
different companies’. But in preparing the contract, CS023 advised that the ‘contract 
plan should be clear on the business objective’.  
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Based on the detailed analysis of the data, it was discovered that Companies are 
taking steps to align the objectives of the owner and contractor in the formation of 
contract strategy. Pre-qualification of contractors in the selection process gives the 
owner opportunity to ensure that the contractor has the capacity and resources to 
deliver. It also gives them the opportunity to check that their objectives are indeed 
aligned. However, the exercise of prequalification has been criticized by project 
managers as a ‘tick in the box…’ (CS009) and ‘…is not done thoroughly enough’ 
(CS001). Whereas, if done correctly, issues such as ‘… cultural differences’ 
(CS020); ‘…previous work record of the contractor…’ (CS005); and their ability to 
deliver to ‘…expectations’ (CS009) would be addressed.  
 
Similarly, it was discovered that the attitude of engineers towards contract strategy 
formation is one of the reasons for the lack of alignment of owner/contractor 
objectives. This statement is supported by CS009. He stated that ‘the contract is 
perceived as a means rather than a vehicle, attitude that ambiguity can be 
opportunistic, done in isolation ... disconnect between commercial, legal and project 
team’. The above statement correctly tell the story that very little effort is put into 
establishing a contract let alone drive getting an optimal contract. This attempt to 
create such ambiguity leads to Projects not investing time into ensuring that the 
contract drivers are aligned and that an optimal contract for the project is put in 
place. This can be easily explained using the previous argument that project 
managers are busy and lack the expertise in contract to be able to fully support the 
contracting strategy formation process. Furthermore, the above statement further 
confirms the findings from the literature review, that the size of the contract is 
proportional to the ambiguity in the contract: the larger the contract, the greater the 
ambiguity in it (Kerzner, 2001). These ambiguities are also stated as the reason why 
contracts are not complete. Hence, suboptimal contracts are used in the execution of 
projects.  
 
The need to maximize ‘Profit’ has been cited as the common reasons for the non-
alignment of the contractor and owner’s objectives. This is supported by CS024, ‘it is 
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always very difficult to forget that contractor has a different objective i.e. making as 
much profit from the contract’. Some of the respondents suggested ways to handle 
the ‘maximization of profit’ while ensuring that the project objective is aligned. 
CS005 suggested the inclusion of ‘...Profit/overhead margins’ in the contract. CS030 
suggested ‘… establishing a partnership ... for a share of the profit’.  
 
In conclusion, the alignment of objectives will certainly increase ‘trust and strategic 
fit’ which according to CS009 ‘...will be the underlying forces of the success of the 
strategy ...’. Similarly, other suggestions given by project managers include 
‘...alliancing/partnering with key contractors’ (CS027) and ‘long-term working 
relationship’ (CS024). These are key attributes of optimal contracts identified in 
section 2.5 of the literature review. It should be emphasized that in the data analysed, 
there were no evidence pointing to how the drivers for the selection of contract 
strategy is identified or selected. The body of knowledge and the theory of contracts 
made it very clear that ‘most relevant’ variables are selected in the formation of 
contracts. How are these variables identified and ranked or selected in the current 
contract formation? Or does the prescriptive nature of the framework stops the PMs 
from identifying the variables?   
 
Refer to appendix F for some illustrative quotes / extracts captured from email 
interview respondents.  
 
 
Findings 2.2: Impact of NOC and JV Directives on Contract formation (key 
word finding) 
The fourth finding of this research project is that the risk of selecting a suboptimal 
contracting strategy is very high due to National Oil Company or Joint Venture 
directives and interferences. This theme is the ‘Why’ resulting from the findings 
based on the analysis of the responses which relates to how the drivers for the 
formation of contract strategy are identified, ranked and managed. This finding was 
discovered through the prevalent concept which emerged in which it appeared that 
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some policies and processes in the formation of contracts and the selection of 
contractors were not in the controls of the corporations and the project managers. 
Keywords such as ‘imposed’, ‘forced’, ‘directives’, and ‘interference’ were used in 
some of the responses. Hence the sentences in which these words appeared were 
further examined to ascertain their impact on contract strategy formation. Though the 
frequencies of occurrence in the usage of these key words were not very high, but the 
resulting impacts were ‘show stoppers’ or ‘infringing on license to operate’. 
 
Based on the analysis, it was discovered that in all instances where national oil 
company (NOC) / partners directives were given, the corporations and project 
managers were required to comply. This mandatory compliance leads to setting aside 
the corporate policy for contract strategy formation which resulted in the selection of 
new and inexperienced contractors with some consequences for the corporation and 
project. The latter statement is supported by the following extracts (not paraphrased) 
from the responses:  
 
‘The local companies especially the newcomers are still new to ‘COMPANY X’ 
rigorous and high ‘COMPANY X’ safety standard. They also lack skilled 
management to oversee the complex multi facets of oil and gas projects. Due to the 
company commitment to the government to develop local companies, the company 
has no choice other than holding their hand for them to start off the process’ 
(response by CS024). 
 
The consequences of the above for corporations are that they commit to use a very 
inexperienced contractor to build a mega and complex oil and gas project, thereby 
risking the company’s reputation with very high chances of failure. CS018 gave 
example of a Plant in Germany that was managed by an incompetent contractor 
which ‘…was imposed by management from the US’. The result of this action was 
‘…delay and …cost overrun’. CS036 also gave example of the consequences where 
Corporations were forced into selecting ‘…new/unfamiliar contractors to ... 
standards/processes’; the owner had to ‘… offer own manpower to supervise them 
and handhold…’. This also has its resultant implications considering that the owner 
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do not have experienced contract personnel on the project. Based on my experience 
in one of the Asia countries, I can collaborate this finding with a real life example 
where an inexperienced contractor was forced on one of the corporations to execute a 
deep water project. The owner ‘scrambled’ its resources from deep water projects 
around the world to handhold this contractor. This resulted in the risks of delay and 
cost overrun for the project; and the learning curve for the contractor was very steep. 
 
It was also discovered that the need to comply with National Oil Company or Joint 
Venture directives and interferences do lead to setting aside corporate policy for 
contract strategy formation with consequent impact on the type of contract or 
contractor selected: 
 
‘Under the PSC (Production Sharing Contract) environment in …, ‘COMPANY X’ 
has to obtain NOC approval for all contracts and procurement cost. Each contract 
shall have its own approved contract value (ACV) for project teams to execute the 
service via this contract. Therefore, using reimbursable contract, it will be difficult 
for ‘COMPANY X’ to establish the ACV and subsequently request NOC approval. 
This is not the preferred type of contract from NOC point of view (response by 
CS017). 
 
The above statement is further supported by responses which points to the fact that 
Corporations policies are not used in the selection of contract strategies where there 
is corporate directives. Example: CS017 wrote: ‘…based on NOC procedures, pre-
qualifying of bidders … prior to tender is not allowed’. This is also supported by 
CS024, ‘prequalification of local companies is a very sensitive issue as the local 
companies are supported by the government shareholder representative of the 
board’. 
 
As seen above, these directives have serious consequences for the project and the 
type of contract that is selected. CS028 pointed out that: ‘JV directives on contract 
strategy which sometimes ignores serious risks or unrealistically transfers these risks 
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to contractors’ as the main reason for improper allocation of risks. CS026 further 
stated that where JV directives lead to the wrong contract decisions, ‘… the Owner 
Company bears most risks and pays for all mistakes contractor made. Budget and 
schedule overrun is anticipated’. But owners are expected to mitigate or manage 
these risks. Commenting on schedule overrun, CS005 stated that ‘…some schedules 
are dictated by politics or client desire and not based on a realistic schedule’. CS002 
do not understand why NOCs challenge project managers that Project cost are not ‘fit 
for purpose’ whereas project managers are ‘…directed down this route via the 
business objective of satisfying the Owner’s (NOC) aspirations for technology and 
capability transfer’. 
 
Similarly, NOC/JV directives and interferences also lead to Project delay and 
additional complexity to the process of contract strategy execution. CS017 gave 
example of waiting indefinitely on NOC to approve contracts. ‘... change of works 
that have an impact on the commercial or contractual obligation could be 
considered as challenging ... if this occurs, a change to contract paper has to be 
raised and presented to a number of Committees, including...(partner)... for final 
approval. Upon completion of the presentations ...we have to wait for final ... 
(partner)... approval, which does not have any specific time frame for the authority 
to do so...’.  
 
There are also additional challenges which work against improving contract strategy 
formation resulting from NOC interferences. One of those challenges affects 
company desires to ‘book in contractors’. According to CS017, ‘... (NOC) prefers a 
competitive, fair tender for any new or replacement contract’. As a result, CS002 
confirmed that in some countries, ‘...Contract Strategies have remained the same for 
the last 3 years…these are typically aligned with the Owner’s (NOC) aspirations…’. 
Therefore, the call by some project managers to form alliancing/strategic partnership 
with some contractors will not be accepted in this type of environment. In the 
literature review, the ability of the owners to ‘book in contractors’ was seen as a 
practical solutions to addressing the gaps in not having competent contractors with 
the required capacity to deliver the work. Whilst most literature stated that the ability 
of the owner to predict volume of work was a major challenge to strategic alliancing, 
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it was not immediately obvious that government / NOC directives was equally a 
challenge. Hence, one of the main attributes optimal contracts which is ‘Long term 
Commitment and renegotiation’ cannot be achieved under current prescriptive 
contract strategy framework used by corporations.   
 
Further implications of government or NOC directives are summarised in the table 
below. The table contains a summary of the extracts where the keywords such as 
‘forced’, ‘directives’,  ‘imposed’, ‘interference’ were used including implications on 
contracts, projects and Corporations: 
 
Table 4.5: Implications of government or NOC directives on optimal contract 
strategy 
Respon
dent 
Location of 
Respondent 
Extract from 
Statements 
made by 
Respondents 
Implications on 
Contract and 
Project 
Implications of not 
complying with 
JV/NOC/Governme
nt Directives 
CS028 Africa/Middle 
East 
‘JV (Joint Venture) 
directives on 
contract strategy … 
ignore serious risks 
or unrealistically 
transfer these risks 
to contractors’. 
• Corporate Contract 
Strategy formation 
process set aside  
• Drivers not 
identified, ranked or 
used in the contractor 
selected 
• Risks not properly 
identified, allocated 
and managed 
• Owner bears all 
risks and pay for all 
mistakes made by the 
contractor (CS026) 
 
• Withdrawal of licence 
to operate 
• No funding for 
project (Show Stopper) 
• Strained 
Relationships 
• High cost of project 
CS028 Africa/Middle 
East 
‘JV partner 
directives also 
introduce stringent 
conditions for 
deviating from…’ 
• Corporate Contract 
Strategy formation 
process set aside  
• Introduce 
inflexibility in the 
• Withdrawal of 
Licence to Operate 
• No funding for 
project (Show Stopper) 
• Strained 
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selection of contracts. 
• ‘…huge burden...’ 
and delays to get 
approval for deviation 
 
Relationships 
• Delay to Schedule 
CS018 Europe ‘… The selection 
was imposed by 
management from 
the US’ 
• Corporate Contract 
Strategy formation 
process set aside  
• Incompetent 
contractor selected 
• Delays and cost 
overrun 
• Owner bears all 
risks and pay for all 
mistakes made by the 
contractor (CS026) 
• Withdrawal of 
Licence to Operate 
• No funding for 
project (Show Stopper) 
• Strained 
Relationships 
• High Cost of project 
CS031 Asia ‘…often costed into 
any lump sum job 
anyway in case 
they are imposed’ 
• Increase in the cost 
of contract and project 
• Wrong contract 
selected  
• Owner bears all 
risks and pay for all 
mistakes made by the 
contractor (CS026) 
• Withdrawal of 
Licence to Operate 
• No funding for 
project (Show Stopper) 
• Strained 
Relationships 
• High Cost of project 
CS012 Asia Interference from 
NOCs…’ 
• Corporate Contract 
Strategy formation 
process set aside  
• Incompetent 
Contractor selected 
• Owner bears all 
risks and pay for all 
mistakes made by the 
contractor (CS026) 
• Withdrawal of 
Licence to Operate 
• No funding for 
project (Show Stopper) 
• Strained 
Relationships 
CS021 Asia ‘the main 
challenge is 
ensuring that local 
contractors are 
fully competent… 
as we are forced to 
• Incompetent 
Contractor selected 
• Drain on Owners’ 
resources to supervise 
and train contractor  
• Owner bears all 
• Withdrawal of 
Licence to Operate 
• No funding for 
project (Show Stopper) 
• Strained 
Relationships 
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use local 
contractors’. 
risks and pay for all 
mistakes made by the 
contractor (CS026) 
• High Cost of project 
 
Source: developed for this research 
 
As seen in the table above, the practice of imposing contractors on corporations 
seems to be more common in Africa/Middle East and Asia regions. However, there is 
no evidence in the data to confirm the reasons for this observation. However, in all 
instances where forced, imposed, or directive were used, it was also obvious that the 
main driver was to get a local contractor employed as part of the NOC Local Content 
policy. Hence, it can be concluded that local content development is one of the main 
drivers why NOCs impose suboptimal contracts on projects. This finding is 
significant hence should be included as one of the attributes of optimal contracts. 
 
The potential implications of not complying with JV/NOC/Government directives 
are derived from the findings detailed in previous sections in the data analysis.  The 
summary of the implications of being ‘forced’, or  ‘directed’ or have a contractor 
‘imposed’ on the project manager includes amongst others setting aside the corporate 
policy for contract strategy formation which includes non-identification of main 
drivers and risks;  Mistakes in the execution of the work including delays and cost 
overrun due to the use of incompetent contractors. There are also potential 
impact/consequences for disobeying ‘NOC’ or Government directives or 
instructions. These includes the withdrawal of licence to operate, No funding for 
project (show stopper), strained relationship which could affect future work, and high 
cost of projects. In some cases, this lack of support can be very frustrating for the 
International Oil Companies (IOC) which could result in moving its operations out of 
a country. Recently, Exxon Mobil was reported to have moved its operations out of 
Iraq due to unfavourable Government directives which had a very significant impact 
on its ability to operate at a reasonable profit margin.    
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Refer to appendix G for some illustrative quotes / extracts captured from email 
interview respondents.  
 
 
 
Findings 2.3: Corporate policy prescribe drivers for formation of contracts (key 
word finding)  
The fifth finding of this research project is that corporate policy prescribes drivers 
for the formation of contracts hence lack of flexibility and non-inclusion of some 
drivers in the contract strategy formation for projects. This finding deals with the 
theme ‘how’ corporate policies prescribes drivers for contract strategy formation and 
the theme ‘why’ project managers sees these processes and procedures as rigid and 
inflexible. In studying this theme, a key word search for ‘procedure’, ‘policy’ and 
‘processes’ were carried out in NVIVO. These key words were examined where used 
in association with contract strategy formation. A pattern soon emerged in which a 
total of 28 respondent out of 51 (55%) expressed some concerns when describing the 
disadvantages of the contract selection activities. It was also noted that some of the 
corporate policies (process/procedures) were put in place in order to meet the 
external/partners requirements. Hence, there is mandatory compliance resulting in 
inflexibility for the project managers in their attempt to establish optimal contracts. 
 
First, this research examined the ‘how’ aspect of this finding. In this finding, it was 
discovered that a large number of respondents support the findings that corporation 
imposed limitations in identifying and selecting appropriate drivers for the formation 
of contracts. There were also examples, where corporation impose contractors on 
project managers. CS018 supported this by citing ‘… delays and cost overrun caused 
by incompetent contractor whose ... selection was imposed by management’. As 
already highlighted in findings 2.2, there are also cases where corporate policy is 
influenced by the need to comply with external stakeholders/partners’ directives 
which leads to rigid processes and procedures for contract strategy and for the 
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selection of contractors. CS024 supports this finding by stating that ‘… due to the 
company commitment to the government to develop local companies, the company 
has no choice...’ than to use new/inexperienced contractors in order to develop them. 
This is in itself a challenge considering that companies do not have experienced 
contract professionals in their team to carry out the required level of supervision and 
handholding.  In the above cases, it is clearly seen that the contract strategy drivers 
are not used in the selection of these contractors. Instead instructions and order from 
management was followed. 
 
Corporate policies are translated into processes documented in procedures. Project 
Managers are required to comply with these policies by strictly implementing the 
procedures in setting up contracts. Based on the responses and analysis of the data, 
these processes and procedures were heavily criticized by project managers as too 
rigid and complex. CS024 supported this statement by describing the current 
processes as ‘…too rigid procedure to maximize contractor potential in realizing 
projects’. The corporate procedures also prescribe the type of contracts and when to 
apply them. CS023 gave examples to support this statement ‘…upstream use 
reimbursable…, … LNG (Lump Sum), Downstream large projects (lump Sum), 
smaller less than USD$20 reimbursable… or site alliance target cost contacts’. This 
example is further supported by CS030. He stated that EPC (lump sum) is used for 
large projects ‘…LNG construction, reimbursable for smaller less defined contracts’. 
Due to the complex and rigid nature of these procedures, CS041 said that 
‘...expecting a range of different participants to follow processes such as the 
Contractor selection and management process just isn’t working’. CS015 further 
said that: ‘...significant effort is required to get this (i.e. process of prequalification) 
right’. He further advised that project managers ‘…must not be scared to say ‘no’ to 
a contractor if we have good reason’. The fear of being punished for non-compliance 
or violating company instructions is no doubt a unique factor which influences the 
selection of Contractors and hence suboptimal contracts.   
 
Other concerns raised by project managers include the time and effort required to 
understand and implement the policies which according to them are complex hence 
project managers requires guidance from professional contract personnel to 
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implement the policies. This statement is supported by 12 out of 28 (43%) 
respondents to the questions on areas of contract strategy formation requiring 
improvements. Short extracts from the supporting statements are as follows: CS031, 
‘....Process is also not clearly routed...’; CS013, ‘.... this process can be time 
consuming and costly’; CS036, ‘… lengthy process for signature of secrecy 
agreement’; CS025, ‘…main issues …, lengthy tendering process’. The lack of 
clarity and complexity of the company policies also directly affects contractors who 
according to CS031 ‘very often contractors approach the contract holder straight on 
in the bid to shortcut the process’. 
 
Some of the respondents gave examples of areas in contract processes to be 
improved. CS010 stated as follows, ‘the conjunction between Project Governance 
Process and Procurement Process…’; CS029:’…tender, bid and evaluation process’; 
CS024:‘…tender Board process can be made efficient and delegated to accountable 
panel…’; CS003: ‘… the process needs to be supported by experienced personnel …, 
not by people new to the position’. CS041: ‘… return to the practice where the 
professional Contacts Manager or Engineer assigned to the Project, guides the 
Project Manager through the processes’. 
 
Despite the criticism levied by Project Managers at the company policies of contract 
strategy formation and selection of contractors, Companies find themselves in a 
position where they cannot make any improvements. CS036 asked the question: ‘…if 
you know that only one or two contractors can do the jobs, why still apply the whole 
process?’. The answers to this question can be easily derived from the foregoing 
analysis. The first answer is that company is constrained by 
stakeholders/government/partners to implement their policies/drivers in the selection 
of contracts and contractors. Hence a contractor can be ‘imposed’ on the Company. 
Another plausible answer is the ‘fear’ of non-compliance with company policies 
hence Project Managers are forced to accept policies and contractors ‘imposed’ on 
them by company. Closely related to this answer is the fact that Project Managers do 
not have sound experience of contract strategy formation. There are also shortages of 
experienced contract professionals to guide the Project Managers.  
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This lack of experienced PMs and Contract professionals has led to the call for 
‘…simplification / standardization…’ by CS036 and other Project Managers. This 
call is very strong considering that the current corporate policies is very rigid, 
prescriptive and do not take into considerations issues such as world markets, current 
company philosophy, policy and strategy, skill availability, supplier and contractor 
availability and integrity, environmental and local issues in the selection of contracts.  
These observations further confirm literature findings that corporations do not use 
the product of consideration of issues such as world markets, current company 
philosophy, policy and strategy, skill availability, supplier and contractor availability 
and integrity, environmental and local issues in the formation of contract strategy. 
Hence this research carried out a more detailed analysis to ascertain the popular 
drivers used by corporations in contract strategy formation.  
 
The table below establishes the current understanding of the popular drivers used in 
the formation of contract strategy.  
 
Table 4.6: The popular drivers used by corporations in contract strategy formation 
 
Source: developed for this research 
Grouping based 
on Popularity
Drivers Listed by Respondents
Total 
number 
of times 
listed
% of 
Total
Schedule 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 20 13%
Cost 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 18 12%
Risks 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 17 11%
Market Scenario/Forces (SupplyvsDemand) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15 10%
Quality/Standard/operability 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 7%
Local Content/development 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 6%
Scope definition 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 6%
location/Commercial Environment 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 5%
Safety/HSE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 5%
Availability of competent owner team 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 4%
Capability/Objective of the Contractor 1 1 1 1 1 5 3%
Project Size 1 1 1 1 4 3%
NOC/JV/Partners/Govt Objectives&Directives 1 1 1 1 4 3%
Project Type/objectives 1 1 1 3 2%
Technology 1 1 1 3 2%
Complexity of Project 1 1 2 1%
Contractor preferred Contract type 1 1 2 1%
Owner preferred Contract type 1 1 2 1%
Sustainable Development 1 1 2 1%
Profit 1 1 2 1%
Opportunity 1 1 1%
long term Working Relation 1 1 1%
Value for Money 1 1 1%
Complexity 1 1 1%
Benchmarking with industry 1 1 1%
Procurement 1 1 1%
TOTAL 155 100%
Frequency of appearance of each Driver
First 
Second
Third
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In the current practice of contract strategy formation, the most popular drivers used 
are schedule, cost, risks, and market scenario. Quality, local content, scope 
definition, safety, location, project size, NOC/JV/Partners/Government objectives 
and directives are in the second most popular group. In real life, the drivers in the 
second most popular groups are taking as a ‘GIVEN’. This means that they must be 
taking into consideration in the selection of contracts. However, based on the 
foregoing analysis, it is now very obvious that the products of drivers including those 
in the first, second and third popular groups are not taking into considerations and 
their selection is largely influenced by the key stakeholders.  
 
In conclusion, based on the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that there is a further 
need to align the objectives of the key players in setting up contract strategy. The key 
players - project managers, partners/government, and corporation all seems to have 
different voices in the formation of contract strategies. Not only should the 
‘conjunction between Project Governance Process and Procurement Process’ 
(CS009) be improved, there is also the need to ensure that the drivers of the 
respective JVs/NOC/Government, Projects, and Corporations are aligned and taking 
into considerations in the selection of contract strategy. This is in line with the advice 
by CS009 in which he stated that key players in the contract strategy formation 
should have the ‘...ability of understanding and acceptance of driver of others...’. 
The current process where these objectives are prescribed in corporate policies and 
procedures removes the flexibility for PMs to analyse the drivers, rank them and 
select the drivers. This additional observation further confirms the literature finding 
that ‘aligned (owner and contractor) objectives’ as an attribute of optimal contract.  
 
Refer to appendix H for some illustrative quotes / extracts captured from email 
interview respondents.  
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Finding 2.4: Reimbursable contracts vs. Lump Sum contracts (key word 
finding)  
The sixth finding of this research project is that reimbursable contracts produce 
better quality work at lower cost than lump sum contracts but companies prefer 
lump sum contracts. It has been established in the foregoing analysis that there are 
different voices and interest which dictates the drivers to be used in the formation of 
contracts. But in the course of the analysis of data, it was discovered that PMs also 
hold opinions and preferences on the type of contracts to be used in projects. This 
preference is based on the PMs belief that they require more insights on the work 
being executed, more controls, and more flexibility. This belief was deduced from 
the advantages of reimbursable contracts and hence the reasons why project 
managers prefer this form of contract over lump sum contracts. This finding seeks to 
establish why companies prefer lump sum contract over reimbursable contracts 
despite the advantages of reimbursable contracts. This finding was discovered in a 
review of the various contract types to determine the most popular contract type used 
by project managers. Using NVIVO key word search, the frequency of each of the 
contract type named by a project manager was recorded and tabulated below. 
 
Table 4.7: Number of times a PM has used each Contracts type 
 
Legend: CPFF – Cost plus Fixed Fee; CPIF – Cost plus Incentive fee; CP- Cost plus 
Note: the total number of respondents for this analysis is 55 
Source: developed for this research 
 
Based on the result of the analysis in the table above, 42% of the project managers 
confirmed that they have experience in the use of reimbursable contracts. This is the 
most popular of all the contract types. The next popular contract type is lump sum 
Contract Types Listed by Respondents Total % Total
Reimbursable/CPFF/CPIF/CP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 23 42%
Lump Sum/Fixed price/LS Turn Key 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 18 33%
Unit Rate 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 13%
Day rate 1 1 1 3 5%
Alliance Target Cost 1 1 2%
Design-Build-Construct 1 1 2%
Guaranteed Maximum 1 1 2%
Time and Material 1 1 2%
Frequency
 124 Chapter 4: Data Analysis 
contracts which recorded 33%. This is followed by Unit rate (13%) and Day rate 
(5%) contracts. In this analysis, instances where a project manager has experienced 
both reimbursable and lump sum contracts were counted as one each for both 
contracts. Though reimbursable contract is most popular amongst project managers, 
lump sum contract is the most preferred type of contract used by project managers 
and corporations. The following was discovered when examining the statements 
relating to the advantages of reimbursable contracts and lump sum contracts.  
 
The first main finding from the response is that reimbursable contract is cheaper and 
a cost effective contract option compared to lump sum contracts. This statement was 
supported by the following respondents. CS008 stated that, ‘…the reimbursable is 
the cheaper of the two…the contractor will not load his bid with risk premiums and 
… Company X (Owner) will have a “ring fenced” project cost’; CS041, ‘… Little or 
no risk to the bidding Contractors so pricing will be keener reflecting the lower risk 
… Contract planning and award cycles can be shortened…’; CS036, ‘lump sum 
contracts are excessively expensive…these contracts are not transparent and not 
flexible to changes’.   
 
Another finding from the responses is that reimbursable contract produce better 
quality work compared to lump sum contracts. This statement was supported by the 
following respondents. CS036, ‘… lump sum contracts are excessively expensive … 
and the quality of work may suffer as contractors will try to fit the work…’; CS006, 
‘…this type (reimbursable contracts) potentially leads to fewer disputes’; and 
CS007, ‘Reimbursable contracts might have high quality… the contractor gets paid 
for every item he purchased/man-hour spent’. He further criticized lump sum 
contract stating ‘…On LS (lump sum) contractors…you cannot see where the money 
went to…cost savings possibly jeopardizing the project quality’.   
  
Closely related to the above is the finding that reimbursable contracts offer the owner 
a better opportunity to develop in-house resources in contracts strategy formation and 
management. This finding was supported by CS009 referring to ‘…higher level of 
capability and experience development of the owner’. Similarly, CS014 stated that 
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reimbursable contract will give the owner the opportunity to develop, ‘… engineers 
that better manage a project…can develop alliance contractual arrangements that 
benefit both parties for long periods of time’. This further reinforces the literature 
finding on the attributes of optimal contract which includes long term commitment 
and renegotiation. Refer to chapter 2, section 2.5. 
 
It was also discovered that a reimbursable contract offers the owner a better 
opportunity to gain information about cost and contractor which can be used for 
future benchmarking, reliable estimates, and also ascertain the actual cost of the 
project. This finding was supported by CS006 and CS036. CS006 stated that 
‘…more detailed cost and other project information is available…the (cost) 
information gained from the project will help improve future projects as well’. 
CS036 also added that ‘…reimbursable contract give more insights on the work done 
and more control’. This advantage provides a solution to asymmetric information 
from contractors which was discovered through literature review. It also provides a 
solution to resolving the issues of hidden information which is known only to the 
agent and not the principal as stated in the theory of contract. Hence confirming the 
literature finding on quality (valued or truthful) information as one of the attributes 
of optimal contracts. 
 
Despite the numerous advantages of reimbursable contract above, most project 
managers and corporation still prefer lump sum contracts. One of the main reason 
‘why’ they prefer lump sum contract over reimbursable is the ability to transfer risks 
to contractors. This statement was supported by CS014 stating ‘…Owners…favour 
fixed price contracting in order to transfer the risk…’; CS008: ‘…the lump sum 
contract allows many of the cost risks associated with the Project to be “passed on” 
to the contractor’. CS036 confirmed that, ‘lump sum contracts…transfer risks to 
contractors …’. This practice of selecting a given contract type in order to transfer 
risks to the contractor without proper identification of the risks and allocation to the 
party best to manage the risks results in the formation of suboptimal contracts. This 
is mostly possible by the prescriptive nature of current contract framework which 
force PMs to use the corporate prescribe contract quilt. As stated in findings 2.3 
above,  company contract quilt prescribe the following for each of their business: 
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‘upstream use reimbursable’, ‘LNG (Lump Sum)’, ‘Downstream large projects (lump 
Sum)’, ‘smaller less than USD$20 reimbursable’,  ‘large projects use EPC (lump 
sum)’ contacts. This example further confirms the literature finding of optimal risks 
sharing as one of the attributes of optimal contracts. It also reinforce the fact that 
corporate prescribe practices deprive the PMs the opportunity to identify contract 
drivers, rank the drivers and select the most relevant drivers to be used in the 
formation of optimal contracts.   
 
Another reason ‘why’ lump sum is preferred by project managers and corporation is 
due to the fact that the owner does not have adequate number of experienced 
resources to supervise and handle issues relating to claims and contract management 
in a reimbursable contract. This finding is supported by CS014, ‘…owners do not 
have adequate numbers of personnel or with proper experience to supervise 
reimbursable contracts’; and CS014 further stated that owners, ‘… favor fixed price 
contracting…and reduce the size and capability of their management team’. CS010 
and CS009 further highlighted some of the major drawbacks of reimbursable contract 
as a reason for preferring lump sum contract. According to CS010: ‘…if you have a 
reimbursable contract claim management will be necessary…’. This was supported 
by CS009: ‘Reimbursable means the ability to manage and implement changes’.  
 
In examining the data and responses, it was also possible to deduce that the selection 
of a contract type over another is heavily dependent on the experience of the project 
manager. Most project managers are very well exposed in the use of lump sum 
contracts because this is very popular in their organization. Statements such as 
‘…most contracts are lump sum…’ (CS018), and the findings from foregoing 
analysis which shows that project managers are exposed to the risks of using 
suboptimal contracts by the lack of experienced contract personnel in their team is a 
pointer to the reasons why they prefer lump sum contracts with which they are very 
familiar. 
 
Refer to appendix I for some illustrative quotes / extracts captured from email 
interview respondents.  
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4.3.3. Research Issue 3: What is the impact of identifying each risks element in 
the respective contracting types (lump sum and reimbursable) and properly 
allocating the risks regardless of the contracting type selected.  
As discussed in findings 2.4 above, corporations selects a given contract in order to 
transfer the risks to contractors. This is known to have resulted in paying high 
premier for a piece of work which leads to high cost of projects. Therefore, this 
research question examines the impact of identifying each risk in a project and 
allocating the risks to person (contractor or owner) that is best placed to manage the 
risks. The identification of risk should be irrespective of the contract strategy. Based 
on the findings of the study carried out by the construction industry institute in 2006, 
it was seen that a proper identification of risks regardless of the type contract and a 
proper allocation of the risks will drive down the cost of a project.  In order to 
examine this statement, the following questions were posed to the respondents.  
 
The aim of the questions and sub questions used in soliciting responses from 
respondents were to determine how risks are identified and allocated between owners 
and contractors. The variables required were to establish how contract related risks 
are identified and how they are allocated to the parties that are best placed to manage 
the risks. One main theme and finding was discovered in this analysis. The theme 
points to the ‘Why’ derived through finding 3.1 (Why the basic principles of risks 
allocation/assignment are not complied with in the allocation of risks in a given 
Contract). The findings are examined below. 
 
Finding 3.1: Non Compliance with principles of Risks allocation (key word 
finding)  
The seventh finding of this research project is that the basic principles of risks 
allocation/assignment are not complied with in the allocation of risks in a given 
Contract.  This finding was discovered by following a pattern of responses where 
most respondent expressed lack of knowledge of how their company identify risks 
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while establishing a contract and also some indications that the process needs to be 
improved. In examining the responses of 16 engineers to the question of how risks 
are identified and allocated in a project contract, the following outcome was captured 
and tabulated.  
 
Table 4.8: Knowledge of Risks identification by Engineers  
 
Note: the total number of respondents for this analysis is 16 
Source: developed for this research 
 
The response shows that 46% of the project managers expressed lack of knowledge 
while 54% had some knowledge but have never been involved in allocating/sharing 
the risks between the contractors and owners. All the Contract professionals that 
responded confirmed that they have some knowledge but most of them have also not 
been involved in the risks sharing between the contractors and owner. Other industry 
practitioners that responded did not have any knowledge of how risks are shared by 
corporations with their contractors.  
 
The above findings further led to examining the responses in detail which led to the 
conclusion that the basic principles of risks allocation/assignment are not complied 
with in the allocation of risks in a given Contract for the reasons given below:  
 
Some of the respondent gave a very clear response which demonstrated their 
understanding of the basic principles of risks identification and allocation. The 
responses from three respondent CS029, CS009, and CS012 were summarised and 
paraphrased to give further meaning to the principles of risks identification and 
allocation:  
Respondent % Total % Total
Some Knowledge Don't Know
Project Management 54% 46%
Contract Engineers/Managers 100%
Others (Industry Practitioners) 100%
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Risks have to be identified and costed (CS029), ...and the C&P strategy developed 
for the project has identified the best parties position (ability and willingness related 
to people, processes and tools) to take the different risks (CS009); and depending on 
the risk tolerance level of both parties and who best can handle the risk (CS012); ... 
assign an owner (CS029). 
 
Based on the above, it can be seen that proper risks identification and allocation 
depends on ability and willingness related to people, process and tools. This research 
examines these three elements of people, process and tools in relations to risks 
identification and allocation in a contract. 
 
The first element which affects proper risks identification and allocation relates to 
the ability and willingness of people. In the analysis of data, it was discovered that 
reference to people means Corporations and Personnel. Both corporation and their 
personnel were weak in the identification and management of Risks. This form of 
weakness was seen in the attitude of the corporations to risks identifications and 
allocation. Corporation has strong preference to select a contract strategy which 
allows them to transfer the project risks to the contractor or retain the risks without 
due considerations to their ability to manage the risks. This discovery is supported by 
statement such as ‘...depends on...and whether ... is willing to buy off this risk’ 
(CS004). CS001 shared his experience stating that ‘I saw too many contracts where 
the Owner shifted any risk they did not want to the Contractor, with no regard to 
either party’s ability to handle the risk’. The driver of the project also affects the 
willingness of the owner to ‘buy off’ the risks. CS030 supported this statement by 
saying that reimbursable contracts are selected ‘where the client deliberately takes 
the risks to give lower overall cost’. CS004 further confirmed this statement stating 
that the contract strategy ‘...is shaped by how much of the risk ... wish to either carry 
... or indeed pass on to the contractors’.  Corporations recognise that certain forms of 
contract are more expensive than the others but they prefer these contracts because 
they offer ‘least risks’ (CS020). CS011 warned that lack of risks identification 
should not be taking as ‘least’ risks because ‘...all risks (even if they don’t occur) will 
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be priced and paid for by the client’. CS027 supported this warning stating that 
‘lump sum contractors tend to be conservative and price for all foreseeable risks...’  
 
CS030 stated that risks ‘distribution ... which delivers the right (for all parties) ... 
will heavily constitute one of the major incentives to project successes’. But further 
added that ‘I realize that this is easier said than done since the commercial 
environment, drivers and company’s strategies (dictating the appetite) might not 
always be in line with the above’. The willingness to ‘buy off’ or accept a given risks 
depends not only on the owner but also the contractor’s willingness.  CS020 stated 
that Risks should be allocated to the party that can best manage them but added that 
‘...contractors will in the future no longer be prepared to accept for example risk of 
weather downtime or increasing steel prices’. CS005 and CS012 concluded that the 
‘market forces’ and ‘...the risks tolerance level of both parties...’ plays a major role 
in the decision by both parties to accept or transfer the risks.  
 
The weakness in the people element was further supported by CS001. He stated that 
‘...Project risks management is not done thoroughly enough’. Some respondents 
(CS001, CS023 and CS004) expressed lack of knowledge of how to assess 
contractor’s risks owing capacity and also how to assign the risks. Some project 
managers seem not to be worried about lack of proper risks management. CS029 
stated that ‘as long as the risks allocation is part of the contract, then no problem’. 
CS024 called for the upgrade (improvement) of Contract managers skills of 
‘...managing uncertainties/risks’. Over 30% of the responses analysed in relations to 
risks stated that ‘management’ of risks was one of the main factors affecting 
successful risks identification and allocation. CS028 recalled from his experience 
that risks are not properly allocated in ‘...about 60% of the cases!’ where he has been 
involved in the formation of contract strategy. CS001 further confirmed that ‘some 
parties manage risk realistically, and some “hope” that the risk event doesn’t 
occur’.  Lack of ‘proactive measures’ (CS034) which will ensure proper follow up of 
identified and allocated risks is also an issue. CS025 stated that most of the risks 
identified at early stages of the project ‘...were rarely followed up at execution 
phase’.  CS001 described the lack of proactive measures as resulting from ‘...too 
much reliance on hope rather than reality’.  
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The second element which affects proper risks identification and allocation relates to 
process and tools. It was discovered in the analysis of data that Corporate and 
personnel ability and willingness is also impacted by the availability of the right 
process and tools. CS003 describes the current risks management tool as ‘...very 
basic and not well structured!’ Despite the lack of adequate risks capture and 
management tool, project managers are expected to comply with the ‘Project Risk 
Management Process and Register should capture and assign Project risks’. CS041 
recognised the benefit of ‘a good risks management system’ in the effective capture 
of the project risks, allocation of the risks and management of the risks.  
 
In conclusion, it can be seen that several factors affect the identification and 
allocation of risks in contract strategy formation. These factors range from 
willingness of people to availability of robust process and tools. The most striking of 
all is the fact that project managers claim not to have experience of how risks are 
shared amongst contractors and owners in a given contract. Hence they express a 
preference to use a certain form of contract as a mitigation factor. This is a strong 
confirmation of the reason why most contracts are suboptimal. Hence, one of the 
main attributes of the optimal contract is optimal risk sharing being taken into 
consideration in the formation of contract. In order to make it very obvious and 
considering that the word optimal risks sharing does not properly highlight the 
importance of risks identification, this research will add ‘identification’ to the 
attribute of optimal risks sharing and hence the attribute will now be optimal risks 
identification and sharing. This extension of the attributes correctly captures the 
knowledge contributed by the PM to this study through the above data analysis. 
 
Refer to appendix J for some illustrative quotes / extracts captured from email 
interview respondents.  
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4.3.4. Research Issue 4: What are the characteristics of persons, their positions, 
their assumed experience and general background that are involved in the 
contract strategy formation process?  
In the literature review, it was discovered that there serious lack of literature in this 
aspect of contract formation. Furthermore, people play major role in ensuring that 
optimal contracts are selected and also manage the contract. This research issue is 
aimed to examine the characteristics of the people that are involved in contract 
strategy formation. The aim is to establish the background and experience of the 
people making contracting decisions, investigate people competencies / experience 
issues and establish opportunity for improvement. The variables required were to 
examine any gap in the people aspect of contract formation and also contribute to 
bridging the gaps in literature in this regard.  
 
Based on the analysis of responses, two themes were established. Both themes relates 
to the ‘what’ is required of the personnel making contracting decisions and also those 
that are supporting the project managers in the day-to-day administration of the 
contracts. The outcome of the analysis established a common understanding among 
project managers of the characteristics of the personnel involved in making contract 
strategy formation decisions and also their perceived gaps in experience and 
knowledge.   
 
Finding 4.1: Local knowledge and contract formulation 
The eighth finding of this research project is that Personnel responsible for making 
contract strategy decisions should have sound local experience which includes 
good knowledge of the local market and local stakeholders. This finding is 
supported by most respondents to the questions relating to people, competence, 
experience and skills. The responses were analyzed to determine the attributes or 
characteristics of the people involved in contract strategy decision making. The 
analysis did not aim at consensus amongst all the respondents but rather at discerning 
common beliefs, and at identifying any unique issues. 
 
 133 
Chapter 4: Data Analysis 133 
Table 4.9: Characteristics of people making contract strategy decisions 
 
Note: the total number of respondents for this analysis is 31 
Source: developed for this research 
 
Based on the analysis above, it was found that the combined total percentage support 
for attributes such as familiarity with project location/environment (23%), 
knowledge of Local Market (13%), and knowledge of local key stakeholders (6%) 
was 42%. This was the most supported combined attributes recorded. On individual 
attribute support level, familiarity with project location / environment had 23% 
supports. This was the second highest individual supported attribute besides expert 
level experience in contract management which received 26% support. This attribute 
is of a major importance in the contract strategy formation and management because 
the quality of decisions and efficiency depends on the availability of these levels of 
experience. Each of these two unique attributes (local knowledge and expert level 
experience) in contracting will be reviewed in detailed below.  
 
Firstly, in relation to the importance of local knowledge, 64% of the respondents 
analysed above are expatriates (foreigners) working outside their home countries. 
Their response in supporting the requirements that a contract engineer should have 
practical local knowledge is no doubt based on their real life experience of 
establishing a contract strategy in environments or locations where they have no 
prior knowledge of the location, market and stakeholders. CS001 confirmed this in 
his response. He stated that Contract Managers are ‘…generally not familiar enough 
with the particulars of the project’. CS002 put it slightly differently. He 
acknowledged that supply chain executives are experienced but ‘… may require 
S/No Attributes CS001 CS012 CS002 CS032 CS041 CS030 CS009 CS024 CS017 CS010 CS005 Total %
1 Expert level experience in contract 
management (Supply Chain Executives) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 26%
2 Expert level experience in project 
engineering / management 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 19%
3 Specialist in Contract Law 1 1 2 6%
4 Team Leadership Skills 1 1 3%
5 Familiarity with Project location/environment 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 23%
6  Knowledge of Local Market 1 1 1 1 4 13%
7 Knowledge of local key Stakeholders 1 1 2 6%
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advice and direction from Country Chair level on the key Stakeholder expectations’. 
CS005 further stressed that it will add significant value to the business to bring in 
contract engineers very early in the project phases but regretted that there are ‘… not 
have many such contract engineers … with good market analysis and strategy 
development’.  
 
The need for Supply Chain Executives to have knowledge of local environment, 
market and stakeholders was further highlighted by CS032 in his response stating 
that ‘…good knowledge of the market where the project is going to be located, 
knowledge of the stakeholders and their ability to leverage opinions and bias the 
local environment...’ should be considered as a mandatory requirement. This 
attribute is particularly very important due to the ‘… cultural differences around 
contract binding obligations …’ (CS009).  
 
Based on the above, ‘… the lack of experienced personnel for location of project’ 
(CS032) and the ‘…challenge of frontier location with no existing contractors with 
experience …’ (CS030) is a contributing factor to the ‘… inefficient decision 
making…’ (CS034). This inefficiency translates into several delays in the contract 
strategy formation, and in some cases, inappropriate contracts are selected.  
 
Second, expert level experience in contract management received 26% support. This 
was the highest scoring individual attribute. This attribute is key to ensuring quality 
contract strategy related decisions and contract management. The lack of expert level 
of experience in contracting is a major issue in the oil and gas industry. As discussed 
in finding 4.2 below, project managers feel exposed to the risks of suboptimal 
contracts by the lack of experienced contract professionals. Furthermore, literature 
reviewed in chapter 2 of this thesis also confirms this as a major issue (Berends, 
2000; Mandil, 2005). The main reason attributed for the lack of experience contract 
professionals includes the fact that the existing experienced workforce is rapidly 
retiring. Corporations are experiencing a major scarcity of staff with the equivalent 
experience and skill to replace those going onto retirement without enough 
replacements. The impact of the scarcity of experience contract resources on the 
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contract strategy is affecting the capacity of the contractor and owner to support 
projects, and to put in place quality contracts and hence manage the contracts 
accordingly. This lack of experience explains why availability of experienced 
resources is seen as a major driver for the selection of one form of contract over the 
other. For example, reimbursable contract will not be selected if the owner has no in-
house resources to manage the contract. This will be the final decision  regardless of 
whether it is the most optimal contract to deliver the work. Details of evidence 
supporting this statement are discussed in finding 4.1 below.    
 
In conclusion, the two most important attributes/characteristics required for a 
contract engineer as seen by project managers are knowledge of local environment 
and expert experience in contracting. Unfortunately, there is scarcity of these 
combined skills. Contrary to the literature finding in which it was stated that supply 
chain executives are ‘not required to be familiar with the particulars of the project’, 
this finding has proved that it should not be the case. The supply chain executive 
should have expert knowledge to ensure that optimal contract is established and 
managed. This is another major contribution of this research to the body of 
knowledge. In addition, as a result of the analysis of data, it is established that 
optimal contract should take into consideration environmental and local knowledge. 
Hence, the existing contract framework will be extended to include ‘Environmental 
and Local Knowledge’ as one of the main attributes of optimal contract.   
 
Refer to appendix K for some illustrative quotes / extracts captured from email 
interview respondents.  
 
Finding 4.2: Incomplete team capabilities 
The ninth finding of this research project is that Project Managers feels exposed to 
the Risks of suboptimal contracts by not having experienced Contract 
professionals in the Project team. This finding was discovered based on the 
analysis of keywords across the entire responses. As a result of words frequency 
count in NVIVO, the following high occurring key words: experience/inexperience, 
lack of knowledge/awareness, not qualified, and competent/incompetent, were 
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selected for further analysis to examine any relationships between the words and 
contract strategy formation, selection and contract management. A pattern soon 
emerged in which the keywords were mostly used in the same sentence with 
reference to owner’s team/personnel and contractor’s team/personnel. Hence, a 
crossword to map each of the key words to the prevailing terms was carried out to 
further confirm the most predominant pattern and impact. The results are tabulated 
below and further confirm finding 4.1 above: 
 
Table 4.10: Keyword analysis of owner and contractor capabilities 
 
Source: developed for this research 
 
Based on the analysis tabulated in the table above the following three conclusions 
can be drawn: 
 
The first and most significant conclusion is that 34 (67% ) out of 51 respondents used 
words such as inexperience, lack of knowledge, not qualified, and incompetent in the 
same context in describing owner’s team or owners personnel.  While 16 (33%) out 
of 51 respondents used words such as inexperience, lack of knowledge, not qualified, 
and incompetent in the same context in describing contractor or contractor 
team/personnel. As can be seen in the table above, ‘inexperience’ of the owner’s 
team was dominant compared to the other attributes. ‘Inexperience of the owner’s 
team’ recorded over 68% of the total count. This conclusion is further supported by 
some extracts from the respondents. CS005, in a response to the questions on reasons 
Keywords used in relations to: Owner's team/Personnel Total Contractor's team/Personnel Total
Inexperience 026, 036, 009, 030, 001, 010, 
005, 037, 021, 025, 026, 025, 
027, 010, 006, 018, 030, 014, 
001, 018, 018, 014, 024
23
036, 023, 030, 036, 008, 020. 
032, 030 8
Lack of Knowledge/Awareness 022, 018, 005, 006, 024, 017, 
013 7
024
1
Not Qualified 010 1 010 1
Incompetent 041, 029, 024 3 041, 041, 017, 021, 025, 021, 29 7
TOTAL COUNT 34 17
% TOTAL 67% 33%
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for project delays stated ‘… first and foremost have adequate availability of skilled 
and experienced contract engineers…’ CS029 had firsthand experience of where the 
Project did everything right but the main reasons for failure was lack of owner’s 
team representative in the Contractor’s office to resolve issues and look over 
progress. CS003 and CS041 both supported CS029. In reference to making sure that 
the process works, CS003 stated that ‘… the process needs to be supported by 
experienced personnel from …, not by people that are new to the position’. 
Statements such as ‘…staff with qualifications to deal with this item are very rare’ 
(CS010); ‘… poorly thought out and implemented prequalification using 
inexperienced personnel, poorly written scope of work, instruction to tenderers…., 
inadequately thought out technical and commercial bid evaluation procedures’ 
(CS041) are clear evidence of the frustrations faced by project managers due to lack 
of experienced contract personnel in their teams.  
 
Some respondent gave personal examples of their lack of contract experience. CS008 
wrote ‘…for people like myself who have worked for company X for many (33) years 
(but who have not directly been involved in contracts) it is likely that we lack the 
personal experiences’. For Project managers like CS041, the main solution to the 
exposure is to ‘… return to the practice where the professional Contacts Manager or 
Engineer assigned to the Project guides the Project Manager through the process 
and drives the technical folks to pursue and complete key pieces of work and activity 
to the required standard’. This form of thinking and solution seems a major 
challenge. Perhaps the main challenge to put in place the solution suggested by 
CS041 is the high turnover and scarcity of experienced Contract engineers. CS013 
and CS034 both support this as a challenge. CS013 gave ‘part-time involvement of 
staff …, and high turnover of staff’ while CS034 describes it as …’ high rate of 
turnover of key … staff both within and outside the project’ as evidence. 
 
Also very closely related to the above, is the fact that the lack of experienced 
personnel is affecting the quality of contract strategy related decisions that are made 
on the project. CS030 stated this as a reason for project failure. He stated ‘... I believe 
it is lack of experience with the personnel making the decisions’. CS014 added that 
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company ‘... does not have adequate numbers of personnel or with proper 
experience’. These statements are also supported by the findings that some 
experienced project managers claimed limited experience in some aspect of contract 
development or implementation. The following statements were captured from the 
responses by examining keywords which relates to ‘experience/inexperience’ and 
‘lack of knowledge’ using extracts from project managers responses: 
‘I don’t have much experience’; ‘Not enough experience’; ‘I have not that much 
experience’; ‘No clue’; ‘currently no experience’; ‘I have no experience’; ‘No 
experience with ...’; ‘I am not aware especially as my experience is in ...; Nil (no 
experience in...)’. 
It was discovered that 15 (50%) out of 31 Project Managers used one of the phrases 
above to describe their limited experiences in some aspects of Contract development 
or implementation. This further confirm the claim in literature that project managers 
are busy people (Camps, 1996) and ‘ideal PMs’ with all the required project 
experience and skills in all related subject matters is not humanly possible (Davidson 
et al, 2009). It is therefore not feasible that PM should have expert level experience 
of contract strategy formation. However, as a minimum, a PM should be supported 
by an experienced contract professional in his team. This assertion is already 
confirmed in the data analysis in findings 4.1 which started that supply chain 
managers and contract personnel should have expert skill level in contracts.     
 
Other conclusions but not supported by such strong evidence is that ‘incompetent’ 
was used more to describe the contractor’s team/personnel compared to the owner’s 
team. ‘Incompetent contractor’s team’ recorded over 41% of the total counts. 
Although there are not many responses to support this conclusion, it is noteworthy 
that in a count of 10 where ‘incompetent’ was used in relation to owner or contractor 
teams, 7 of those describe the contractor’s team. This discovery was supported by 
CS018 ‘... small delay and small cost overrun, caused by an incompetent contractor’. 
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CS002 ‘... ensuring local contractors are fully competent. The other evidence 
supporting this statement is from CS025, ‘... lack of competent contractor personnel’. 
CS021 described Lowest bidder contract as misleading as they may ‘… not be … 
technically competent ...’ Based on my experience in one of my projects, recent 
managing director communication on the reason for the delay in the completion of a 
major project which is aimed to produce 175kbpd Oil was ‘contractor 
incompetence’. 
 
A further analysis to confirm if there are any regional / location bias in the above 
analysis reveals that the spread is fairly representative of the whole set of 
participants. Asia and Europe recorded 18 and 19 respectively, while Americas and 
Africa/Middle East recorded 5 and 9 respectively. Hence it is safe to conclude that it 
is a global (industry) wide belief that the owners team is largely inexperienced in 
contract strategy formation through to post contract award management. This is not 
surprising considering the progressive retirements of experienced contract personnel 
from the industry. However, most of those retiring from the owners organisations as 
fulltime resources do turn up in contractor organisations as part-time contract 
resources. There are no evidence in the data analysed to support this claim. But from 
my experience, it appears that the owners’ organisations do not provide the flexibility 
for retiring personnel to continue as a contractor post retirement. Hence, they leave to 
continue working in projects with EPCs.  
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, it can be concluded that Project Managers do not 
have complete overview experience of all forms of contracts. Hence they are heavily 
reliant on Contract specialists on the project. Furthermore, based on the findings 
discussed in 4.1 above and in this section, it is surprising that skills availability has 
been overlooked by literature as critical to the successful formation of optimal 
contracts. Hence the attributes of optimal contract may be extended to include 
‘owner and contractor skilled personnel availability’ required to successfully 
establish and manage optimal contracts. 
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Refer to appendix K for some illustrative quotes / extracts captured from email 
interview respondents.  
 
 
4.4 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
One of the objectives of this research is to contribute ideas to develop a descriptive 
theory of contract formulation in the oil and gas industry which can be considered as 
optimal for operations and capital expenditure projects in oil and gas industry. The 
current prescribed framework used by PMs is rigid and does not meet the attributes 
of optimal contracts. Based on the data analysis crossed checked against the 
information gathered from Literature review and contract theory, the following oil 
and gas process diagram was developed. The contract related issues and gaps 
captured from data are also highlighted in the process map. The oil and gas process 
map is presented in the diagram below. 
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Figure 4.2: Oil and Gas High-level process map 
 
Source: developed for this research  
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The process map shows the major process steps in the production of oil and gas from 
initial planning phases until the first oil and gas is produced. The information 
captured in red fonts represent the gaps/issues in the process of establishing a 
contract and managing the contract. The gaps/issues were captured based on the 
outcome of the review of literature and theory of contracts, and data analysis. The 
process map contains the ‘as is’ current practices and gaps in the formation of 
contract strategy. This research will further use the findings captured in the data 
analysis in this chapter to revise the theoretical framework which was developed 
from the review of literature to map out the contributions of this research and the 
improvements required to achieve optimal contract strategy. 
   
4.5 REVISED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Based on the outcome of the data analysis, the previous theoretical framework 
developed from the review of literature and contract theory was revised to allow 
capture of the new findings. The revised version of the framework is shown in Figure 
4.3.  The summary of the main additions to the framework are as follows:  
A) A simplified but focused definition of Contracts in oil and gas industry. The 
definition is based on the preference of project managers which includes having 
more insights on the work being executed, more controls, and more flexibility. It 
also takes into consideration the need for a contract to be tailored to the 
environment in which the project is executed.  
B) Another addition is to the prescriptive contract formation methods. The two 
additions to this bubble are made to address the ambiguities and delays in the 
formation of contracts. They also address the need plan for “turning points” 
which could occur during the execution of the contracts. Projects may be long 
haul spanning a considerable length of time (Berends & Dhillon, 2004). 
Therefore, proper scenario analysis is needed to establish a robust plan which 
will be used to manage “turning points” (Wack, 1985b) the course of execution 
of the work is required.  
C) The next addition is to the variables used in the formation of contracts. Based on 
literature and data analysis, all the variables required to form a contract should be 
identified, ranked and prioritized in the order of importance to enable the 
selection of the most relevant variables.  As seen from the data analysis, the 
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prescriptive nature of the current framework prevents the identification and 
selection of variables which will enable ‘tailoring’ of the contracts to the local 
environment of the project operates.  
D) The steps to achieve optimal risks sharing are also added. To achieve optimal 
risks sharing, all risks must be identified, shared based on the ability of each 
party to manage the risks, and allocated to the party that is best placed to manage 
the risks. This is in accordance with the basic principles of risks identification 
and allocation. Furthermore, a risk management strategy is required to handle the 
process, people, and tools related issues including compliance with the basic 
principles of risks identification and allocation.  
E) The next addition is to the characteristics of the project managers. The changes 
emphasize the need for contract personnel assigned to projects to have expert 
knowledge of contracts in addition to knowledge of the local environment.  
F) Finally, the eight attributes of optimal contracts discerned from the review of 
literature were further extended to include the three newly discovered attributes 
from the analysis of data. All eleven (11) attributes were added to the framework 
to make it more comprehensive. Furthermore, the recommendation of this thesis 
will require PMs to validate contracts against the eleven attributes to demonstrate 
that the contract form is optimal.  
 
 
 
 Figure 4.3: Revised Theoretical Framework
 
Source: developed for this research
 
Note: Additional elements to the previous theoretical framework in chapter 2 are 
indicated by red broken lines. 
 
4.6 CHAPTER CONCLUSION
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Furthermore, it was also noted that given the prescriptive framework of contracts 
formulation, various situational contingencies make the implementation of this 
prescribed theory not feasible. Hence contracts are suboptimal. These situational 
contingencies have been identified in the analysis of data. Therefore, this research 
project has contributed ideas of what needs to be done to develop a descriptive 
theory of contract formulation in the oil and gas industry that has some chance of 
addressing delays, cost overruns etc. Hence, by contrast, there comes the possibility 
of optimal contracts. 
 
The next chapter will be dedicated to discussing and identifying final conclusions, 
implications and limitations of the findings discussed in this chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, the analysis of the data collected to study the four research 
issues was carried out. The result of the data analysis led to modifying the initial 
framework used for this research.  
 
The main research question explored in this thesis is outlined in chapter 1: How can 
structured contract strategies be established for oil and gas industry? The 
research question was further refined in chapter 2 through the review of literature and 
the theory of contracts. This resulted in the development of a framework with four 
research issues to address the research question. In chapter 4, themes were 
established through the analysis of data. These themes became important findings to 
address the research issues. This data analysis led to the revision of the initial 
framework which was developed in chapter 2. 
 
In this chapter, the conclusion of each of the four research issues will be considered 
by contrasting the findings from the data analysis and the review of literature. This 
contrast will help ascertain the specific contributions of this study to the research 
question. The outline of this chapter is as summarized in Figure 5.1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 5.1 Outline of chapter
 
 
Source: developed for this research
 
5.2 CONCLUSION ABOUT THE
This chapter presents the conclusions drawn from the findings of the data analysis 
compared with the literature reviewed. The conclusions of each of the Nine (9) 
findings are contrasted against the literature to confirm their level of contributions. 
Three classes (High, Medium, and Low
contributions as follows:
 
 High contribution indicates
 5 
 
 RESEARCH ISSUES 
 level) are used for the grouping of the 
 
 where the contribution is new in this area of research.  
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 Medium contribution indicates where the contribution is a confirmation of the 
literature but the findings and recommendations have not been empirically tested 
on Project Managers.  
 Low contribution confirms known ideas about PMs and Contract Strategy 
formation. 
 
The conclusions are presented in a table below. 
 
Table 5.1: Summary of conclusions and level of contributions 
 
Research Issue Conclusions Contribution 
 
Research Issue 1: 
What are the methods used 
by corporations to arrive at 
the formation of contracting 
strategy? 
 
 
Conclusion 1: Contract strategy 
formulation process is too lengthy 
and prescriptive hence the delay in 
establishing contracts for Projects. 
 
Conclusion 2: The selection of a 
value for money contractor is the 
most practical option to reduce the 
cost of projects through Contracts. 
 
Medium 
 
 
 
Medium 
 
Research Issue 2: 
How are the major drivers 
for Contract strategy 
formation identified, 
evaluated and ranked in 
importance and impact?  
 
 
Conclusion 3: For the successful 
execution of a given contract strategy 
the alignment of Drivers between 
Contractor and Owner is crucial to 
ensure a common goal to deliver the 
project objectives. 
 
 
Low 
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Conclusion 4: The risk of selecting a 
suboptimal contract strategy is very 
high due to National Oil Company or 
Joint Venture directives and 
interferences. 
 
Conclusion 5: Corporate policy 
prescribes drivers for the formation of 
contracts hence lack of flexibility and 
non inclusion of some drivers in the 
contract strategy formation for 
projects. 
 
Conclusion 6: Reimbursable 
contracts produce better quality work 
at lower cost than Lump Sum 
contracts but companies prefers 
Lump Sum Contracts 
High 
 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
 
Research Issue 3: 
What is the impact of 
identifying each risks 
element in the respective 
contract types (Lump sum 
and reimbursable) and 
properly allocating the risks 
regardless of the contract 
type selected? 
 
Conclusion 7: The basic principles of 
risks allocation/assignment are not 
complied with in the allocation of 
Risks in a given Contract. 
 
Medium 
 
Research Issue 4: 
 
Conclusion 8: Personnel responsible 
for making Contract strategy 
 
High 
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What are the characteristics 
of persons, their positions, 
their assumed experience 
and general background that 
are involved in the contract 
strategy formation process? 
 
decisions should have sound local 
experience which includes good 
knowledge of the local market and 
local stakeholders. 
 
Conclusion 9: Project Managers are 
exposed to the risks of suboptimal 
contracts by not having experienced 
Contract professionals in the Project 
team. 
 
 
 
 
Medium 
 
Source: developed for this research 
 
5.2.1 Conclusion Research Issue 1: Contract Strategy Formation Methods 
 
Research Issue 1: What are the methods used by corporations to arrive at the 
formation of contracting strategy? 
 
Two main conclusions were drawn from this research issue as follows: 
 
Conclusion 1: Contract strategy formulation process is too lengthy and prescriptive; 
hence the delay in establishing contracts for Projects. 
 
In the literature review, it was established that organisations have contract 
formulation processes, which they consider optimal designed to guide PMs. In the 
literature review, eight attributes of optimal contracts were identified. Namely; 
aligned (owner and contractor) objectives, value for money contractor, quality 
(valued or truthful) information, trust and relationship management, long-term 
commitment and renegotiation, optimal risks sharing, optimal wage schedule, and 
optimal incentive contract. Refer to chapter 2, section 2.5.   
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In the finding in chapter 4, existing process of formulating contract was criticised by 
PMs as very prescriptive and rigid. In the literature review finding, it was established 
that little is known about how PMs utilise the existing process. PMs describes their 
understanding of the process as ‘clear as mud’. There is evidence in both the 
literature review and data analysis which confirms that contracts are suboptimal due 
to the various challenges of establishing a complete contract (Salanie, 2005; Tirole, 
1999; Segal, 1999; Maskin & Tirole, 1992). Though the literature review identified 
eight attributes of optimal contract there are no evidence in the data analysis that the 
eight attributes are considered in the formation of contract. As seen in both literature 
review and data analysis, alignment of stakeholders’ objective is hardly carried out. 
There are varied interests and hidden information by all parties which leads to lack of 
trust which affects relationships and also the selection of value for money contractor. 
Furthermore, corporate policies and NOCs play a major role in deciding the type of 
contracts to select. This reliance on corporate directives further impacts on any long-
term commitment and optimal risks sharing. Efforts by companies to incentivise the 
contracts through optimal wage and optimal incentive is also affected.  
 
Furthermore, some steps in the formation of contract strategy are confirmed in the 
data analysis as not adding value but simply an exercise to fulfil corporate policy or 
done as a tick in the box. According to project managers some of these steps in the 
process of formation of contract strategy are not necessary but required to be 
complied with by the corporations. Hence delays in establishing a contract. There are 
also evidence in the data analysis which confirms that pre-qualification of contractors 
are complex, time-wasting and resulting in schedule delay, lacking the quality and 
information required to properly conduct the exercise, and lacking the experienced 
personnel to carry out the exercise. Despite all of these, it is also confirmed that in 
some location prequalification of contractors is not supported by the policies of some 
NOC. Thus, the prequalification process does not add any value in these 
circumstances. 
 
 153 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 153 
Based on the result of the data analysis, it was discovered that the current 
‘prescriptive framework’ used in the formation of contract does not meet the PMs 
preferred contract. PMs prefer a contract that is flexible, easy to use in a given 
scenario (control), and tailored to local environment of a project. Hence the need for 
a ‘descriptive theory’ of contract formation in the oil and gas industry that better 
reflects the operating environment in which the project manager operates.  It was 
also confirmed that PM requires support to establish and manage a contract, 
eliminate waste and redundancy in the process, plan ‘turning points’ (scenarios) in 
the contracts, and ensure that the contract reflects the environment of the project.  
 
The above findings largely provide an empirical confirmation of the review of 
literature. This research has empirically tested the findings on Project Managers as 
seen from the result of the data analysis. Hence the level of this contribution to 
knowledge is classified as ‘medium’. 
 
Conclusion 2: The selection of a value for money contractor is the most practical 
option to reduce the cost of projects through Contracts. 
 
In the literature review it was established that corporations’ prescriptive policies 
restrict PMs to selecting lowest bid contractors. In the literature review, it was 
established that contractors are selected through competitive tender. The selected 
contractor has to be the lowest bidder. This practice is confirmed in the data analysis. 
It was also confirmed in the data analysis that the lowest bidder clauses in the 
prescriptive framework used by corporation have been extended to include clauses 
such as the most technically qualified lowest bidder contractor. Though the extension 
of the lowest bidder clause has positive impact on the outcome of contractor 
selection, it also results in extra steps to evaluate the bids in order to ensure that the 
contractor is technically qualified to do the job before commercial evaluation of the 
bid to ensure that the bidder is the lowest. Again, these extra steps are additional 
work requiring resources and time to complete which can lead to delays in setting up 
a contract. 
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While the data analysis established the characteristics of a lowest bidder contractor to 
include – ‘Low staff morale’, ‘low efficiency and productivity’, desperate to secure 
the job’, do not understand scope, changes/variations’, ‘expensive/costly’, and 
‘incompetent’; value for money contractor was described as a contractor who ensures 
that the money you pay is commensurate to the technical merits and quality of work 
being delivered. Value for money contractors are also confirmed in the data analysis 
as “cheaper” on the long run when the total cost of ownership is taking into 
considerations. 
 
In the data analysis, the literature review finding that lack of ‘valued or truthful’ 
information to properly identify and evaluate the contractor in order to select value 
for money contractor was confirmed. In addition, it was also established in literature 
review that some contractors make false representation of information in order to win 
the job. The data analysis also confirms the theory of auction (Salanie, 2005) which 
states that ‘bidders generally submit a bid which is lower than their valuation of the 
goods but the bid is slightly higher than their competitor’.  This practice leads to 
contract variations during the execution of the project. 
 
Finally, though this contribution is new to this research i.e. there are no literature 
findings where the characteristics of the lowest bidder was so detailed, but some of 
these attributes can be deduced from the literature and theory of contracts. However, 
this is clearly the first time that this finding has been tested empirically on PMs. 
Hence the level of this contribution to knowledge is rated medium.   
 
5.2.2 Conclusion Research Issue 2: Selection of Contract Strategy Drivers 
 
Research Issue 2: How are the major drivers for contract strategy formation 
identified, evaluated and ranked in importance and impact?  
 
Four main conclusions were drawn from this research issue as follows: 
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Conclusion 3: For the successful execution of a given contract strategy the 
alignment of drivers between contractor and owner is crucial to ensure a common 
goal to deliver the project objectives. 
 
In the literature review, it was established that moral hazards exist where the 
objectives of the parties differs. This was further confirmed in the data analysis. 
Using the analysis of data, it was established that key players - project managers, 
partners/government, and corporation have different voices in the formation of 
contract strategies. The objectives of all the players are usually not taking into 
considerations in the formation of a contract. This leads to using suboptimal 
contracts. Hence, there is mistrust and failed contracts.  
 
In the literature review, the need to manage relationships through the alignment of 
objectives was also established. Salanie (2005) described the interdependence of both 
parties once a contract is signed. The success of the principal depends on the 
contractor’s succeeding in delivering the work. Hence, there is a need for trust and 
relationship in executing the contract. The data analysis also confirmed this stating 
that the alignment of objectives will certainly increase trust and strategic fit which 
will be the underlying forces of the success of the contract strategy.   
 
The need for trust and relationship is established in literature review, and confirmed 
in the analysis of data, as one of the attributes of optimal contracts.  The data analysis 
also confirmed trust and relationship as an attribute which supports alliancing and 
partnering with key contractors.  
 
Another finding from the data analysis is related to the attitude of engineers towards 
contract strategy. It was established that contract is likely to be perceived by 
engineers as a means rather than a vehicle, with an attitude that ambiguity can be 
opportunistic, and done in isolation from other business functions/teams. Though the 
attitude that ambiguity can be opportunistic confirms the literature findings that ‘the 
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size of a contract is proportional to the ambiguity in the contract’, there was no 
evidence in the literature to confirm that this has an influence on the engineers’ 
attitude towards contract strategy formation.    
 
In conclusion, this research found that alignment of the drivers between contractor 
and owner is crucial to ensure a common goal to successfully deliver the project 
objectives. This contribution is rated low because it is mostly a confirmation of the 
findings established in the literature. 
 
Conclusion 4: The risks of selecting a suboptimal contract strategy are very high due 
to National Oil Company or Joint Venture directives and interferences. 
In the review of literature it was established that there are different stakeholders in 
the oil and gas industry with varied interests and different voices in the formation of 
contract strategy. The major stakeholders were identified as Government/NOCs, JVs, 
Lenders/Financial institutions, and IOCs. The varied objectives of these stakeholders 
which are also described as drivers are critical in the definition of the objectives of 
the business and projects. Hence these objectives are required to be aligned. Refer to 
conclusion 3 above for the outcome of the aligned objectives.        
 
In the data analysis, it was found that the alignment of objectives is threatened by the 
fact that some stakeholders have a stronger voice and therefore dictate the drivers to 
be used in the selection of the contractors. In particular, the data analysis revealed 
that non-compliance with NOC and JV instructions/directives or interference has 
very strong consequences which can lead to the withdrawal of licence to operate, 
stoppage of funding, strained relationships and high cost of projects. The need to 
comply with NOC and JV directives therefore prevents PMs from selecting some 
relevant variables in the formation of contracts. As a result, suboptimal contracts are 
used in the execution of projects.           
 
The data analysis also established that NOCs in Africa, Middle East and Asia regions 
are mostly likely to give directives to IOCs to select a given contractor. It was further 
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established that the reasons for imposing a given contractor on PMs is sometimes to 
achieve NOC local content policy. Furthermore, it was also established through data 
analysis that local content development which is one of the major drivers of NOC 
and JV is a strong factor in the selection of optimal contracts. The lack of 
considerations and attention to this factor results in using suboptimal contracts in the 
delivery of projects.  
 
This finding is significant hence the conclusion that local content should be added as 
one of the attributes of optimal contracts. Though local content development in oil 
and gas industry is extensively discussed in most literatures, this is the first time that 
it has been considered as a unique characteristic of optimal contracts.  Hence, the 
level of contributions to knowledge of this finding is rated high.   
  
Conclusion 5: Corporate policy prescribes drivers for the formation of contracts 
hence lack of flexibility and non-inclusion of some drivers in the contract strategy 
formation for projects. 
 
In the literature review, it was established that a contract is never complete because 
‘only’ the ‘most relevant’ variables (Salanie, 2005) tend to be used in contract 
strategy formation. Hence there is a need to select drivers from all relevant variables 
in order to achieve optimal contracts. The concept that a ‘contract is never complete’ 
was confirmed in the data analysis. The literature finding that only relevant variables 
are selected to reduce cost of preparing a contract is also confirmed in the data 
analysis.  Hence, it was also confirmed in the data that the size of a contract is 
proportional to the ambiguity in the contract. PMs see ‘ambiguity as opportunistic’.  
 
There is still a gap in the knowledge of how the drivers are identified, ranked and 
selected. The earlier hypothesis that it is not known the contingencies taking into 
considerations by PM which influences the selection of any given variable is correct. 
The subject of identification, ranking and selection of variables is a novelty to PMs. 
PMs relies heavily on the prescriptive framework dictated by corporate policies. 
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Hence the use of only variables prescribed by the corporations. Therefore, the 
knowledge gap of how variables are identified and selected for the formation of 
contracts still exists.  
 
Hence, the conclusion is reached that corporate policy prescribes drivers for the 
formation of contracts. This research further confirms that the subject of 
identification, ranking and selection of variables is a novelty to PMs. Therefore,, the 
level of contribution is rated high.  
  
Conclusion 6: Reimbursable contracts produce better quality work at lower cost than 
Lump Sum contracts but companies prefers Lump Sum Contracts. 
 
The literature findings that reimbursable and lump sum contracts are the most 
popular types of contracts used by corporation was confirmed in the data analysis. It 
was also established that the decision of which type of contract to select 
(reimbursable or lump sum) is dictated by corporate policy as stipulated in the 
contract quilts, in which the scope and inter-relationship of contracts are depicted. 
Some functions/business are restricted to the use of certain form of contracts only. 
Furthermore, it was also established that reimbursable contract is the most popular 
contracts used by PMs. Controls, flexibility, transparency, and lower cost are 
confirmed as the reasons why PMs prefers reimbursable contracts.  
 
On the other hand, it was established that despite the popularity of reimbursable 
contracts, corporations prefers lump sum contracts. The fixed nature of the cost and 
also the peace of mind resulting from the transfer of project risks to contractors make 
this contract type very appealing to corporations. The data analysis also confirms the 
literature findings that the size of owner’s team plays a great role in the decision of 
which contract type to select. Where owner’s team is large, then the reimbursable 
contract is used. Otherwise, the lump sum contract is preferred.  
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Another new finding is that PMs have more experience in the use of lump sum 
contracts. It was further discovered that corporation’s preference for lump sum 
contract is an influencing factor in this regard. After all, PMs are mostly forced to 
use lump sum contracts hence they get very familiar with its implementation. Hence, 
they are more likely to select lump sum over reimbursable contracts. 
 
Furthermore, it was also confirmed in the data analysis that reimbursable contracts 
produce better quality work. In reimbursable contracts, contractors are known to 
comply with process and standards in the delivering of the work. Owner’s staff are 
involved in the supervision, assurances, and due diligence of the work. In lump sum 
contracts, contractors may cut corners to reduce cost of delivering the project hence 
maximises profit.  
 
Thus, it can be concluded that reimbursable contracts produce better quality work at 
lower cost than Lump Sum contracts but companies prefers lump sum Contracts. The 
above finding is mostly new. Therefore, the contribution of this finding is rated high.   
 
5.2.3 Conclusion Research Issue 3: Risks Identification and Allocation 
 
Research Issue 3: What is the impact of identifying each risks element in the 
respective contract types (Lump sum & reimbursable) and properly allocating the 
risks regardless of the contract type selected? 
 
One main conclusion was drawn from this research issue as follows: 
 
Conclusion 7: The basic principles of risks allocation/assignment are not complied 
with in the allocation of Risks in a given Contract. 
 
In the literature review it was established that lump sum contracts are mostly selected 
by corporations in order to transfer risks to the contractor. The data analysis 
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confirmed that these approaches to selecting contracts are suboptimal. The relative 
significance of different sources of risks is not determined. The data analysis also 
confirm this practice in which PMs, and indeed organisations, have a preference for 
certain type of contracts. These contracts are selected irrespective of the risks 
involved, and they pay high premium for the peace of mind that these risks are 
transferred to the contractor. This observation also in accordance with and it 
confirms the literature review finding of organisational negative attitude towards 
risks identification and management (section 2.3).  
 
In addition to organisations’ attitudes to risk identification, the data analysis also 
confirmed that PMs often have no experience of risks allocation to the parties that 
can best manage them. PMs recalled that risks were not properly allocated in about 
60% of projects. This wrong allocation of risks is happening because organisations 
lack proactive measures which will ensure proper allocation and follow-up on 
identified risks. Hence PMs can only hope for rather than ensure the reality that the 
risk events to not eventuate. 
 
Another finding from the literature review is that the current process of identifying 
risks is complex. This complexity, in addition to the lack of guidance is the reason 
why PMs do not put in considerable effort in risk identification and management. 
The complexity of the current process and the fact that project risks management is 
not thorough is confirmed in the data analysis. The tools used for the capture and 
management of risks are described as very basic and unstructured.  Hence the lack of 
good risk management tool impacts the project risks identification, allocation of the 
risks and management of the risks in the project. 
 
Finally, the process steps to achieve risks allocation was confirmed in the data 
analysis. This process includes the identification of the risks, sharing of the risks, and 
allocation of the risks to the party best placed to provide the risk management. These 
steps are required in compliance with risks identification and allocation principles. 
Hence fulfill the optimal risks sharing attribute of optimal contract. However, it is 
noted that throughout the data analysis, most of the responses indicate the lack of  an 
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effective Risk Management Strategy. A Risk Management Strategy will address 
issues such as those relating to process, people and tools which are summarized in 
this conclusion. 
 
The level of contribution of this finding is classified as medium. The reason for this 
is because the subject of risk identification in projects is not new. Most of the 
findings are covered in the literature review. However, it is suggested that this is the 
first time that these findings have been empirically researched on PMs in contract 
strategy formation.  
 
5.2.4 Conclusion Research Issue 4: Characteristics of persons making contract 
strategy decisions 
 
Research Issue 4: What are the characteristics of persons, their positions, their 
assumed experience and general background that are involved in the contract strategy 
formation process? 
 
Two main conclusions were drawn from this research issue as follows: 
 
Conclusion 8: Personnel responsible for making contract strategy decisions should 
have sound local experience which includes good knowledge of the local market and 
local stakeholders. 
 
In the literature review, it was established that very little information is available on 
the subject of characteristics of the people that are making contract strategy 
decisions. It was also established in the literature review, that people making contract 
strategy decisions lack the required local environment experience. The lack of 
experience was further established as one of the contributing factors to the selection 
of suboptimal contracts. This finding was confirmed in the data analysis on PMs’ 
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responses. Expat PMs confirmed that based on their experience, local knowledge of 
the market and environment contribute to selecting optimal contracts for a project. 
  
In the data analysis the most important characteristics of people that are making 
contract strategy decision are confirmed as - familiarity with project 
location/environment, and knowledge of local market and local key stakeholders. 
Furthermore, PMs were also very critical of the fact that they had no local knowledge 
hence reliant on their corporation ‘country chair’ for local input.  
 
This contribution is new to the body of knowledge. Apart from the fact that this 
finding has also been empirically tested on PMs by this research, the literature 
review did not explicitly state this finding. Therefore, the level of contribution of this 
finding is classified as high.  This contribution also resulted in the extension of the 
existing framework used for this study to include local content development, and 
environment & local knowledge as an attribute of optimal contract. 
 
Thus, the conclusion is formed that personnel responsible for making contract 
strategy decisions should have sound local experience which includes good 
knowledge of the local market and local stakeholders.  
 
Conclusion 9: Project Managers are exposed to the risks of suboptimal contracts by 
not having experienced contract professionals in the Project team. 
 
In the literature review, it was discovered that there is hardly any analysis or 
facilitation in the contract strategy formation workshops. Incompetence of 
contractors and inexperience of the owner’s team is confirmed in the data analysis to 
be responsible for the poor quality of input document (lack of analysis) in the 
workshops. The same reasons were confirmed as responsible for the lack of 
facilitation in these workshops.  
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The literature finding that the oil and gas industry is suffering from progressive 
retirement of experienced personnel due to the ageing workforce was also confirmed 
in the data analysis. PMs used words such as ‘scarcity of experienced personnel’ and 
‘high rate of turnover of staff both within and outside the project’ to describe the 
shortages of experienced personnel.  
 
The next finding from data analysis clarifies the finding in the literature about the 
skill of the supply chain manager. Whereas it was established in the literature review 
that supply chain managers are not required to have expert knowledge of contracts; 
the data analysis confirmed ‘expert level experience of contracts’ as one of the 
characteristics of the people making contract decisions. 
 
Using words captured in the data analysis, it can be concluded that the lack of 
experienced personnel for location of projects and the challenge of frontier location 
with no existing contractors with experience is a contributing factor to the inefficient 
decision making which results in several delays in contract strategy formation and 
also in the selection of suboptimal contracts. 
 
The conclusion reached is that PMs are exposed to the risks of suboptimal contracts 
by not having experienced contract professionals in the Project team. This finding is 
also classified as medium because it is not new but this is the first time that the 
findings have been empirically derived from research on PMs. Furthermore, the 
existing framework used for this study was extended by the inclusion of owner and 
contractor skilled personnel availability as an attribute of optimal contract.  
 
 
5.3 CONCLUSION ABOUT THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The final theoretical framework for this research is presented in this section. It 
incorporates the conclusions including interrelationships noted in the above sections 
in the final framework. This section also synthesises the research contributions into 
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solutions to the research question/problem about how structured contracts strategies 
can be established for oil and gas industry.  
 
The theoretical framework brings together what has been established in the current 
literature and theory, and extends what has been found in the real world of oil and 
gas to describe how structured contract strategies can be established. The framework 
commences with two main themes - contract process and contract type in oil and gas 
industry. These two themes are central to understanding the current practices of 
contract strategy formation in oil and gas industry. PMs described their preferred 
contract as one which is flexible, easy to use in any given scenario, and tailored to 
local environment. In order to achieve the desired flexibility, the current prescriptive 
and rigid framework for formation of contract strategy should be improved through 
the elimination of redundant process steps. In addition, turning points should be 
planned into contracts using scenario analysis/planning. This form of flexibility will 
give PMs the opportunity to react to changing conditions/risks throughout the life of 
the project.  
 
The contingency which influences PMs to select certain variables in the formation of 
contract is unknown. PMs have very little guidance in the formation of contract 
strategy and in the selection of variables. The guidance required should be in 
identifying all the variables, ranking and prioritization of the variables, and selection 
of the most relevant variables. Another major variable in the selection of contract 
strategy is risks. A risks management strategy which addresses issues relating to 
process, people and tools is required to drive the right attitude towards the proactive 
identification, sharing and allocation of risks in accordance with the principles of 
risks allocation.  
 
The main decision of which optimal contract to use for a given project is left to the 
PM and his team. The teams are mostly inexperienced in the formation of contracts. 
PMs require guidance from their contract team. These contract personnel should 
have expert knowledge and experience of contracts as well as sound local and project 
environment knowledge. 
  
Finally, an optimal contract is defined as 
consideration of issues such as world markets, current company strategy, skill 
availability, supplier and contractor availability and integrity, environmental and 
local issues to deliver cost reduction through proper allocation of risks. 
for a contract to be def
attributes/characteristics defined in the final theoretical framework. Hence cost 
reduction can be achieved through the use of optimal contracts in capital projects. 
These attributes forms the descriptive fra
 
The final framework for this project is depicted below.
 
Figure 5.2: Final Theoretical Framework  
 
Source: developed for this research
 
a contract which uses the product of 
ined as optimal, it should meet the eleven (11) 
mework for contract strategy formation.
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Therefore, 
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Note: Risks Management Strategy is added to the revised theoretical framework in 
Figure 4.3 (chapter 4).  
 
 
5.4 IMPLICATIONS  
The implications discussed below are based on the above conclusions.  
 
5.4.1 Implications for Theory 
This section presents the implications of arising from this research for theories 
relating to contracts formation in oil and gas industry. Based on the literature review 
and data analysis, it was confirmed that the existing processes for formation and 
selection of contracts in oil and gas industry are very rigid and prescriptive, and not 
always appropriate or optimal for a given situation. There is a need for a descriptive 
theory that reflects the operating environment in which project managers operate.  
 
For this research, optimal contract is defined as a contract which uses the product of 
consideration of issues such as world markets, current company strategy, skill 
availability, supplier and contractor availability and integrity, environmental and 
local issues to deliver cost reduction through proper allocation of risks. This research 
further established the attributes of an optimal contract which is a set of 
characteristics which the PMs can use to measure against well accepted criteria for 
setting up a contract. It is required that for a contract to be optimal, it should meet all 
the attributes of an optimal contract. As discerned in the literature review, each 
organisation uses different methods in the establishment of their contracts. Therefore, 
these attributes provide a holistic and standard approach required by the oil and gas 
an industry in the formation of a contract. 
 
From the existing literature and prior theory, this research has developed a new 
theoretical framework for the establishment of an optimal contracting formation in 
the oil and gas industry. The final theoretical framework which is classified by the 
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two main themes of this research, namely contract process and contract type, 
identified four key focus areas to establish an optimal contract. The four key focus 
areas are Contracts Methods, Drivers Identification and Selection, Risk Identification 
and Allocation, and Characteristics of PMs.  
    
Finally, this research through the identification of the eleven attributes of optimal 
contracts and the final theoretical framework of contract has successfully completed 
the first step in the development of a descriptive theory of contract formulation. This 
‘descriptive theory’ of contract in the oil and gas industry reflects the operating 
environment in which the project manager operates.  
 
5.4.2 Implications for policy and practice 
 
Government: The existing methods of contract formation and selection are criticised 
as very prescriptive. There are also numerous standards and regulations which are 
very prescriptive and rigid in nature. The need to comply with these standards is 
paramount and cannot be compromised. These prescriptive and rigid standards and 
regulations are drivers which corporations are directed or instructed by the national 
oil company to use in the selection of contract strategy. This research confirmed that 
non-compliance with these government standards and regulations could lead to 
withdrawal of licence to operate, withholding of fund and strained relationships with 
the international oil companies. The implications of compliance with these standards 
mostly result in the selection of contract strategies which are not always appropriate 
or optimal. The results are too often delays, cost overruns, and poor quality work. 
 
In the literature review, it was established that the Government/NOC key drivers for 
contracts includes revenue, employment of citizens, sustainable development, local 
content, and environment. It was further established both in the literature and data 
analysis that alignments of these drivers are hardly carried out. Most Government or 
NOC drivers are considered as a given which must be complied with in the selection 
of contracts. There are examples both in literature and data analysis which confirmed 
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that the selection of these drivers mostly lead to suboptimal contracts. Furthermore, 
PMs work with “fear” of being punished for not complying with these drivers hence 
forced to accept the directives of Government or NOC in the formation of contracts 
even when it is very clear that the result of such directives will lead to suboptimal 
contracts. Example, based on the data analysis, it is confirmed that PMs are scared to 
‘say no’ where a contractor is imposed on them.  
 
Other stakeholders also have drivers which are sometimes not taken into 
consideration due to the mandatory compliance of Government or NOC directives. 
To establish an optimal contract, the alignment of all stakeholders’ objectives is 
required. Non alignment of these objectives leads to suboptimal contracts hence 
delays, cost overrun and poor quality work. Whilst the importance of the 
Government / NOC drivers is noted. The drivers of the other stakeholders are also 
very important. Hence the need for PMs to identify the drivers, rank and prioritise 
the drivers and select the most relevant drivers to form the contracts. Anything short 
of this approach will lead to suboptimal contract. There are examples where IOCs 
have pulled out of some countries due to Government or NOC imposing 
unfavourable drivers on the IOCs. Going forward, this type of action by IOC will 
become the norm especially as IOCs become more risk averse coupled with the 
additional risks resulting from the sophisticated advanced technology required to 
drill oil from difficult and complex reservoirs (Casselman, 2011).  
 
Oil and Gas Industry: Organisations typically have a contract formation process – 
one they see as optimal from the organisations point of view. That is the prescriptive 
framework designed to guide/govern project managers’ behaviour. Different 
organisations use different approaches in the formation and selection of contract 
strategy. There is rarely any measurement against established set of attributes. It is 
industry-wide known fact that contracts are generally not optimal. Little is known 
about how PMs utilise this prescriptive framework or the operating contingencies 
that influence project managers interpretation of the prescriptive framework, which is 
surprising given the value of contracts in the oil and gas industry and the potential for 
savings.  
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The existing practice of selecting a ‘technically qualified lowest bid’ contractor is 
proven to be inefficient which results in using suboptimal contracts. This research 
confirms that value for money contractors are the most efficient and delivers cost 
savings hence optimal. It has been established that the selection of value for money 
contractor is a challenge in the current contract environment, but this research 
confirms that the alignment of all stakeholders’ drivers will pave the way for the 
selection of value for money contractors.  
  
Furthermore, the practice of selecting lump sum contract in order to transfer risks to 
contractors is against the basic principles of risks identification and allocation. This 
research confirmed that there are processes, people and tools related issues which 
does not support the identification and allocation of risks. This research also 
confirms that this process, people and tools issues can be addressed by corporations 
through the establishment of Risks Management Strategy. This will provide guidance 
to PMs in the identification, sharing, and allocation of risks to the parties that are best 
placed to manage them.  Therefore, the existing practice where corporations develop 
contract quilt to guide PMs should stop in favour of using the most relevant variables 
in the decision of which contract to select.  
 
Another finding of this research is the confirmation that there are severe shortages of 
experienced workforce in project management and contracts. This research confirms 
that owners’ teams are generally inexperienced while the contractors’ teams may  
also be incompetent. The progressive retirement of experienced engineers is 
confirmed as one of the reasons for these shortages. This exposes PMs to the risks of 
using suboptimal contracts due to lack of experienced guidance. This further 
highlights the need for the industry to set up competence development frameworks in 
Contracts supported by good programmes of on the job and classroom training for 
PMs and engineers. In addition, corporations should invest on recruitment and 
retention of engineers. A coaching and mentoring programme is also recommended 
for young engineers especially those in the graduate scheme to enable them attain 
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their full potential hence a robust succession plan for the retiring workforce 
(Watkins, 2003).  
 
Furthermore, a combination of expert and local contracts personnel should be 
dedicated to supporting PMs in the projects at the project location. The existing 
practice of having contract engineers allocated on part-time and also the use of 
personnel without local knowledge in selecting contracts for projects is not efficient. 
This research confirmed that sound local knowledge is required to establish optimal 
contracts.  
 
Finally, ‘turning points’ are not planned into the existing prescriptive contract 
framework used in contract strategy formation. This research confirmed that in long 
haul projects, a robust plan based on proper scenario analysis to manage “turning 
points” (Wack, 1985b) in the course of execution of the work is required. Therefore, 
scenario analysis is required to establish the robust plan and also build flexibility into 
the project contract execution strategy. 
 
5.4.3 Implications for methodology 
 
This research project has two main areas of interest relevant to its scope, viz. the 
Contract process and Contract types. To achieve the contract strategy formation 
improvement benefit proposed in this research, the contemporary phenomena have to 
be investigated within its real life context. Hence the case research within the realism 
paradigm is the most appropriate option, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomena and context are not clearly evident. The chosen case study design 
framework takes into account the methods used to collect the data to provide more 
perspectives to investigate the phenomena within its real life of oil and gas industry.  
 
Data from various sources were collected from one oil and gas corporation and used 
to establish knowledge about external reality which may not be completely true 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994). The targeted participants (respondents) in this research are 
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in various countries in the world. Therefore, the peculiarity of this case that is 
participants working in one company but in different locations was considered in 
choosing the data gathering techniques and instrument of inquiries. Hence 
Qualitative methods which are able to ‘deploy a wide range’ of interconnected 
interpretive methods were selected for this research.  
 
The instrument used for data collection was designed in the form of a semi - 
structured interview but the administration of the tool was different from the 
traditionally known techniques of face-to-face or telephone interviews. Such 
flexibility is generally seen as acceptable in contemporary research. A mixed but 
flexible strategy of inquiry which takes into account access to the participants, 
convenience of the participants, and most effective option for obtaining the 
information was chosen for this research (Lee, 1999). The use of questionnaires to 
administer semi-structured interviews proved to be very effective because the 
researcher was able to focus on the research questions, the purpose of the research, 
and the information that would most appropriately answer specific research questions 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2008, p. 33), and also reach a large group of participants in 
different countries. 
 
This research is to a large extent exploratory, descriptive, inductive, analytical, 
testing and elaborating of established theory. Qualitative methods provided the 
required level of flexibility in the analysis of the data. Over one hundred pages of 
data were collected. The messy nature of the data and the need to take into account 
the ‘context’ of the data which is based on meanings expressed through words, 
collection which results in non-standardised data requiring classification into 
categories, and analysis conducted through the use of conceptualisation was one of 
the major factors in the selection of qualitative methods. Furthermore, this method 
also allowed the researcher to probe through one-on-one interview any 
misunderstanding in the data to obtain clarity from the respondents. 
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5.5 LIMITATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
 
The main limitations of this research are detailed in chapter 3 (section 3.5 - the 
administration of the instrument for data collection). Measures taken to address the 
limitations where also discussed in chapter 3.  
 
Another limitation is in the generalisation of the findings of this research for the oil 
and gas industry. This research was conducted using data provided by respondents 
from one oil and gas corporation. Though theory may have been built from the 
investigation of the research problem, the main limitation is in the difficulty with 
which the findings can be generalised.  Further empirical research which builds upon 
the findings of this research in another oil and gas corporation will provide the 
evidence to compare and contrast the results of this finding. 
 
Finally, as in all field studies, this research has limitations but every attempt was 
made to overcome these. Therefore, they should not detract from the overall value of 
the research and its findings.  
 
5.6 APPLICABILITY OF THIS RESEARCH TO AN INDUSTRY OTHER 
THAN OIL AND GAS  
Despite the limitations discussed in section 5.5, this research study was completed 
based on the rich quality data that was gathered and analysed to arrive at the 
findings. The researcher notes certain points that are relevant to his experience of 
contracting strategy formation outside of the oil and gas industry. The degree of 
applicability of a research finding to other population or samples is referred to as 
generalisation (Polit & Hungler, 1991; Ryan & Bernard, 2000). Patton (2002) used 
extrapolations instead of generalisation to describe the modest speculations on the 
likely applicability of findings to other situations. Others used words such as 
relatability (Bassey, 1981) or transferability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Denzin 
(1983), Wainwright (1997), Creswell (1998), and Hammersley (1990) support 
Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 110) claim that the only generalisation is ‘there is no 
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generalisation’. The general idea of generalisation is that a rich description of a 
single case or a reduced number of cases, if of good quality, will help practitioners 
see their own cases reflected and judge for themselves what is applicable in their 
own practice (Stake, 1995a, p. 87). Furthermore, since qualitative research is very 
much influenced by the researcher’s individual attributes and perspective (Schofield, 
1993) and also qualitative methods provide vicarious link with the readers to give 
them a sense of ‘being there’ (Stake, 1995b, p. 63). Therefore, it is possible that the 
researcher can speculate (with caution) on the applicability of the findings of this 
research to other heavy engineering industries to illuminate or be suggestive of 
practice elsewhere (Mejia, 2008). 
 
Based on the researcher’s experience, telecommunication and mining industries 
stand out as some of the heavy engineering industries which share characteristics 
with oil and gas industry. The common characteristics are in the aspect of seeking 
new markets/developing infrastructure in new frontier areas and remote locations. 
Both industries depend heavily on technology and its associated risks. Most heavy 
engineering industries rely on contractors to execute work. The capital project phases 
are also in accordance with the stage gate approach.  Though the views expressed 
below on the applicability of this research findings to other non oil and gas industry 
are not tested anywhere in this research. It is with ‘caution’ that the researcher 
explains the potential applicability of the findings to telecommunication industry 
based on his experience.  Here is a summarised account of the researcher’s 
experience below: 
 
Researcher’s example: A global telecommunication company which was exploring 
new markets in one of the countries in Africa lost the opportunity to progress, 
because of the rigid and prescriptive contracting process. The national government 
telecommunication and the UK based telecommunication company setup a local 
company to represent the business. The UK-based Telecommunication Company 
processes were deployed in the running of the local company. The UK-based 
telecommunications company head office had full control over the business from the 
head offices in UK. The processes and methods were very rigid, prescriptive and 
very frustrating for the local partners. The rigid and prescriptive process resulted in 
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the non-alignment of the stakeholders drivers. Furthermore, the UK-based company 
had no local knowledge of the contracting environment that they were moving into. 
The decision of the national government to seek new partners did not come as a 
surprise to most observers including some of the UK-based Telecommunication 
company employees. 
 
Based on the above example, there are many aspects of the results of this research 
that can be speculated on with caution as potentially applicable or transferable to the 
telecommunication industry as follows: (i) the contract strategy formulation process 
is too lengthy and prescriptive hence the delay in establishing contracts for projects; 
(ii) alignment of drivers between contractor and owner is crucial to ensure a common 
goal to deliver the project objectives; (iii) there may be a high risk of selecting a 
suboptimal contract strategy due to national government or Joint Venture directives 
and interferences;  (iv) corporate policy may prescribe drivers for the formation of 
contracts, with a consequent lack of flexibility and non-inclusion of some drivers in 
the contract strategy formation for projects; (v) the basic principles of risk 
allocation/assignment are not complied with in the allocation of risks in a given 
contract; and (vi) project managers are exposed to the risks of suboptimal contracts 
by not having experienced contract professionals in the project team.  
 
Key note: It should be noted that the above generalisation await empirical 
verification. 
 
5.7 DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This research is the first step in the development of a descriptive theory of contract 
formulation in oil and gas industry. Eleven attributes of optimal contract were 
confirmed in the descriptive framework.  These attributes were developed through 
inductive analytical generalisation rather than statistical generalisation. Furthermore, 
this research was conducted in a case study design within the realism paradigm.  As 
discussed in section 5.5, future research could be undertaken to test the theory using 
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surveys and quantitative modelling. Quantitative and qualitative research methods 
are complementary nature. Quantitative methods may suit research which is aimed to 
test the findings of this present research which was conducted using qualitative 
methods. 
 
Furthermore, a replication of this study based on semi-structured face-to-face 
interview (inquiry) qualitative methods in a different oil and Gas Corporation may be 
necessary to confirm the result of this research and to enable generalisation of the 
descriptive theory of contract established in this research.  
 
Another area of future research is on how to design optimal incentive schedules. An 
optimal incentive schedule is one of the attributes of optimal contracts established in 
this research. Payment scheduling and contractor motivation is necessary to 
establishing a good owner-contractor relationship and reduce project cost (Berends & 
Dhillon, 2004). Rose and Manley (2005) also agree that a financial incentive is a 
mechanism to promote and gain contractors commitment to client’s goals (Rose & 
Manley, 2005). In designing financial incentives, it is imperative that it should be 
balanced in such a way that other drivers do not suffer. Incentives that target cost are 
likely to challenge quality. Similarly, incentives that target time risk challenging 
safety, quality, and productivity (Hartman, 2003). There are positive examples of 
projects in which financial incentives have helped the owners to achieve project 
objectives. For example, Heathrow Airport (UK) terminal 5 project will contribute 
immensely to improving contract strategy formation generally through substantiating 
how the financial incentives were designed and applied. Overall, it is proposed that 
future research should investigate how financial incentives can be effectively 
designed and applied as a component of the project contracting strategy. 
 
5.8 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter concludes the study. It presented the conclusions to each of the four 
research issues and contrasted the key findings in chapter 4 with those established in 
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the literature review (chapter 2).  It was established by this research that most 
contracts used in the oil and gas industry are always not appropriate or optimal. This 
research provide a definition of optimal contract as a contract which uses the product 
of consideration of issues such as world markets, current company strategy, skill 
availability, supplier and contractor availability and integrity, environmental and 
local issues to deliver cost reduction in Capital Projects through proper allocation of 
risks. The final theoretical framework of this research establishes a ‘descriptive 
theory’ of contract in the oil and gas industry that reflects the operating environment 
in which the project manager operates. 
 
In conclusion, by establishing a ‘theory’ of contract formulation in the oil and gas 
industry that better reflects the operating environment in which project managers 
operate, this research has made a useful and potentially significant contribution to the 
gap in knowledge of contract formulation in the oil and gas industry, an industry 
which anecdotally suffers from delays, cost overruns, poor quality work.  
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Appendix A: Hot-Button Risks 
 
Number Risks Description 
1 No Damages for 
Delay 
Limit or exclude recovery of damages for owner-caused 
delays 
2 Consequential 
Damages 
(i) For the owner it includes loss of revenue or loss of 
beneficial occupancy resulting from delay.  
(ii) For Contractor – loss of potential business and loss 
of advantageous weather conditions.  
Consequential damage is not limited to damages caused 
by delays. 
3 Indemnity Indemnification (“hold-harmless) clauses attempt to limit 
the liability for the personal injuries of contractor 
employees, owner employees, and third parties. 
4 Ambiguous 
Acceptance Criteria 
Acceptance criteria which includes phrases that specify 
that the work be completed so that it is fit for purpose or 
to the owner’s satisfaction. 
5 New or Unfamiliar 
Technology 
This clause refers to functionality risks of new 
technology which is not currently properly allocated. 
6 Force Majeure “Act of God” clauses. Who takes these risks? Insurance 
company may go insolvent when this risks materialize 
e.g. Hurricane Katrina, etc. 
7 Schedule 
Acceleration 
Limitation on the indirect cost that the contractor is 
allowed when owners mandate acceleration at any time. 
8 Cumulative Impact 
of change orders 
Compensation measures for indirect costs associated with 
resultant loss of productivity for the contractor is not 
documented and agreed in advance. 
9 Owner mandated 
subcontractors 
Allocation of an owner mandated subcontractor’s 
performance should be clearly stated in a contract clause. 
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If owner limits the contractor’s choices of subcontractors, 
then they should take the risks for non-performance of 
the subcontractor. 
10 Insurance 
Allocation 
Contingencies to account for insurance deductibles. Since 
the contractors does not know upfront what the insurance 
deductibles will be. They are not properly estimated in 
the bids. Who takes the risks for under estimation, and 
insolvency of the insurance company? 
11 Differing Site 
Conditions 
Existing site conditions may be different from those on 
the contract documents. Yet owners state in the contract 
that it is the responsibilities of the contractor to verify the 
drawings.  
12 Design 
Responsibility 
Design responsibilities should be given to the party with 
controls over the design and can survive financial 
consequences of an insufficient design.  
13 Waiver of Claims Time limit for the discussions of delay waivers is 
inappropriate. Appropriate allocation of final claims 
should be discussed. 
14 Standard of Care Design professionals are required to perform their duties 
to highest and best industry standards.  
 
Source: This table is a full extract from the work done by CII Research team on Equitable 
Risk Allocation (Construction Industry Institute, 2006). 
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Appendix B: Consent to provide Data for Research 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION FOR QUT 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
 
Structured Contract Strategies for Capital and Operations Expenditure 
Projects in Oil and Gas industry 
QUT Ethics Approval Number 1100000464 
 
RESEARCH TEAM   
Principal 
Researcher: 
Cletus Ikhinmwin, PhD Student, QUT 
Associated 
Researchers: 
Assoc Prof Paul Davidson and Dr Robert Thompson, QUT 
 
DESCRIPTION 
This project is being undertaken as part of PhD research by Cletus Ikhinmwin.   
The main objective of the research is to improve the contracting strategies formation 
process and to provide flexible options tailored to different scenarios in the use of 
any given contract type in the Upstream Oil and Gas Industry. Contract strategy 
formation process covers the activities carried out to outsource a piece of work (to 
design, build/construct, or maintain facilities or assets); and the activities to engage a 
suitable contractor to carry out the work. The key deliverables of the research is to 
provide a solution to support the selection of a cost effective and optimised Contract 
Strategy for Capital Projects.  
 
You are invited to participate in this project because you have the required 
experiences and background which is essential for this research.  
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PARTICIPATION 
Your participation in this project is entirely voluntary. If you do agree to participate, you 
can withdraw from the project at any time without comment or penalty. Your decision to 
participate, or not participate, will in no way impact upon your current or future 
relationship with your employer. Please note that you are not able to withdraw once 
you have submitted the questionnaire. The information provided will be used in 
accordance with the privacy and confidentiality statement below. 
 
Participation will involve completing a 16-item anonymous questionnaire with 
exploratory response which will require you to provide some descriptions in writing. 
You can choose to complete the questionnaire in electronic or paper form. It will take 
approximately 60 minutes of your time. Questions will include (i) describe the 
current contracting formation processes used in your organisation; (ii) What are the 
main issues or problems with the current contract process; (iii) list the most popular 
contract types used in your organisation.  
 
If you agree to participate you do not have to complete any question(s) that you are 
uncomfortable answering. 
EXPECTED BENEFITS 
It is expected that this project will not benefit you directly. However, it will benefit 
the Oil and Gas industry and contribute to the existing body of knowledge.  
RISKS 
There are no risks beyond normal day-to-day living associated with your participation in 
this project. 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
All comments and responses will be treated confidentially.  The names of individual 
persons and their employer/Company are not required in any of the responses.  
The project is funded by CIEAM. The funding body will not have access to the data 
obtained during the project. Access to the original questionnaire submitted by you 
will be restricted to the Researcher and Supervisor. Where you have mistakenly 
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provided your name/personal identity or company name; such information will be 
removed from the data. The email address used by you to submit the questionnaire 
will be deleted.  
 
The information that you provide will be used for this research project only. Please 
note that non-identifiable data collected in this project may be used as comparative 
data in future QUT projects. 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
Due to the nature of the project the return of the completed questionnaire will be taken as 
consent.   
QUESTIONS / FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE PROJECT 
If have any questions or require any further information about the project please contact 
one of the research team members below. 
Mr Cletus Ikhinmwin – PhD student 
Email Cletus.ikhinmwin@student.qut.edu.au 
Phone + 60 128 704 255 
A/Prof Paul Davidson – Supervisor 
Email p.davidson@qut.edu.au 
Phone  +61 7 3138 1248 
Mobile phone  +61 414 641 364 
CONCERNS / COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE CONDUCT OF THE 
PROJECT 
QUT is committed to research integrity and the ethical conduct of research projects.  
However, if you do have any concerns or complaints about the ethical conduct of the 
project you may contact the QUT Research Ethics Unit on +61 7 3138 5123 or email 
ethicscontact@qut.edu.au. The QUT Research Ethics Unit is not connected with the 
research project and can facilitate a resolution to your concern in an impartial manner. 
 
Thank you for helping with this research project.  Please keep this sheet for your 
information. 
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Appendix C: Questionnaire  
 
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane 
PhD Research Project 
 
Research Title: Structured Contract Strategies for Capital 
and Operations Expenditure Projects in Oil and Gas 
industry 
 
 
PhD Research Questionnaire 
 
Section A 
Please complete section A with basic information about you and your 
experience. Please do not include your name or personal identification details: 
1) Job Title: 
2) Work Location: 
3) Specialisation*: 
4) Sex: 
5) Industry Experience (Number of Years only): 
6) Project Management Experience (Number of Years only): 
7) Date this questionnaire was completed: 
 
*this refers to the appropriate categorisation for your present job. Example: Supply Chain 
Management, Project Management, etc 
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Section B 
Please complete all questions in section B. Please do not include your name, 
personal identification details, or company name in your answer: 
 
Q1: Describe the current contracting strategy formation process in your 
organisation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q2: What are the main issues or problems with the current contract process?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q3: List the most popular contract types used under the current contracting 
environment? 
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Q4: What are the reasons for the selection of these popular contracting types?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q5: Does the process for selection of Contract strategy change depending on 
Contracting type selected? 
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Q6: How do you define what a ‘correct’ or ‘optimal’ contract is? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q7: List potential areas in the contracting process that costs could be reduced?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q8: How can cost reduction be achieved in the listed contracting process?  
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Q9: What are the payment structures used for a given contract?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q10: What are the factors taking into considerations in the design of payment 
structure for a given contract?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q11: What are the characteristics of a person, their positions, their assumed 
experience and general background involved in contract strategy formation? 
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Q12: What do you consider adequate qualifications, experience, and 
background for a person to be able to develop a contract strategy? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q13: What tool(s) are used by your company to arrive at a decision for selecting 
appropriate Contracting Strategy? Is this tool adding value to the process? 
Why?  
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Q14: What is your experience in designing and using positive and/or negative 
incentives? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q15: How is contract associated risks identified in a capital project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q16: How is the contract associated risk assigned between contractors and the 
owner  
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Appendix D: Illustrative Quotes/Extract - The Contract Strategy Formation 
Process 
 
Research Issue 1 
Theme 1.1 Contract Strategy Formulation process is too lengthy and 
prescriptive hence the delay in establishing contracts for Projects 
Interview 
Questions Focus 
Area 
The Contract Strategy Formation Process 
Respondent Illustrative Quotes/Extracts from the interview 
CS014 Market Competition does not favour fixed price contracting at this time. 
Inadequate scope development does not favour fixed price contracting. 
Owners, such as Company X, favour fixed price contracting in order to 
transfer the risk and reduce the size and capability of their management 
team. Some contractors that have a project with a well-developed scope 
and the likelihood of few changes prefer fixed priced contracts in order 
to make more profit. 
CS029 The following risks should be addressed and evaluated during the pre-
award phase: Is my scope clear and have I invested time to come with 
clear scope of work? 
CS014 The advantage of the reimbursable contract is that you can work with 
poorly defined scope and excessive changes without being involved in 
claims.  Company X also has all the control tools to properly manage a 
project if it is a reimbursable contract.  Company X will develop 
engineers that better manage a project, since they will now be involved 
in problems that were often considered to be the contractor’s 
responsibility on lump sum contracts.  Company X will be able to obtain 
the best EPC contractors since they do not need to do fixed price work 
and are only looking for reimbursable projects at this time.  Company X 
can develop alliance contractual arrangements that benefit both parties 
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for long periods of time. 
CS015 If there are severe time constraints for the project and the time required 
to tender the work is not available. The effort by Company X in controls 
is about the same. 
CS009 Contract and Procurement (C&P) strategy development: unclear scope, 
more a tick in the box exercise rather than a fit for purpose solution. 
CS002 12 rounds of pre-qualifications were required consisting of in excess of 
200 clarifications.  Technical Clarification meetings are discouraged – I 
would advise to undertake such meetings so that clarifications can be 
resolved more expediently. 
CS034 Inefficient decision making within Company X (e.g. allowing too many 
changes in projects, taking too long to arrive at firm conclusions) 
CS025 The current contracting process includes (a) establish scopes and spend 
(b) develop strategy (c) develop tender package (d) tender (e) evaluate 
and award. Main issues are scopes not fully defined, insufficient tender 
information, lengthy tendering process, scopes are not fully understood, 
rigid tender board requirement, wrong strategy, lack of good cost 
estimate, contract document poorly prepared and etc. 
CS028 This stretches from pre-DG-3 to FID and execution, with the most 
intense periods being during concept selection and contract strategy 
development. Once the contract strategy is approved, a contract tactics 
workshop will follow to establish the most effective tactics for realizing 
the objectives of the contract strategy. 
CS028 Main issues are: time between strategy development and award is 
variable but is typically 2 to 4 years, by which time market conditions 
and the operating environment would have changed significantly. Other 
issues include: JV funding challenges; late concept and design changes; 
JV directives on contract strategy which sometimes ignores serious risks 
or unrealistically transfers these risks to contractors; and unrealistic 
schedule promises decoupled from volatilities in the operating 
environment. 
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CS008 I am of the opinion that as with design, it is very important that as much 
effort is put into early contract strategy and planning as soon as is 
possible. In this way, hopefully, there are no last minute “surprises” 
when for example a contractor fails to deliver later on. 
CS004 Main advantage is the fact that pre-qualification should prove that the 
Contractor is capable to do the work in the first place. 
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Appendix E: Illustrative Quotes/Extract - The Contract Selection Criteria 
 
Research Issue 1 
Theme 1.2 The Selection of Value for Money Contractor is the most practical 
option to reduce the cost of projects through contracts 
Interview 
Questions Focus 
Area 
The Contract Selection Criteria 
Respondent Illustrative Quotes/Extracts from the email interview 
CS025 The main drivers are to deliver the business safely, timely and within 
budget (value for money) with no claims and variations. 
CS020 High pressure from project developers and financers to go for lowest 
price, but project manager would prefer best value for money bid. He 
generally loses …  
CS024 Lowest bidder is not always cheap in a lifecycle cost when quality of 
contract management and HSE is a concern. It is always costly to have 
cheap contract initially but a lot of resources will be required to manage 
them during execution of contract. 
CS025 In most cases, the lowest bidder will be selected. Vendor always bids 
low in order to secure a contract. Problems start to develop during 
contract’s execution e.g. lack of competent personnel, inadequate 
tools/equipment and contractor’s staff complained about low salary. 
CS026 Lowest bidder usually means there will be problems; they either don’t 
have the resources to get the job done well, or they won’t go above and 
beyond to finish a job that might not be very profitable.  In all bid 
evaluations, it is paramount to evaluate based on total cost of ownership 
(TCO).  Value for money bidder may seem expensive at first glance, but 
the TCO will throw lights to the lifecycle cost. 
CS027 Value for money bidder should be the most preferred option any time. 
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CS027 JV partner directives also introduce stringent conditions for deviating 
from the lowest bidder approach, and therefore placing a huge burden of 
proof on the operator advocating this deviation 
CS029 The lowest bidder is based purely on the value of the commercial 
proposal.  Value for money bidder means that the money you pay to the 
contractor commensurate to the Technical merits and quality of work 
being delivered.  
CS029 The best value for money contract is the one that emerged from the 
competitive bidding.  
CS030 The comments validity depends on the project, a small, simple short 
project that is a say repeat project could easily go to the lowest bidder.  
However as projects become larger and more complex it is important 
that the bidder has fully understood the work scope and often the lowest 
bidder may end up being more expensive. 
CS031 Interesting. One should clarify why a bidder appear to be the lowest.  
The bid should be analysed to ensure the bidders full understanding of 
the tender requirement.  Very often these bidders turn out to the not-so-
lowest-cost contractors as they generally intentionally excludes a few 
scopes 
CS036 Lowest bidders: cut corners/quality of work, look for every possible 
change.  
CS036 Value for money bidder: more control, more transparent, better quality 
of work 
CS007 The joy of a discount will be long gone over the joy of quality. Always 
be careful with this, is it quantity or quality you’re after. It also depends 
on what the contract contains. Is it aggregate or a Frame 9 compressor 
who will determine the reliability of the project! 
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CS013 There is always a risk in going forward with the lowest bidder. Is his 
price low, because he did not fully understand the scope of work? He 
may even have priced the scope of work incorrectly (in this case too 
low) as he is inexperienced with the type of project. Or is he coming in 
low, just to win the job, and then later on recover his costs via an 
aggressive claims approach? Other bidders may have set their prices 
high, because their work portfolio is over loaded and they are reluctant 
in declining to bid straight away. Evaluating a bid, determining the right 
price, is therefore not an easy task. 
CS001 You tend to get what you pay for.  There is some research that shows 
that the actual final cost of the project tends to be toward the middle of 
the spread of bids, so awarding the contract to the low bidder does not 
necessarily mean you will end up with the lowest price. 
CS018 Company X: 1) Many delays and a fire during the start-up caused by a 
Novelty process design. 2) Explosion of the O2 unit after about two 
years of operation, caused by relying on third party technology. XXXX 
base project: CW piping corrosion, wrong water treatment program. CRI 
Catalyst plant of Country G: small delay and small cost overrun, caused 
by an incompetent contractor. The selection was imposed by 
management from the US. XXX plant in Country A: A very special 
membrane filtration unit failed twice, because of a cheaper supplier than 
a proven one (thus a Novelty issue).    
CS030 Reimbursable contracts in an alliance relationship where the main issue 
was scope growth/ scope creep ie costs increased through multiple small 
changes rather than big scope changes.  Changes always appear to be 
warranted and hard to control. 
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Appendix F: Illustrative Quotes/Extract - Project Objective – Alignment of 
project goals    
 
Research Issue 2 
Theme 2.1 The alignment of drivers between contractor and owner is crucial to 
ensure a common goal to deliver the project objectives 
Interview 
Questions Focus 
Area 
Project Objective – Alignment of project goals 
Respondent Illustrative Quotes/Extracts from the email interview 
CS010 It is the chance to develop different solutions (technical and process) 
which can be compared to come to the best solution for the 
Stakeholder(s). Sometimes there are different process methods with 
licenses owned by different companies.  
CS015 Ensuring the deliverables are compatible with the capability and 
objective of the contractor – any mismatch can lead to friction which will 
then detract from the completion of the work. These differences could be 
about continuity of personnel, profit expectations, risk allocation, extent 
to which sub-contractors will be used, etc. This approach will probably 
not result in the lowest absolute contract cost to Company X but should 
achieve the overall project outcome better. 
CS005 Previous work record looked in at pre-qualification/technical evaluation 
phase. · Or this can be done by surveying the companies, market 
intelligence and risk workshops.  
CS020 HSE-culture: we should have audited the selected EPC contractor 
upfront: the HSE-culture difference between this civil contractor and the 
Company X oil & gas standards would have been obvious, but only 
became clear now during the project. 
CS024 Although every effort is being made to the contractor on the main 
objectives of projects during tender briefing etc., it is always very 
difficult to forget that contractor has a different objective i.e. making as 
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much profit from the contract.  This is normally the case when there 
wasn’t enough knowledge about the contractor or there was no plan for 
the contractor to have a longer term presence or commitment to work for 
the company. 
CS009 Negotiation and award: the team who will delivered are not (sufficiently) 
involved, no ownership, contract perceived as a mean rather than a 
vehicle, attitude that ambiguity can be opportunistic, done in isolation. 
CS009 Contract execution: cultural differences around contract binding 
obligations (once signed, negotiations can start!), no trust and 
professionalism, different agendas, courage, misunderstanding the 
contract, incompatible (leading) personalities, different values and 
norms, poor steering committees, not fencing disagreements form the 
day-today management of challenges and issues, unclear appropriate 
team management, no project leadership empowerment/mandate. 
CS020 All-inclusive EPC contract, which led to very little control over and 
influence on the works. The contractor chose (obviously) for the 
cheapest suppliers and equipment, meeting the specs but often not our 
expectations. For example we often suggested hiring higher capacity 
installation equipment with lower weather downtime, but the contractor 
consequently went for the cheapest equipment he could get. 
CS030 I believe that in all cases “trust” and “strategic fit” will be the underlying 
forces of the success of strategy as this one (in reference to optimal 
Contract Strategy).     
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Appendix G: Illustrative Quotes/Extract - Project Objective – Alignment of 
project goals    
 
  
Research Issue 2 
Theme 2.2 the risk of selecting a suboptimal contracting strategy is very high 
due to National Oil Company or Joint Venture directives and 
interferences 
Interview 
Questions Focus 
Area 
Impact of NOC and JV Directives on Contract Formulation 
Respondent Illustrative Quotes/Extracts from the email interview 
CS010 Some schedules are dictated by politics or client desire and not based on 
a realistic schedule. Final Investment Decision (FID) dates are moved, 
strategies changed, scopes changed but RFSU dates are not moved 
accordingly.  
CS002 Some stakeholders challenge our costs as not fit for purpose, yet we are 
directed this route via the business objective of satisfying the Owner’s 
(NOC) aspirations for technology and capability transfer  
CS017 From contract point of view, change of works that have an impact on the 
commercial or contractual obligation could be considered as challenging. 
For Company X, if this occurs, a Change To Contract paper has to be 
raised and presented to a number of Committees, including NATIONAL 
OIL COMPANY (NOC) for final approval. In these sittings, Company X 
will have to provide strong justifications on the request, especially if it is 
a retroactive one. Upon completion of the presentations, Company X will 
have to wait for final NOC approval, which does not have any specific 
time frame for the authority to do so. 
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CS017 Causes: 1) shortage in the market place, 2) legal aspects and competitive 
laws 3) new/unfamiliar  contractors to Company X standards/processes, 
4) prevent to find ourselves with no competition during EPC tendering, 
5) not defining real contractor costs and measurable parameters/not close 
monitoring.  
CS026 Cost Reimbursable with Incentives - Company X bears most risks and 
pays for all mistakes contractor made.   Budget and schedule overrun 
anticipated.  Incentive is not attractive enough to motivate the contractor 
to perform.   
CS02 Main issues are: time between strategy development and award is 
variable but is typically 2 to 4 years, by which time market conditions 
and the operating environment would have changed significantly. Other 
issues include: JV funding challenges; late concept and design changes; 
JV directives on contract strategy which sometimes ignores serious risks 
or unrealistically transfers these risks to contractors; and unrealistic 
schedule promises decoupled from volatilities in the operating 
environment. 
CS017 Based on NATIONAL OIL COMPANY (NOC) Procedure, Pre-
qualifying of bidders via a certain set of criteria prior to tender is not 
allowed.  
CS002 Contract Strategies have remained the same for the last 3 years.  These 
are typically aligned with the Owner’s (NOC) aspirations for technology 
and capability transfer 
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Appendix H: Illustrative Quotes/Extract - Corporate policy prescribe drivers 
for formation of contracts  
 
Research Issue 2 
Theme 2.3 corporate policy prescribes drivers for the formation of contracts 
hence lack of flexibility and non-inclusion of some drivers in the 
contract strategy formation for projects 
Interview 
Questions Focus 
Area 
Corporate policy prescribe drivers for formation of contracts 
Respondent Illustrative Quotes/Extracts from the email interview 
CS013 In the current market, EPC contractors have high workloads and as such 
are not always interested to execute a project. Especially if they have not 
been involved during the definition phases, they are reluctant to bid on a 
project, assuming they are at a disadvantage to the FEED contractor. 
This makes competitive bidding on a Project Specification very difficult. 
In order to ensure more than one party is bidding for the project, a 
“design competition” can be considered. Two contractors develop a 
Project Specification and in addition submit a bid for the project.  
CS018 Avoidance of cost overrun, therefore the Lump sum preference. No 
experience with reimbursable contracts, which requires quantity 
surveyors. Hardly experience with Cost plus contracts  
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CS031 The pre-qualification process is probably as clear as mud to most 
contractors.  Elements included in the pre-qualification are usually not 
defined properly.  Process is also not clearly routed.  The pre-
qualification process generally should go to the Supply Chain 
Department that will inform the Work Category Custodian who then 
will pass the documents to the technical and financial department for 
approval.  Very often contractors approach the contract holder straight 
on in the bid to shortcut the process.  Contractors sometime directly 
speak to higher management of the intent 
CS024 Over ambitious schedule / planning; Lacks of knowledge in Risks 
Management; Wrong strategy for contracting; Lacks of skilled 
resources/people; Competing with each other for same external 
resources; Lacks of stakeholder management with contractors; Lacks of 
project management skills; Too rigid procedure to maximize contractor 
potential in realizing projects; Lacks of good/effective incentive scheme; 
Lacks of skilled contractors.   
CS010 In my opinion the conjunction between Project Governance Process and 
Procurement Process has to be improved.  
CS036 Main problems encountered in project development:1) find a qualified 
contractors to do Definition of the project,2) lengthy process for 
signature of secrecy agreement  3) More resources for 
verification/approval of the work, 4) dual contracts for development, 5) 
cost overrun. Causes: 1) shortage in the market place, 2) legal aspects 
and competitive laws 3) new/unfamiliar  contractors to Company X 
standards/processes, 4) prevent to find ourselves with no competition 
during EPC tendering, 5) not defining real contractor costs and 
measurable parameters/not close monitoring. 
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CS014 I cannot respond for Company X, but in general, the scope is not well-
developed when the project is undertaken.  There are numerous changes 
that increase the cost and lengthen the schedule.  Jobs are accelerated 
with little chance to recover schedule, but costs are excessive.  Risks 
that were not identified impacts costs and schedules.  Competition for 
management, engineering and labour resources is causing significant 
cost and schedule pressures.  Material cost increases and delivery delays 
are impacting jobs.  Company X is constructing projects in hostile 
environments with little, if any, infrastructure.  
CS041 Return to the practice where the professional Contacts Manager or 
Engineer assigned to the Project, guides the Project Manager through the 
process and drives the technical folk to pursue and complete key pieces 
of work and activity to the required standard. Expecting a range of 
different participants to follow processes such as the Contractor 
Selection and Management Process just isn’t working.  
CS015 Significant effort is required to get this right. We must not be scared to 
say ‘no’ to a contractor if we have good reason.   
CS023 Can and is very much dependent on the Projects Capex Cost, Type, 
Complexity and the Business sector. Typically Upstream use 
reimbursable (with Target Incentive Schemes), Gas & Power LNG 
Projects (Lump Sums), Downstream Large Projects (Lump Sums), 
Smaller <$USD 20 Reimbursable with Incentives or Site Alliance 
Target Cost contracts     
CS030 EPC for large projects e.g. LNG construction, reimbursable for smaller 
less defined contracts. 
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Appendix I: Illustrative Quotes/Extract - Reimbursable Contracts vs Lump 
Sum contracts  
 
Research Issue 2 
Theme 2.4 Reimbursable contracts produce better quality work at lower cost 
than lump sum contracts but companies prefer lump sum contracts. 
Interview 
Questions Focus 
Area 
Reimbursable Contracts vs Lump Sum contracts 
Respondent Illustrative Quotes/Extracts from the email interview 
CS010 I have currently no experience. The problem is that even if you have a 
reimbursable contract claim management will be necessary.  
CS023 Company X has a Project Risk Management Process to capture, (take, 
treat, terminate) and review project wide risks. In terms of Contractor 
taking risks in Capital Projects these are assessed and incorporating into 
Capital Estimates, as Risk premia. In terms of a system/or process used 
to show the Capacity for Contractors to take these risks and how or if 
this assessed during pre-award – not aware.    
CS041 1) Little or no risk to the bidding Contractors so pricing will be keener 
reflecting the lower risk 2) Contract planning and award cycles can be 
shortened vs a lump sum (LS) arrangements 
CS006 More detailed cost and other project information is available. This 
enables you to spot problems in a project sooner. The (cost) information 
gained from the project will help improving future projects as well. This 
type potentially leads to fewer disputes. 
CS007 Reimbursable contracts might have high quality. As the contractor gets 
paid for every item he purchased/man-hour spent. On LS contractors the 
owner does not have audit rights on the contractors cost. You cannot see 
where the money went to, shortcuts could be taken, cost savings 
possibly jeopardizing the project quality. 
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CS008 The disadvantage to Company X is that the lump sum contract allows 
many of the cost risks associated with the Project to be “passed on” to 
the contractor. This means that in terms of the likely project cost, the 
reimbursable will be cheaper of the two – namely the contractor will not 
load his bid with risk premiums and from Company Xs portfolio 
management viewpoint  Company X will have a “ring fenced”  project 
cost 
CS009 Ability to manage and implement changes (e.g. schedule driven 
projects) at less risks when adequate considerations are given in the 
formation of the owners’ team. Higher level of capability and 
experience development of the owner, which might be very useful if 
project scope has to be “duplicated” for multiple internal clients and 
could for sub-sequent projects be converted to Lump Sum (LS). 
CS036 Lump sum contracts are excessively expensive nowadays (transfer of 
risks to contractors and pay for it) and the quality of work may suffer as 
contractors will try to fit the work, these contracts are not transparent 
and not flexible to changes. Reimbursable contracts give more insights 
on the work done and more control. Where new technology is involved 
it is more cost effective to make changes under reimbursable contract. 
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Appendix J: Illustrative Quotes/Extract - Non Compliance with principles of 
Risks allocation  
 
Research Issue 3 
Theme 3.1 The basic principles of risks allocation/assignment are not complied 
with in the allocation of risks in a given Contract. 
Interview 
Questions Focus 
Area 
Non Compliance with principles of Risks allocation 
Respondent Illustrative Quotes/Extracts from the email interview 
CS020 Market conditions: in the overstressed wind turbine and contracting 
market, we are being forced from the preferred EPC contracts towards 
multi-contracting. Company X always prefers EPC (I): more expensive 
but least risk. 
CS008 There are many drivers which in many ways “dictate” the best contract 
strategy for any particular project, Clearly cost control and schedule 
management are significant, but so too is knowledge about the location, 
labour, technology etc., these issues relate to the project “risks” and the 
contract strategy to some extent is shaped by how much of the risk we 
wish to either “carry ourselves” or indeed pass on to the contractor(s). 
CS009 For the projects I have worked on, the main driver has always been to 
explore the strategy, which delivers the right (for all parties) risk 
distribution as that will heavily constitute one of the major incentives to 
project success. I realize that this is easier said than done since the 
commercial environment, drivers and company’s strategies (dictating the 
appetite) might not always be in line with the above.  
CS023 Indirectly, Project Risk Management Process and Register should 
capture and assign Project Risks between Company X and Contractors  
CS020 Risks should be allocated to the party that can best manage these risks. 
However, civil contractors will in the future no longer be prepared to 
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accept for example risk of weather downtime or increasing steel prices. 
CS028 Are risks identified and allocated to the right party? Not in about 60% of 
the cases! 
CS029 As long the risk allocation is part of the contact, then no problem. Yes 
CS030 I am not aware especially as main experience has been reimbursable 
contracts where the client deliberately takes the risks to give a lower 
overall cost. 
CS004 This depends on how well the scope can be defined, how big the risk is 
and whether Company X/Shareholder is willing to ‘buy off’ this risk. 
CS001 The basic principle is that risk should be allocated to the party best able 
to handle the risk.  When the market forces favoured the Owner, I saw 
too many contracts where the Owner shifted any risk they did not want 
to the Contractor, with no regard to either party’s ability to handle the 
risk.  This has led to a number of huge claims, some projects 
experiencing extreme cost and schedule overruns, and some contractors 
going out of business. 
CS012 Depends on the risk tolerance level of both parties and who best can 
handle the risk. Yes – Risk assessment and management process  
CS001 It depends.  Some parties manage risk realistically, and some “hope” that 
the risk doesn’t occur. 
CS024 Company X is not the best company to identify and manage project 
construction risks. Managing uncertainties / risks skills have to be 
upgraded in Company X contract managers as it involves huge potential 
saving when it is done correctly. Company X only make reference to 
contractors past (on paper) experiences during pre-qualifications or 
tendering. There should be an exercise to interview contractor past 
clients and make as much due diligent to the contractor. This includes 
detailed analysis of financial standing of the potential contractors 
through interview with Banks and financial institutions.  
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CS041 Financial robustness, a Company estimates that covers probability (P) 
P10, P50, P90 so that the amount of risk that a Contractor is pricing in 
can be assessed, a good risk management system and attitude to risk 
management established during technical evaluation, reviewing the past 
history through other Client references  
CS003 Very basic and not well structured! Risk registers are developed and 
maintained on major projects. 
CS001 … I think generally project risk management is not done thoroughly 
enough. 
CS009 Assuming that risk transfer has been allocated properly and that the 
Contract and Procurement (C&P) strategy developed for this specific 
project has identified the “best“ parties position (ability and willingness 
related to people, processes and tools) to take the different risks either at 
venture or at project level. 
CS011 In the current market situation all risk (even if they don’t occur) will be 
priced and paid for by Company X 
CS001 Insufficient scope definition, insufficient risk identification and 
assessment, poor change management, and too much reliance on “hope” 
rather than reality. 
CS034 In a number of cases, one or more of the following: 
-  inadequate front-end development (e.g. inadequate risk analysis / 
proactive measures) 
-  inefficient decision making within Company X (e.g. allowing too 
many changes in projects, taking too long to arrive at firm conclusions) 
CS027 My exposure has been largely limited to Lump Sum contracts from 
clients (since I worked for EPC org.) and from EPC organization to 
contractors generally on Unit Rates basis. The L/S contractors tend to be 
conservative and price for all foreseeable risks. However, if the 
situations / risks during actual execution go beyond range, Lump Sum 
contracts start losing money and do not get compensated by customers. 
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Appendix K: Illustrative Quotes/Extract - Local Knowledge and Contract 
Formulation; and Incomplete team capabilities   
 
Research Issue 4 
Theme 4.1 Personnel responsible for making contract strategy decisions should 
have sound local experience which includes good knowledge of the 
local market and local stakeholders 
Theme 4.2 Project Managers feels exposed to the Risks of suboptimal contracts 
by not having experienced Contract professionals in the Project 
team. 
Interview 
Questions Focus 
Area 
Local Knowledge and Contract Formulation 
Incomplete team capabilities 
Respondent Illustrative Quotes/Extracts from the email interview 
CS036 Cost effectiveness, quality of work, reflection of the market at the project 
location, capability of the contractor, local content, project risks (with 
input from expert). 
CS005 Project definition at contract award, Level of technology involved, 
Market analysis, Regional factors and local content requirements, 
Requirements of stakeholders (government, partners in joint venture 
etc.). 
CS024 Interview with the potential contractor management are seldom made to 
ensure the contract will be managed by competent personnel. 
CS030 Main challenge was a frontier location with no existing contractors with 
experience to meet the requirements.  Therefore it was new territory for 
not just Company X but also the contractors and this was not considered 
when an aggressive cost and schedule was awarded under lump sum. 
CS009 Contract execution: cultural differences around contract binding 
obligations (once signed, negotiations can start!), no trust and 
professionalism, different agendas, courage, misunderstanding the 
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contract, incompatible (leading) personalities, different values and 
norms, poor steering committees, not fencing disagreements form the 
day-today management of challenges and issues, unclear appropriate 
team management, no project leadership empowerment/mandate. 
CS008: None- However I would like to make a general comment on this 
questionnaire and of the course material to date (up to 3b)- For people 
like myself who have worked for Company X for 33 years (but who have 
not directly been involved in contracts) it is likely that we lack the 
“personal experiences” on which the course seems to rely. I would like 
further reading/ materials / books etc to allow me to get up to speed prior 
to the commencement of the course 
CS032 Major problems are:  
·          lack of Company X /Contractor good relationship 
·         lack of thorough contractor assessment 
·         lack of detailed planning 
·         lack of robust flexible contracting strategies 
·         lack of experienced personnel for location of project. 
 
 
